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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
The purpose of this study is to analyze the foreign policy of a weak state,
the Philippines, in Southeast Asia from 1972 to 1981. While the focus of this study
is on the Philippines’ authoritarian regime and its foreign policy toward the United
States and ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations), this study also
deals more generally with the broader question of foreign policy change of
weak/small states towards great/super powers.
Since the 1950s, many independent states in the Third World have tried to
break their dependent relationships with former colonial or dominant powers and
diversify their foreign relations. The Philippines has followed this trend. The
Philippines’ foreign policy through the 1960s was characterized by a special
relationship with the U.S. During the mid-1970s, the diversification of the
Philippines’ foreign policy involved three major changes: (1) a reassessment of the
dependent/special relations with the U.S., (2) a diversification of its diplomatic and
trade relations to include the Socialist bloc, and (3) a closer identification with its
regional neighbors (ASEAN) and the Third World.1
The major focus of the new foreign policy was to seek new partners while
emphasizing close relations with Asian neighbors and other Third World countries.
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Thus, the Philippines was to become less dependent upon its special relations with
the U.S. and diversify its foreign relations as it pursued its own national interest.
This shift can be seen especially during the mid-1970s and proved to be one of the
most interesting aspects of change in the Philippines foreign policy.2
Significance of the Study
This study is distinctive in that it attempts to explain Philippines foreign
policy both in terms of external variables (i.e., the policy of the United States) and
internal or domestic variables (i.e., the impact of the authoritarian Marcos regime).
In other words, this study links analytically that which is inseparable in reality,
domestic and international politics. This linkage approach, though relatively
common in studies of powerful states, is less often applied to foreign policy studies
of weak/small states, and to my knowledge, has not been done with regard to the
Philippines. This study should contribute to a better understanding of the foreign
policies of weak/small developing states in general, especially with respect to the
strong or great powers. In particular, this study may contribute to an evaluation of
the argument that small states have considerable difficulty in shifting their foreign
policy orientation away from their former colonial masters or dominant powers.
And, finally, this study delineates the linkage argument that external variables may
be more influential on the foreign policy changes of a small state when they
interact with internal variables.
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In general, systematic analyses of weak/small states’ foreign policy change
are few in number with regard to the Philippines and Southeast Asian countries.
Regarding some analyses of Philippines foreign policies that are available in
English, they have usually been unsystematic, descriptive or ideologically biased.
Their analyses are often based on their personal orientation or experience, which
resulted in no significant contribution to foreign policy studies. For Example,
Pomeroy focused on Marxist-oriented perspective based on his own experience of
anti-government struggle. He saw the Philippines foreign policy as “Neo
Colonialist.” On the other hand, others like Pringle, Ingles, and Meyer, used no
theoretical framework in their analyses. They merely described foreign policy
outcomes. Nevertheless, they provided some helpful insight about the Philippines.3
A prominent Southeast Asian specialist, Leifer earlier recognized the general
problem of this kind of research was that “the states of Southeast Asia either
individually or collectively have not attracted the attention of authors concerned
specifically with testing theoretical propositions about foreign policy.”4
The time period of this study includes the martial law era of 1972-1981.
This period was chosen because it was unique and critical in the history of
Philippines foreign policy. It was unique in the sense that for the first time in
Philippines history martial law was introduced and decision-making processes were
altered. It was critical in Philippines history in the sense that during this period the
War in the Indochina peninsula ended and the United States withdrew its military
forces from Vietnam in 1975. Thus, the region and the Philippines faced an
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uncertain future about their security. And domestically, for the first time since
1946, the prominent Philippines democracy was broken down by the authoritarian
leadership in 1972. Although foreign policy change in the Philippines had been
sought earlier than 1972, these two international and domestic events had a great
impact on the making and implementation of Philippines foreign policy. In addition
to these, significant changes that have happened since 1981 were actually initiated
and planned during this period of martial law. For example, the lease term of U.S.
military bases in the Philippines, which was scheduled to expire in 1992, was
already being considered and negotiated during this period. Martial law represented
a typical characteristic of authoritarian rule. Also, some past history, such as the
U.S. initial contact with the country, the introduction of military and economic
agreements, and Philippines governments before 1972, will be briefly included
because it is particularly relevant to this study as background.
In the meantime, there are some limitations in this study. First, it was
difficult to gain access to some primary sources, especially those written in the
Philippines native language and classified governmental documents regarding
foreign policy toward the U.S., ASEAN, the Socialist bloc, and other nations.
Second, this study does not resolve the contentious issue of whether the internal or
external variable is the determining one in affecting the Philippines’ foreign policy
change. In other words, the data do not provide conclusive evidence regarding
whether domestic environment or external environment may have more weight in
explaining foreign policy change of a weak state. However, the study explored the
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way these factors may have been related to foreign policy change, and showed the
both did apparently have an impact.
The Level of Analysis
There are three basic levels of the analysis of foreign policy in the Third
World. The first is the “great man” theory of history. This approach reduces all
political and social phenomena to the man at the top. The second level of analysis
is that of society and its dynamics, which takes into account the role and impact of
other groups and alliances on decision-making. The third level deals with the
impact of the global system on weak states and penetrated societies.5
In the study of Third World foreign policy, the conventional view was that
the political leader tends to dominate the foreign policy decision-making process.
Many recent studies have rejected the earlier conventional view. They argue that
Third World foreign policies should be seen as being produced by domestic and
international pressures. As Korany and others argue, in modern states foreign
policy making is rooted in the domestic and international environment.6 Hagan
points out that “even where foreign policy making is dominated by a single leader,
that leader should be seen as coping with pressing international and domestic
problems.”7
On the other hand, concerning the theoretical linkage of domestic politics to
foreign policy, foreign policy decision-making is intrinsically political. This means
that government leaders and decision-makers use domestic political conditions and
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incorporate them into their foreign policy calculations.8 In most Third World
countries, retaining political power has been the most important imperative. One of
the goals for those foreign policy makers has been to enhance the political support
base necessary for holding on to political power. Thus, political leaders have
involved foreign policy with their need to maximize domestic political support for
their regime. Political leaders have adjusted foreign policy to make it more
effective with those domestic realities. These arguments can be found in the works
of Russett, Levy, and James.9
Weak states have often been penetrated by their external environment.
Hanrieder has discussed and proposed some ways wherein external and internal
dimensions may relate to each other.’° In order to correlate the external and
internal dimensions of foreign policy, he used two important concepts: first,
“compatibility,” which is “to assess the degree of feasibility of various foreign
policy goals, given the strictures and opportunities of the international system”;
second, “consensus,” which “assesses the measure of agreement on the ends and
means of foreign policy on the domestic political scene.” Criticizing Rosenau’s
concept of “penetrated system” and applying the two concepts of compatibility and
consensus, Hanrieder redefined the concept of a penetrated system: a political
system is penetrated (1) “if its decision-making process regarding the allocation of
values or the mobilization of support on behalf of its goal is strongly affected by
external events,” and (2) “if it can command wide consensus among the relevant
elements of the decision-making process in accommodating to these events.” Then
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he argues that foreign policy is made in response to domestic impulses and
international restraints.
Holsti also noted the importance of the relationship between external and
internal dimensions in the study of foreign policy. He insisted that a nation’s
foreign policy orientation is rarely exposed in any one decision, but results from a
series of combined decisions and conditions of the internal and external
environments.’1
This study attempts to apply a linkage analysis of both dimensions,
connecting the external and internal variables. In other words, by examining U.S.
foreign policy behavior and the influence of a domestic authoritarian regime in
foreign policy decision-making, the study will try to explain the causes of foreign
policy change in a penetrated weak state, the Philippines.
The Concept of Foreign Policy
The term “foreign policy” is often used ambiguously. However, there seems
to be a general agreement among scholars that foreign policy is a complex
phenomenon resulting from various forces rather than a decision made solely by
top national leadership)1 However, Hermann raises some critical questions in his
comparative work on foreign policy definitions:
1. Who are the foreign poiicy actors? Are they constitutionally designated
authorities, the national community, the decisionmakers or somebody else?
Can others than the constituted officials, for example, elites, interest
groups, etc., be actors in foreign policy?
2. What occasions foreign policy? Is it the fulfillment of a previous
commitment, an input from the external system, the perception of
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decisionmakers of something that may or may not exist, or the
achievement of national goals?
3. What is the unit of analysis? Is it an output of the system, an undertaking
or a course of action together with rules for action?
4. Who is to be affected by foreign policy? Can it be foreign states, other
sectors of foreign societies, the international environment, a problem or
situation, or the community initiating the policy?
5. Is foreign policy more than an intended effect? Is foreign policy the effort
to deal with selected recipients or the actual results, both intended and
unintended, that follow from action?13
In political science-oriented literature, foreign policy is often discussed in
terms of input-output analysis.’4 In his analysis, Modelski proposed a foreign
policy theory emphasizing input-output flow and a complexity of feedback.’5 His
theory is based on the notion of a process of adjustment to the external
environment using the main variables of power input, power output, interests, and
objectives. Brecher et al. applied a system of action to provide a research
framework, saying that the foreign policy system comprises an environment or
setting of a group of actors, structures through which these initiate decisions and
respond to challenges, and processes which sustain or alter the flow of demand as
a whole.’6
Snyder et al. have emphasized the conversion process of input-output
analysis applying the decision-making theory to foreign policy.’7 They argue that
certain forces which significantly influence decision-making should be emphasized
in understanding the action-reaction pattern among states. They argue that
interaction and relationships among states can be explained by the decision-makers’
perceptions and definition of the situation. However, decision-making theories
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often are criticized for their lack of generalizability based mostly on the American
political experience and for a lack of interrelation among the input variables.’8 In
spite of this criticism, decision-making theories contributed to “the importance of
linking inputs with outputs and of searching out the motives which underlie policy
choice.”19
In fact, as Cohen and Harris pointed out, one of the major underdeveloped
areas in the study of foreign policy has been in the output system itself.2° Thus,
foreign policy in this study will emphasize the output which is the foreign policy
change of the Philippines from a special relationship with the U.S. to closer
relations with ASEAN nations, the Third World, and the Socialist bloc.
On the other hand, as Meehan and Rosenau pointed out, the concept of
foreign policy needs to be distinguished because the term itself can often be
ambiguous and criticized.2’ Meehan argues that it is needed to develop an
adequate and systematic meaning for the term of foreign policy. The relation
between policy, purpose, and action is seldom examined systematically or even
explained.22 Rosenau, from a similar point of view, proposed three kinds of
foreign policy concepts, including a cluster of orientations, a set of commitments
to and plans for action, and a form of behavior. The first concept of foreign policy
includes attitudes, perceptions, and values that derive from the historical
experiences and strategic environments which place a state in a position in
international relations. The second concept refers to strategies and decisions which
consist of means and goals created by opportunities and challenges outside the
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state. The third concept refers to the specific steps that policy-makers of a state
take regarding international events and situations.23
These foreign policy conceptions are all connected in this study. First, I
treat foreign policy as a cluster of orientations consisting of attitudes, perceptions,
and values based on historical experiences. Thus, it is necessary to include a
discussion on the historical background of the special relationship between the
Philippines and the U.S.. The historical experiences, i.e., the effects of the
colonial period, the liberation from the Japanese occupation, and the treaties signed
after independence, helped create a foreign policy oriented in America’s favor. It
is also useful to discuss the change in foreign policy orientations by presenting the
historical experiences and strategic environments such as the disappointments
resulting from U.S. behavior in the region.
Second, foreign policy as a plan for action can be examined in terms of the
goals and general relations with the U.S. According to Rosenau, plans and
commitments are in effect both translations of generalized orientations and
reactions to the immediate context.24 While Philippines foreign policy had been
very dependent on the U.S. after its independence in 1946, the Philippines sought
to realign its foreign policy in the 1970s to a more self-reliant, pragmatic, and
rational approach for the benefit and interest of its own people.
Third, foreign policy as a form of behavior includes two types of activity.
Diplomatic pattern and trade policy during the martial law period are considered as
examples of this behavior. The two types of behaviors can be observable. This
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kind of foreign policy study as a behavior is shown in the literature. For example,
Hermann views foreign policy as those actions independently made by
“authoritative” decision-makers of a nation’s government, which are expected to
influence the behavior of international actors.25
In general, change in the foreign policy of modern weak states is a
reflection of dynamic processes of domestic and international politics. Weak states
are particularly likely to be vulnerable to their external environment in addition to
their unstable domestic politics. However, many foreign policy studies on weak
states tend to overlook the external environment of foreign policy changes by
emphasizing domestic politics as a determining source of the changes. Such
arguments can have significant theoretical weakness because, in fact, many weak
states have been dependent upon the great powers while their own national interests
were pursued. In other words, the inclusion of both domestic and external
environments is a more relevant and reasonable strategy in the study of foreign
policy than arbitrarily considering either one of the two variables. In this regard,
Holsti’s framework of a foreign policy restructuring model is a useful tool to
analyze the foreign policy behaviors of many weak states in Asia and other Third
World countries.
The Concept of Foreign Policy Change
Many states have changed their foreign policy orientation, and it was not
until recently that some scholars have paid attention to this issue.26 For example,
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Volgy and Kenski recognized the problem of the lack of systemic empirical
research on foreign policy changes.27 They argued that in the study of foreign
policy changes between states, the dependent variable must include several
dimensions of foreign policy behavior. As a result, scholars of international
relations have had insufficient results in “systematically measuring, predicting or
accounting for the occurrence of major changes between states.”28
Since the term “change” can be ambiguous, it needs to be clarified here.
Foreign policy change, as used in this study and as defined by Volgy and Kenski,
includes the following three characteristics: first, “magnitude” (i.e., a significant
deviation from existing patterns); second, “multidimensionality” (i.e., a
corresponding change in different aspects of foreign policy); and third, consistency
in the direction of change.29 Holsti refers to the intent to change as reorientation
and the behavioral change as restructuring.30 System theorists like Volgy and
Kenski refer to it as “changes in the degree of congruence in the behavior of a
group of states.” They also argue that “a major increase or decrease in deviation
from the single or the collective is the referent for changes in the relative distance
of any one of the states.”31
This study examines both the intent to change and the behavioral change
while emphasizing the latter, and it adopts in this study Holsti’s framework of
analysis. Hoisti emphasized independent variables, together with intervening
variables, to examine change. This study emphasizes three types of influence
necessary for restructuring change: first, external factors, including military threat,
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non-military threat, and structure of past relations; second, historical background
and cultural factors, including attitudes towards foreigners and colonial experience;
and third, intervening variables, including policy-makers’ perceptions and
calculations, policy-making process, personality factors, and elite attitudes toward
external actors.32
In an earlier work, Holsti identified three fundamental orientations:
(1) isolation, (2) nonalignment, and (3) coalition-making or alliance.33 He
described them as follows:
(1) A strategy of political and military isolation is indicated by a low level
of involvement in most issue areas of the system, a low number of
diplomatic or commercial transactions with other political units and
societies, and attempts to seal off the country against various forms of
external penetration.
(2) The most common form of nonalignment. . . is found among those states
that, on their own initiative and without the guarantee of other states,
refuse to commit themselves militarily to the goals and objectives of the
major powers.
(3) Governments that seek to construct permanent diplomatic coalitions or
military alliances assume that they cannot achieve their objectives,
defend their interests, or deter perceived threats by mobilizing their
own capabilities. They thus rely upon, and make commitments to other
states that face similar external problems or share similar objectives.34
The Philippines made an effort to distance itself from its strong ties to the
U.S. in the 1970s. However, the Philippines could not extract itself completely
from the alliance with the U.S. because of the presence of military bases and the
large amount of military assistance it received. As Holsti pointed out, some states
can only be nonaligned by their public declarations rather than by their foreign
policy actions.35 Later Holsti developed four categories of foreign policy change,
including isolation, self-reliance, dependence, and diversification.36 The
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Philippines was trying to move from a state of dependence with the U.S. to
diversification or self-reliance.
The concept of foreign policy change is a complex one. In this study,
foreign policy change is viewed as a process and as the foreign policy output.
Process means the way a foreign policy undergoes a change from one type to
another, such as a shift from special relations to diversification. The foreign policy
output that is examined is characterized by diversification.
In this study, three major types of Philippines foreign policy changes are
investigated. First, the modification of special relations in terms of distancing
itself from the U.S. Among other things, the military bases have become an
important aspect of the relationship between the Philippines and the U.S. The
issues related to the military bases have often become controversial targets, i.e.,
the issues of criminal jurisdiction and sovereignty. During the time of martial law,
the Philippines called for a review of the bases’ agreement. As a result of
negotiations between the two parties, the Philippines had some important successes,
i.e., reversion of certain bases to Philippines’ control, reaffirmation of Philippines
sovereignty, Filipino soldiers becoming base commanders, and the flying of the
Philippines flag over the bases. In retrospect, these early achievements were
extremely significant given the fact that the two parties subsequently terminated the
bases lease agreement.
Second, diversification of the Philippines’ foreign relations with the
Socialist bloc was examined. One of the most significant changes in the history of
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Philippines foreign policy was the establishment of relations with the countries of
the Socialist bloc. This was significant given the fact that since the colonial era the
Philippines had relied almost exclusively on relations with the U.S. and the
Western countries. Beginning with Yugoslavia and Romania in 1972, Marcos
actively initiated diplomatic and friendly relations with the Eastern European
countries, i.e., East Germany, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia,
and the two leading Socialist countries, the People’s Republic of China in 1975 and
the Soviet Union in 1976.
Third, increased cooperation with Third World countries, including ASEAN
members, is examined. The Philippines has been closely identified with the Third
World since the founding of the U.N. in 1945. During the 1970s, the Philippines
began to cooperate more closely with the Third World countries. For example, the
Philippines strongly supported the creation of a New International Economic Order
by hosting the Ministerial Meeting of the Group of 77 in Manila to prepare for
UNCTAD IV in 1976 and the General Conference of UNCTAD V in 1979.
The Philippines also sought representation in the nonalignment movement,
which is the main collective political force among the Third World nations.
ASEAN has been one of the cornerstones of Philippines foreign policy since the
founding of the organization in 1967. The Philippines has regarded ASEAN as a
necessary organization for stable regional security and economic development in
Southeast Asia. However, for the Philippines, the Sabah dispute with Malaysia
was a major source of conflict. The issue at stake between the two countries is
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sovereignty over the North Borneo territory of Sabah in East Malaysia. This
dispute has been the most serious challenge to ASEAN’s existence. While
numerous diplomatic attempts were made to resolve the issue, there remained deep
hostility. But things began to change when the Philippines became less assertive
regarding its claim to Sabah. For example, Philippines Foreign Secretary Carlos
P. Romulo stated in December 1973, “We are holding [the Philippines’ claim to
Sabah] in a very low profile.”37 He restated in August 1975 that the Philippines
and Malaysia agreed to “put in the background” the Philippines’ claim to Sabah for
the sake of ASEAN cooperation because the Sabah issue had “hurt” ASEAN.38
Definitions of Weak State
The terms “weak state” and “small power” are interchangeably used in
international relations literature. This study also uses both terms. There are two
main reasons to focus on weak/small states in this study of foreign policy change.
First, the Philippines is a weak/small state. Second, the explanatory variables in
terms of both internal (authoritarian regime) and external (foreign policy behavior
of a great power) dimensions can primarily be found in weak/small states.
However, there are some competing arguments on the concepts. Handel
stated that using the term “small” state is unsuitable because it is a self-conflicting
term.39 He argues that in the study of international relations it is the relative
strength that is important rather than the geographical land mass of a state. For
example, some states like Saudi Arabia, Chad, Mongolia, Libya, and Mauritania
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are very large in territory, but they are not considered strong or big states. Strictly
speaking, the term small state should refer only to those states which lack both
strength and are small in territory. Thus, Handel concludes that the term “weak”
state may be more proper because it can be applied not only to small, weak states
but to states of big territory which are weak and vulnerable.40
On the other hand, in his study of small/weak powers, Robert Rothstein is
concerned with a limited category of small powers that “are potentially or actually
threatened by the policies of great powers.”41 Rothstein seeks to establish this
central notion by saying that small powers are something more than, or different
from, great powers.42 Thus he rejects a definition of small powers based purely on
“objective or tangible criteria.” He further contends that such definitions are
inappropriate because they order states “along an extended power spectrum so that
it can only be said that B is stronger than A but weaker than C. The result is that
the significance of the categories ‘great’ and ‘small’ is effectively denied.”43
Furthermore, Rothstein notes that “if there is a unique category of states
called small powers, which possess distinct patterns of behaviors, then it is clearly
inadequate to describe them merely in terms of being less powerful. “~ He
therefore develops a definition for small powers based on psychological as well as
material dimensions:
A small power is a state which recognizes that it can not obtain security by use of
its own capabilities, and that it must rely fundamentally on the aid of other states,
institutions, processes, or developments to do so: the small power’s belief in its
inability to rely on its own means must also be recognized by the state involved in
international politics.45
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Rothstein further demonstrates this distinction by contrasting the situations
of great powers and small powers in the otherwise similar situations of threat.
Thus he describes the three unique aspects of the small power’s situation as:
(1) external support is required, (2) the state has a vulnerable security, and (3) the
state’s leaders recognize its weakness as essentially unalterable.46
In contrast, Keohane argues that a definition of small powers based on
psychological and material dimensions serves well only for certain periods. He
argues that in the past “obtaining security primarily by use of a state’s own
capabilities was a live option for only five to ten states in system of limited
scope.”47 He further noted that “in a nuclear age . . . defense is impossible for all
states and effective deterrence possible only for a few.” A definition based on
capacity to obtain security is unrealistic. He thus argued that definitions of small
power based on capability are like a categorization of nations without defining the
categories in conceptually useful terms.48
By using the analytical significance of nonalignment to define the
characteristic of small powers, David Vital recognized that “[t]he world community
is divided into certain, admittedly, great, middle, and small states drawing the
rough estimate for small power” as: (1) developed nations with a population of
10-15 million or (2) underdeveloped nations with a population of 20-30 million.49
According to Vital, there are great differences among political, economic, and
military powers. In examining the small state’s situation he chooses to consider the
nonaligned states as a small power.5°
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Another prominent scholar in international politics, George Liska, defined
small powers by institutional representation. He argued that definition of a great
and small state depends on “scope of interests and forms of institutional
representation.” He claimed that to be a great power a state should have a major
influence by using threatful means like war or hold a permanent seat in the United
Nations Security Council.5’
Keohane suggested that instead of focusing on perceptions of whether
security can be maintained primarily with one’s own resources, one should focus
on the “system rule” that states leaders see their countries playing. He explained
that a particular international system rules the behavior of states within it. He
emphasized the point that state behavior determines the nature of the international
system as well as vice versa. Keohane contended that classifications such as
“system-dominant” or “subsystem-dominant” are useful in explaining state
behaviors.
Keohane divided nations into four classifications. First, “system-
determining” states play a critical role in shaping the system, i.e., the imperial
power in a unipolar system and the great powers in a bipolar system. Second,
“system-influencing” states cannot expect individually to dominate a system but
may nevertheless be able to influence its nature significantly through unilateral as
well as multilateral action. Third, states that cannot hope to affect the system in
actions alone can nevertheless exert significant impact on the system by working
through an alliance or through universal or regional international organizations.
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According to Keohane, these are called “system-affecting” states. Finally, most
international systems contain some state that can do little to influence the world
system that affect them, except in groups which are so large that each state has
minimal influence and which may themselves be dominated by larger powers. For
this fourth category of small, “system-ineffectual” states, foreign policy is adjusting
to reality, not arrangement of it. These four types of states, according to Keohane,
can be referred to in a traditional usage as “great,” “second,” “middle,” and
“small” powers.52
Based upon this classification of states, Keohane suggested the following
definition:
A great power is a state whose leaders consider that it can, alone, exercise a large,
perhaps decisive, impact on the international system; a secondary power is a state
whose leaders consider that alone it can exercise some impact, although never in
itself decisive, on the system; a middle power is a state whose leaders consider
that it can not act alone effectively but may be able to have a significant impact in
a small group or through an international institution. A small power is a state
whose leader considers that it neither, acting alone or in a small group, makes a
significant impact on the system.53
Based on this approach, the Philippines can be categorized as a small
power. It is, however, dependent on what specific perspective of the country one
wants to study. For example, according to Rothstein’s definition, the Philippines
can be considered as small power since it, like other Southeast Asian nations
including Singapore, Brunei, Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia, probably cannot
obtain security by use of its own capabilities. Similarly, the definition of small
power by Keohane can be suitable for the characteristics of a Southeast Asian state
like the Philippines in that he claimed small states, when acting alone or in a small
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group, can never make a significant impact on the international system. In the
case of the Philippines, Keohane is perhaps correct when he states that some
Southeast Asian nations acting as a military alliance can never make any significant
impact on the great powers militarily. However, it is important to note that some
Southeast Asian nations like the Philippines could make a significant impact on the
regional politics of Southeast Asia. For example, ASEAN countries have used their
political power to persuade the United Nations to recognize the Kampuchea
Democratic Coalition instead of the puppet government of Heng Samrin in
Kampuchea. Finally, a possible method when one wants to classify a state or states
is by using Vital’s definition. In this case, the Philippines has a population of
about 60 million, which does not exactly belong to Vital’s category, but it is
economically underdeveloped. On the other hand, for example, Singapore, Brunei,
and Malaysia have populations of less than 10-15 million people, but are
economically developed. In this study, Keohane’s definition will be used for the
case of the Philippines.
Explaining Foreign Policy Change
This analysis attempts to explain why weak/small states may want to change
their foreign policy toward a great power which is usually a former colonizer.
There has been much discussion about states’ behavior in the literature. One of the
main arguments tested by most foreign policy studies is that the weak states tend to
manifest their foreign policy behavior toward those powers on which they are
22
dependent.54 Empirical studies show that many weak states follow independent
policies,55 although others exhibit foreign policies favorable with the core/great
powers.56 The explanations can be varied one way or another depending on the
analyst.
In the meantime, Holsti proposed a useful explanatory framework. He
recognized that foreign policy change as reorientation and restructuring is related
to external, domestic, and background historical and cultural factors.57 Holsti
discusses three classifications of variables: independent, dependent, and
intervening. According to Hoisti, foreign policy change is caused by three kinds
of independent variables: (1) external factors such as military threats, non-military
threats, and the structure of previous relationship, (2) domestic factors such as
internal threats, economic conditions, and political factionalization, and
(3) background historical and cultural factors such as attitudes about foreigners and
colonial experience.58 The dependent variables of foreign policy change are the
intent to restructure, including disengagement policies, restructuring actions in
external environment, and actions toward external penetration. The intervening
variables which are in between the two variables are policymakers’ perceptions and
calculations, policy-making process, personality factors, and elite attitudes toward
external actors.
Holsti’s framework can be applied to the Philippines’ case as a tool. But
Hoisti’s model, as he recognizes, is not limited to the analysis of weak/small
states, but to any types of states. Thus, the framework needs to be modified for
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the Philippines’ case. Particularly, under the circumstances of martial law, the
foreign policy decisions are dominantly determined by the authoritarian ruler
himself, as in the case of the Philippines during the 1970s. The intervening
variables in Holsti’s framework should be considered as more important than
domestic factors in independent variables such as internal threats and economic
conditions because, under martial law, it is the ruler himself who defines internal
threats and emphasizes economic growth. Also, for the Philippines’ case, some
variables are overlapped in Hoisti’s framework, i.e., the structure of previous
relationships with background historical and cultural factors, internal threats with
economic conditions and political factionalization, policymakers’ perceptions and
calculations with policy-making process and personality factors.59
Applying Holsti’s model to this analysis, a similar simplified hypothetical
model is employed here: great power policy and behavior influences foreign
policy change on an action-reaction basis based on the perception of the decision-
maker who is managing under authoritarian rule. Great power policy in Southeast
Asia is the source of foreign policy change of a small/weak state. The authoritarian
decision-maker is likely to be affected by the great power policy and behavior.
The authoritarian regime can attempt to create a nationalistic mood to legitimize
itself by insisting on more independence and autonomy from the great power. The
regime leads and creates public opinion favorable to foreign policy change by using
and controlling the mass media and information channels. This can be summarized
by the simplified model below.
24
A >B >C
A: Great Power Policy & Behavior (Independent Variable)
B: Authoritarianism (Intervening Variable)
C: Foreign Policy Change (Dependent Variable)
Foreign Policy Change and Authoritarian Rule
The presence of authoritarian rule is a variable which is included in this
study to explain the foreign policy change of the Philippines. Authoritarian rule can
be a factor in foreign policy change. For example, authoritarian regimes may be
likely to prefer a new foreign policy that contributes to their political
legitimization.
Authoritarian rule is related to a new foreign policy in the sense that it
tends to adopt a nationalistic as well as a popular policy, both at home and abroad.
An authoritarian regime tends to emphasize economic development for the purpose
of justifying the authoritarian rule that controls and concentrates power in a leader.
The authoritarian ruler prefers a foreign policy that promotes foreign investment
and foreign trade to create economic growth. Foreign policy change may include
this economic dimension. Economic development has been a very popular means
to legitimize the authoritarian rule. The diversification of Philippines foreign trade
relations with Socialist and other Third World countries was an aspect of this
economic dimension. Also, centralized leadership, a central characteristic of
authoritarianism, tends to simplify the process of foreign policy change because the
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lack of institutional constraints allows the ruler to control the foreign policy
process.
Foreign Policy Change and the Behavior of the Great Powers
Foreign policy change is an interactive process in the sense that foreign
policy is made as a reaction to changes in the environment. This study deals with
the relationship in which a weak/small Third World country is allied with and
dependent on a great power. The environment and its changes may cause the actor
to adjust foreign policy in line with the new policy of the partner or simply change
foreign policy because of disappointment or uncertainty with the partner’s
behavior.
A state’s reaction can be different depending on the circumstances. Given a
policy of military withdrawal from a vital area, a small state may react in several
ways. One way is that if its security is endangerd, a small state may try to
strengthen its relations with its neighbors and other states to defend its sovereignty
and security by its own effort. In this respect, closer cooperation among
weak/small neighboring states and diplomatic diversification can be the alternative
way of protecting their own security and the interests of small states. Thus, the
foreign policy change of a small state can be seen as a consequence of
disappointment and insecurity caused by a great power.
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Summary
This chapter has examined various analytical frameworks of foreign policy
change, including the two main concepts of the presence of authoritarianism and
the policy and behavior of a great power. I have mentioned how these two
variables are interrelated and how they affect the foreign policy change. The
Hoisti framework is used in this study as a tool to link both external and internal
variables in the present analysis of the Philippines’ case. My review of the
literature on foreign policy change in weak states suggests that a small state, which
is heavily dependent on a certain great power, is likely to change its foreign policy
when the domestic situation becomes complicated and complex or when a great
power takes a passive security policy and behavior in the region.
The basic elements of this study, including the research problem and
objective, the level of analysis, scope, and major concepts, were also discussed. In
later chapters, each of these variables will be discussed in more detail. In
particular, I will examine the extent to which they help to explain the Philippines’
foreign policy change.
The study is presented in three parts. First, the theoretical context of
foreign policy of weak/small states and an historical background of the relationship
between the United States and the Philippines are presented. Second, the nature
and directions of foreign policy change of the Philippines are described.
Cooperation among ASEAN members is emphasized, for example the Sabah
territorial claim, and diversification of Philippines’ foreign relations with Socialist
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states, which led to a fundamental reconsideration of the previously special
relations with the U.S. Third, an explanation of foreign policy change by the
Philippines is described in terms of external and internal dimensions, including the
impact of U.S. foreign policy behavior (the external variable) and the domestic
political and economic environment of authoritarianism (the internal variable).
Overview
Chapter One defines and examines the main concepts of this study,
including foreign policy, foreign policy change, weak states/small powers, and the
relationships between external and internal variables, drawing upon the existing
theoretical literature. Chapter Two examines the basic historical background of the
U.S.-Philippines relationship. Among the major issues examined are the military
and economic agreements and the Philippines governments before 1972.
Chapters Three and Four identify the dependent variable of this study,
which is foreign policy changes by the Philippines from 1972 to 1981. Chapter
Three examines a major element of Philippines foreign policy change, the review
and renegotiation of the military bases agreements. There is also a brief review of
the Philippines’ efforts to establish diplomatic relations with Socialist countries and
to cooperate with Third World nations as a part of its foreign policy change. The
main focus of Chapter Four is the Philippines’ movement toward and cooperative
policies with ASEAN. The evolution and functions of ASEAN are outlined as
background to a discussion of the Philippines’ claim to Sabah, a revealing episode
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in the Philippines’ foreign policy change. Throughout the 1970s, the efforts to
identify themselves within ASEAN were the main development among the
weaklsmall states in Southeast Asia, including the Philippines.
Chapters Five and Six explain the reasons for the foreign policy change of
Philippines with the two variables of external (independent variable) and internal
(intervening variable) forces. Concerning the external dimension, the impact of
U.S foreign policy behavior in Southeast Asia has made a very significant
condition for foreign policy change of the weak/small power of the Philippines.
The impacts of U.S. behavior are examined through major issues like the Nixon
doctrine and the Indochina war, U.S. emphasis on Japan’s role, detente with
China, and human rights. Regarding the internal or domestic dimension, the
political system of authoritarianism made by Marcos in 1972 significantly
influenced foreign policy decision-making and implementation. Selected
characteristics of martial law, foreign policy impacts of martial law, and the
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THE SPECIAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE PHILIPPINES AND THE U.S.
Historical Background
After having been a colony of Spain for more than three hundred years, the
Philippines was ceded to the U.S. on December 10, 1898, under the Treaty of
Paris. Ferdinand Magellan claimed the islands for Spain in 1521, and the
Philippines was ruled by Spain for the next 377 years, until May 1, 1898, when
U.S. Admiral Dewey defeated the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay.1 At that time, the
Philippines had already established itself as a Republic headed by Emilio
Aguinaldo, who was in full control of the country. A war of Philippines resistance
against U.S. rule (the so-called “Philippines-American War”), led by revolutionary
President Aguinaldo, broke out during the years of 1899-1902. The Aguinaldo
forces were defeated and persuaded to swear allegiance to the U.S.2 Then for
some 50 years, excluding the period of Japanese occupation, the U.S. effectively
ruled the Philippines by dominating its colonial assembly. In 1907, the first
legislative assembly was elected. In 1916, the Jones Law introduced the first
Filipino senate, a bicameral legislature. In 1935, under the terms of the Tydings
McDuffie Act, the Philippines Commonwealth was inaugurated, ending direct
American political domination. In 1942, Japan invaded and defeated U.S. forces
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in the Philippines and occupied the islands until 1945. The Japanese were so hated
in the Philippines that America’s return was welcomed. During the period of
Japanese occupation, the Filipinos cooperated with the U.S. and the Allies.3
The Introduction of Special Relations with the U.S.
The miserable situation resulting from World War II brought into contrast
the close relations between the Philippines and its former colonizer with the
divergent paths taken by former colonies not so devastated by the war. The
Philippines accepted a continuing dependency upon the U.S. for aid and post-war
reconstruction. For the Philippines there would be no choice but to depend on its
former colonial master, which became the world’s strongest country after World
War II because other major powers, including the Soviet Union, China, and the
larger European powers, were struggling to solve their own post-war-related
economic and political problems.
Besides the need for economic reconstruction, there was a strong
predisposition among many Filipinos against communism. This sentiment was
shared by the U.S. in the early 1950s, even if the Filipinos’ preference for
independence and sovereignty was not. A pro-American sentiment developed in
this situation and yielded a special relationship that was eventually supported by
several bilateral treaties and agreements.4 There was also significant and persistent
criticism, and even outright opposition, from nationalists. Senator Claro M.
Recto, one of the dependent relationship’s strongest opponents, said:
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[The Philippines] foreign policy was conducted from the very beginning, and is
being pursued on the erroneous assumption of an identity of American and Filipino
interests, or more correctly of the desirability, and even necessity, of
subordinating our interests to those of America.5
Economic Agreements
The Philippines Trade Act, passed by the U.S. Congress in 1946 and
commonly known as the Bell Trade Act, provided that free trade would be
continued until 1954. Thereafter, tariffs would be increased five percent annually
until full amounts were reached in 1974. Quotas were established for Philippines
products for both free trade and the tariff periods. At the same time there could be
no restrictions on the entry of U.S. products, nor would there be Philippines
import duties. The Philippines currency, the peso, was tied at a fixed rate to the
U.S. dollar.
However, the U.S. rehabilitation aid to the Philippines was tied to a Trade
Act which incorporated parity provisions. The U.S. insisted as a precondition to
any form of aid that the parity amendment allowing equal rights to Americans in
the exploitation of Philippines natural resources be passed. The Tydings
Rehabilitation Act, which appropriated $400 million as compensation for war
damaged property, $120 million for the restoration of damaged public property and
facilities, and $100 million worth of U.S. surplus for use by the Philippines
government for the task of rehabilitation, would be implemented only upon the
amendment to the Philippines constitution to provide parity rights for Americans in
the country, and only after the constitutional amendment was adopted would the
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Philippines receive war damage compensation.6 Since the Philippines had suffered
massive destruction in the war, President Roxas and other leaders thought that
parity rights should be accepted in return for American aid. So Roxas worked hard
to persuade the Filipinos to accept this condition for U.S. aid.
In addition to American parity regarding property, residence, occupation,
and taxation, the Trade Agreement had other terms. The Act did not limit the
amount of U.S. goods entering the Philippines, but subjected seven of the
Philippines’ most important exports to the U.S. to quotas. It was also stipulated
that if these exports were in competition with similar items produced in the U.S.,
the U.S. Tariff Commission could impose additional quotas on such exports. No
similar authority was granted to the Philippines.
Toward the end of this free trade period under the Bell Trade Act, the two
countries agreed to reexamine all aspects of the 1946 Agreement on Trade and
Related Matters. The resulting revised executive agreement concluded in
September 1955, to take effect on January 1, 1956, came to be known as the
Laurel-Langley Agreement.7 This agreement retained some provisions of the
Philippines-U.S. Trade Agreement of 1946.8 The Laurel-Langley Agreement
accelerated the imposition of Philippines duties on American products and also
slowed down the imposition of U.S. duties on Philippines products by a new
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The Laurel-Langley Agreement did not terminate the parity rights of the
Philippines Trade Act. The U.S. reciprocated by allowing Filipinos in America
similar privileges. The peso was no longer tied to the dollar. The Laurel-Langley
Agreement became the basis for the Philippines-American relations until July 4,
1974. It was mainly responsible for making the U.S. Manila’s leading trade and
investment partner.
In 1974, with the signing of the U.S. Trade Act, the U.S. put into effect its
part of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) with selected developing
countries. This meant the end of the preferential relations of the U.S. with the
Philippines and the start of a new framework. On October 30, 1979, the
Philippines-U.S. Trade Agreement was signed, expanding accessibility of
Philippines products in the U.S. and with the eighty members of the General
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Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GAIT). As a result of these negotiations, the
Philippines got a reduction of the duties on its exports by about sixty five percent.
In return, the Philippines granted duty reductions of only 5.7 percent for U.S.
exports. In addition, these reductions involved 97 tariff lines on Philippines
exports and only 60 tariff lines on U.S. exports.1°
Military Agreements
In addition to economic agreements, the two countries signed several
military pacts. Three agreements are especially important: (1) The Philippines-
U.S. Military Bases Agreement of March 14, 1947; (2) the Philippines-U.S.
Military Assistance Agreement of March 21, 1947; and (3) the Philippines-U.S.
Mutual Defense Treaty of August 1951.”
The first military agreement granted the U.S. the right to “retain the use of
bases in the Philippines” for a period of 99 years, to permit the U.S. to use such
bases as the U.S. may determine according to military necessity, and to enter into
negotiations with the Philippines regarding the expansion of such bases. The U.S.
retained control of 23 military installations, including the extensive navy facilities
at Subic Bay and Clark Air Base, for a lease period of 99 years. The U.S., rather
than the Philippines authorities, had full jurisdiction over their territories, including
the collection of taxes and the trying of offenders, including Filipinos, in cases
involving American service personnel.’2 Base rights remained a controversial issue
in relations between the two countries for many decades.
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The Military Assistance Treaty stated that the U.S. would furnish arms,
ammunition, equipment, and supplies to the armed forces of the Philippines. The
agreement also provided for the creation of a Military Advisory Group composed
of Filipino and American personnel whose function was to “provide such advice
and assistance to the Philippines as is necessary to accomplish the purpose of the
agreement.”3 The Treaty was to last for five years. On June 26, 1953, in an
exchange of notes which had the effect of a formal agreement, the Treaty was
effectively extended until terminated by either party. The most important of the
assistance given by the U.S. along this line consists of: (1) the Military Advisory
Group; (2) logistics support; (3) the sending (by the Philippines’ government) of
“selected students” to designated technical and service schools of the ground,
naval, and air services of the U.S. for training; and (4) disclosure and exchanges
of classified military equipment and information of security classification.14
The Mutual Defense Treaty provided that each party recognizes that an
armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the parties would be dangerous to its
own peace and safety and declares that each party would act to meet the common
dangers in accordance with its constitutional process.15 It is noteworthy that the
agreement does not provide for an automatic declaration of war on the part of the
U.S. against any aggressor of the Philippines; rather, according to the American
constitutional process, it is up to Congress to decide on such a formal declaration
of war. Following these treaties, which embodied the so-called special relations,
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the subsequent presidents of the Philippines pursued a foreign policy which was
pro-American and Western-oriented.
Philippines Governments Before 1972
Before martial law was declared by Ferdinand Marcos in 1972, the
Philippines had a presidential system of government and a bicameral Congress.
Manuel Roxas became the first president of the Republic. There were two major
parties, the Nationalista and the Liberal Party. There was not much difference
between them, and members sometimes changed from one party to the other.
Marcos, for example, was member of the Liberal Party when he ran for the Senate
in 1959. He switched parties in 1965 and received the Nationalista’s nomination
for presidency.
The Philippines constitution was inspired by the American model. The
president was elected every four years by direct suffrage. The political system was
similar to that of the U.S. in that there were three branches of government,
executive, legislative and judicial, each branch with distinct and separate functions.
The legislature had two houses: a Senate with 24 members, one-third elected
every two years for a period of 6 years, and a House of Representatives with a
maximum of 120 judicial members, elected every 4 years. The judicial branch was
headed by the Supreme Court. The government held sovereignty and jurisdiction
over all the nation except the military and naval bases granted to the U.S. The
principles of separation of powers and checks and balances were included in the
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Constitution, even if not fully integrated into the practice of politics. For example,
the press was constitutionally free and independent and was able to openly criticize
the government.’6
In a sense then, the Philippines could be considered a firm democracy with
a representative government. Indeed, the erosion and eventual breakdown of
democracy in the Philippines was somewhat surprising because the Philippines had
been regarded as a solid democratic system. After the end of World War lithe
Philippines ranked among the well-established democratic nations in the world.’7
Nevertheless, the Philippines system of governance can, to some extent, be
characterized as oligarchic. The economic elite was at the same time the political
elite, and business was mixed with politics. Thus, some significant problems of
extortion and corruption were evident from the founding of the independent state.
Philippines Foreign Policy Under Various Administrations
In 1935, the Commonwealth government had elected Quezon as president
and Osmena as vice president, both of them Nationalista, only for one term of six
years. In 1940, the Constitution was amended to change to allow presidents to
serve for more than one four year term. From 1946 to 1981, the Philippines
Republic had six presidents.
Manuel Roxas (president from 1946-1948), the first president of the
independent republic, had a policy of unlimited cooperation with the U.S.,
continued association with other Asian neighbors, and adherence to the principles
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of the U.N. Under Roxas, Philippines foreign policy generally followed the
international programs of the U.S. It was during this period that the Military
Bases Agreement and the Trade Agreement of 1947 providing for parity rights
were signed. Roxas believed it was important to establish better relations with
Asian countries mainly because the Philippines was not seen as sharing a common
Asian culture by its Asian neighbors. 19
Elpidio Quirino (president from 1948-1953) generally followed the same
policy as his predecessor in strengthening Philippines-U.S. relations.2° It was
during his presidency that the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1951 was signed.
However, he criticized the treaty’s lack of retaliation clause, i.e., that the U.S. is
not automatically committed to go to a war in the event of an attack on the
Philippines. He also opposed the establishment of American military bases close to
urban centers. Because of his strong opposition, the U.S. could not claim
ownership of the territory occupied by the bases.21
The Quirino administration emphasized the need for greater cooperation
with Asian neighbors and participated actively in Asian affairs. It withdrew its
earlier $8 billion war compensation demand in which the Philippines asked Japan
for aid to reconstruct property ruined during the Pacific War period in 1941-1945
and moved slowly toward accommodation with Japan in commercial matters.
Quirino extended an invitation to the heads of states of several Asian countries to a
conference in Baguio in 1950. In the U.N., the Philippines was supportive of U.S.
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policies, such as the condemnation of the Chinese intervention in the Korean War.
It sent an expeditionary force to South Korea under the auspices of the U.N.
The Quirino administration refused to grant recognition to the People’s
Republic of China. Among the reasons were its perception of a Chinese threat to
its security through the subversive activities of the Huks, which China reportedly
aided.22 Another reason was the existence of an economically powerful pro-
Taiwan Chinese community in the Philippines. The most effective government
action against the Huks was taken by (then) Congressman Magsaysay as Secretary
of Defense under the Quirino administration. With the successful military campaign
against the Huks, the popular Magsaysay was able to easily defeat his boss,
Quirino, in the 1953 presidential election.23
Ramon Magsaysay (president from 1953-1957) was the Philippines
president most closely associated with the U.S. While Quirino in his time rejected
the American claim that the U.S. owned the base lands in the Philippines,
Magsaysay accepted a declaration affirming such a claim by U.S. Attorney General
Herbert Brownell on August 23, 1953. Magsaysay was a firm anti-Communist. In
1954, the Philippines was the site of a conference that resulted in the formation of
the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), the anti-Communist alignment of
Western and regional powers that arose as a response to the French withdrawal
from Indochina. The Eisenhower administration assured the group that this treaty
system represented the most cost-effective option for extending its containment
policy to the Southeast Asian region because it did not require permanent
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deployments of U.S. ground forces and bases.24 Magsaysay supported the
establishment of SEATO as a deterrent to Communist intervention in Southeast
Asia. The Philippines became a member of SEATO, becoming with Thailand one
of only two Southeast Asian countries to join the treaty.25 There were those who
felt that the Philippines was following an unrealistic foreign policy in not having
diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China and the Soviet Union.26
While Magsaysay was regarded as pro-American, certain problems in
Philippines-American relations persisted, one of which was the Philippines Trade
Act of 1946. Magsaysay thus requested its readjustment. In 1955, the revised
U.S.-Philippines Trade Agreement (the Laurel-Langley Agreement) was negotiated
as an overall instrument to regulate commercial relations over the next two
decades. The new agreement abolished the authority of the U.S. to control the
exchange rate of the peso, made parity privileges reciprocal, extended the sugar
quota and the time period for reduction of other quotas, and established the
progressive application of tariffs on Philippines goods exported to the U.S.27
Carlos Garcia (president from 1957-1961) took office immediately after
Magsaysay died in a plane crash. He stressed Philippines security objectives, such
as continuing the fight against Communism, compliance with SEATO
commitments, and adherence to the treaty of mutual defense with the U.S. Like
Magsaysay, Garcia was against relations with China. On June 19, 1957, he signed
a bill known as the Anti-Subversive Bill, which outlawed the Philippines
Communist Party. Moreover, the Philippines opposed the representation of China
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in the U.N. Regarding Philippines-U.S. relations, some tension was present
because of the criminal jurisdiction over the U.S. military bases in the
Philippines. 28
The Garcia administration demanded some readjustments of the terms
regarding the bases which led to the conclusion of the Bohlen-Serrano Agreement.
Among other things, it provided for a reduction of the ninety-nine year lease of the
American bases to twenty-five years, subject to renewal or termination by mutual
consent. It was also agreed to allow the U.S. to install nuclear missiles after due
consultation with the Philippines. However, the dispute over the question of
criminal jurisdiction over the bases persisted. Further discussions with the U.S.
took place in 1959 on the question of the military bases. An agreement was
reached regarding U.S. relinquishment of large land areas initially reserved for
bases but no longer required for their operation. Thus, the U.S. turned over to
Philippines administration the town of Olongapo on Subic Bay, north of Manila,
which previously had been under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Navy.29
Garcia defined his two guiding objectives as friendly relations with the U.S.
and closer cooperation with Asian neighbors. He stressed regional economic and
sociocultural cooperation rather than political and security pacts.
Diosdado Macapagal (president from 1961-1965) directed policy in a
slightly different way. The nationalist thinking in the Philippines was exhibited
during Macapagal’s term by his issuance of an executive order in 1962 changing
the Philippines’ Independence Day from July 4 to June 12, the day in 1898 when
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Emilio Aquinaldo had read the declaration of independence.30 The matter of
jurisdiction over U.S. service personnel in the Philippines, which had not been
fully settled after the 1959 discussions, remained an obstacle in relations between
the two countries. A series of incidents during his term mainly associated with the
misbehavior of some American military personnel in Clark Air Base provoked
considerable anti-American feeling and demonstrations.31 Thus, negotiations took
place and resulted in an agreement in August 1965 adopting provisions similar to
the status of forces agreement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
regarding criminal jurisdiction. In the next four years, agreements were reached
on several other matters relating to the bases, including a 1966 amendment to the
1947 agreement, which moved the expiration date of the lease to 1991.
Philippines foreign policy under Macapagal emphasized closer relations with
neighboring Asian nations. In July 1963, he convened a summit meeting in Manila
consisting of the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia. An organization called
MAPHILINDO was formed. It was viewed as a realization of Philippines’
national hero Jose Rizal’s dream of bringing together the Malay peoples.
MAPHILINDO was seen as a vehicle that would resolve issues of common
concern in the spirit of consensus. MAPHILINDO was quickly put aside,
however, mainly because of the continuing confrontation between Indonesia and
newly established Malaysia and the Philippines’ own claim to Sabah, the territory
in Northeastern Borneo that had become a part of the Malaysian state in 1963.
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In June 1962, Macapagal’s foreign minister had pressed the claim on the
British, arguing that the transfer of Sabah by the Sultan of Sulu to the British
North Borneo company in 1898 had been a lease rather than full cession. Bad
relations between Malaysia and the Philippines over this issue hindered the latter
from taking a more positive role in the region.
Like his predecessors, Macapagal continued to adhere to the policy of anti-
Communism. Thus, the Philippines continued to refuse to have diplomatic or trade
relations with either China or the Communist regimes in North Korea and North
Vietnam.
During the Macapagal years, there were some changes in Filipino attitudes
towards the U.S. Filipinos began to question the country’s special relations with
the U.S. more seriously, and large sections of the society became more critical of
it, exposing and discussing its exploitative aspects. For example, the Filipinos
increasingly tended to see the presence of U.S. bases as serving U.S. national
interests rather than the Philippines’ ~ Morrison and Suhrke argue that “there was
a Philippines’ inclination to view the bases as a Philippines’ contribution which
benefitted the United States more than the island republic, or at least more
directly.”34 Also, in November 1964, the radical youth organization Kabataang
Makabayan (KM) was founded. It attracted many young Filipinos to its
organization and became active in arranging protest demonstrations against
American behavior in Asia in general, and in the Philippines in particular.
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Ferdinand Marcos (president from 1965-1986) assumed the presidency in
1965. He showed a more flexible attitude vis-a-vis the Communist countries. For
the first time, Filipinos were allowed to travel to China, the Soviet Union, and
other Communist countries. In March 1966, an official government delegation led
by Senator Maria Kalaw Katigbak visited China. Official permission for such a
trip would have been unthinkable previously. Earlier, Macapagal had even refused
to allow the Soviet and Yugoslav basketball teams to participate in the Fourth
World Basketball Championship held in Manila in December 1962. However,
while Marcos seemed to be less rigid regarding relations with Communist
countries, he continued to criticize China and praise the U.S.
Of all the presidents the Philippines ever had, Marcos made the most
unique impact on the Philippines’ political system. For one thing, he governed the
longest. After having been reelected for a second four-year term, Marcos placed
the entire Philippines archipelago under martial law in 1972 in order to remain
president. This was the first step in an altering of the structures and processes of
decision-making in the government. Martial law was imposed under the
emergency provision of the 1935 Philippines Constitution stating, “In case of
invasion, insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger thereof, when the public
security requires, [the Philippines President] may suspend the privileges of habeas
corpus or place the Philippines or any part therefore under martial law.”35
Under martial law, the country’s liberal democratic institutions were
suspended and the Philippines was governed by decrees. Marcos called for self-
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reliance and national progress in a new, changed foreign policy. In the end, the
assassination of opposition leader Benigno Aquino upon his return to the
Philippines from the U.S. in 1983 after a long period of exile amplified popular
dissatisfaction with Marcos. This event set in motion a succession of events that
culminated in a presidential election in February 1986. The opposition forces
under the leadership of Aquino’s widow, Corazon Aquino, and Salvador Laurel
struggled against widespread electoral fraud on the part of Marcos and his
supporters. Marcos was finally forced to flee to Hawaii after the 1986 democratic
revolution. After her election, Aquino successfully managed the restoration of
democratic government from the local to the national level.
Conclusion
This chapter discussed the basic historical background of the U.S.-
Philippines special relationship. Among the major issues discussed were the
economic and military agreements and the various Philippines governments before
1972. From its independence through 1960s, the Philippines maintained its
dependent special relations with the U.S. For the Philippines, immediately after its
independence, there seemed no other choice but to depend on the U.S. economic
and military power. This close relationship resulted in several important unequal
agreements between the two parties under various Philippines governments.
However, the Marcos government made different approaches toward the United
States by initiating new foreign policies which will be discussed in next chapters.
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CHAPTER THREE
FOREIGN POLICY CHANGE TOWARD THE U.S. AND
THE SOCIALIST BLOC
By the time of the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, the Philippines had
announced a foreign policy change and took steps to support this with action.
President Marcos displayed his new self-reliant foreign policy by signing trade and
diplomatic documents in Moscow normalizing relations between the Philippines and
the Soviet Union. He actually began modifying the Philippines’ pro-U.S. image in
early 1972 when he sent his wife, Imelda Marcos, to the Soviet Union on a private
visit. A Philippines-USSR Friendship Association was formed with Mrs. Marcos as
chairperson.
Following the declaration of martial law in 1972, Marcos opened relations
with six Communist countries. In 1974, he sent his wife to China as a prelude to
his own visit in June 1975. Later that year, Mrs. Marcos was sent to Cuba to
formalize the opening of relations with that country. Marcos repeatedly
emphasized the need for Manila to be self-reliant and to make new friends by
normalizing relations with Communist states. He also questioned the wisdom of
relying on a treaty commitment with the U.S. government. Aside from the
normalization of diplomatic relations with China and the establishment of relations
with the Socialist countries of Eastern Europe, a review was urged regarding
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Philippines-American relations, particularly with regard to mutual defense
arrangements and the status of the military bases in the Philippines.
The next two chapters will examine the presence and status of the bases as
well as the Philippines policy toward ASEAN and its relations with the Socialist
bloc. I use these indicators to analyze the extent of foreign policy change and as
the main examples of how the policy was carried out in the seventies. Each
indicator has a character of its own. Also, it is true that the indicators do not have
the same weight in terms of their importance in showing foreign policy change.
Some may be more significant than others. The significance of various types of
behavior depends on the entire network of relations within which a country finds
itself. However, for the purposes of this study, it is not necessary to attempt to
determine the relative importance of each indicator. What matters is that they are
viewed as valid expressions of foreign policy change.
U.S. Military Bases in the Philippines
Apart from the economic ties between the two countries, when one speaks
of the special relations between the Philippines and the United States, the U.S.
bases in the Philippines come to mind. These bases had their origin in the colonial
period, when the U.S. took over first from Spain and a second time from Japan
after World War II. Partly because of this, the bases have often been regarded as
remnants of colonialism.
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Since independence, the bases have become controversial aspect of
Philippines-U.S. relations and are often the target of nationalist attacks. The bases
have provided some of the more serious irritants in the bilateral relationship, such
as the issues of criminal jurisdiction and sovereignty.
The U.S. bases in the Philippines were regarded as crucial to America’s
strategic position in the region. The existence of these bases served to increase
American interest in developments in the Philippines. Their presumed vital
importance to the U.S. made it essential to keep the bases safe and intact. The
bases were sometimes used by the Philippines as leverage in bargaining. For
example, during an interview after the assassination of opposition leader Benigno
Aquino in August 1983, Marcos linked the planned visit by President Ronald
Reagan to the issue of the American naval and air bases. There were reports that
the Reagan administration was reconsidering Reagan’s one day stopover.1
The issue of the bases was entwined in both the domestic politics and
foreign policy of the Philippines. For example, on the domestic scene, politicians
could ride on the nationalist sentiments regarding controversial issues concerning
the bases to strengthen their political positions. This section will not deal with the
implications of the bases for the internal politics of the Philippines, but rather will
have its focus on the foreign policy aspects of the bases. Specifically, an attempt
will be made to relate the question of the bases to the issue of foreign policy
change as announced in the 1970s.
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The Philippines government’s action regarding the American bases can be
regarded as an indicator of foreign policy change. Using the bases as an indicator
of foreign policy change, one can examine the government’s tough stances on the
bases and calls for a review of the agreement as a possible sign of reassessment of
Philippines-U.S. relations. For example, Marcos regarded the revised agreement
affirming Philippines sovereignty over the bases as indicative of the success of his
foreign policy change. However, there are alternative explanations for these tough
stances and the demand for negotiations on the bases. One was Marcos’s desire to
neutralize nationalist emotions, some of which were also aimed against his
imposition of martial law.
The presence of and the situation surrounding the bases may have provided
an incentive for foreign policy change. One can cite the Filipino people’s growing
critical attitude toward the bases and the abuses committed in relation to them as
contributing to the president’s decision to review the agreement. Nationalism,
which was apparent in a critical public mood regarding the bases, was sweeping
the country in the early seventies. Thus the new policy, or at least the rhetoric of
change, can be seen as a response to this popular sentiment. On the other hand,
this critical attitude regarding the bases was exploited and served as a bargaining
tool to extract concessions from the U.S. Thus, the Philippines government’s
exploitation of this sentiment also can be viewed as a means to get more out of the
bases negotiations.
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The next two sub-sections are concerned with the role of the bases in
Philippines~Ame~.j~~ relations, the problems related to them, and how the policy
of change was manifested regarding the bases. In what ways could the policy of
change have affected the situation in the bases? Has foreign policy change been
reflected in the negotiations of the bases in the seventies? What kinds of
improvements, if any, were made in the Philippines’ position in terms of
increasing Philippines control? Can it be said, based on any such improvements,
that the Philippines has reoriented its foreign policy toward the U.S.? In other
words, can the bases be viewed as an indicator of foreign policy change?
Until recently, the U.S. maintained five major military facilities in the
Philippines. Subic Bay Naval Base (and its associated units at Cubi Point,
Zambales Providence) and Clark Air Base were the two most important of these
facilities. Both were located northwest of metro Manila. Other facilities included
the John Hay Air Station in Benguet Province, the Naval Communications Stations
in Zambales Province, and Wallace Air Station in La Union Province. Philippines
armed forces periodically engaged in joint training exercises with United States
forces assigned to these bases, on both permanent and temporary status.2
Subic Bay Naval Base consisted of 14,570 hectares located 112 kilometers
northwest of Manila, was home to eight separate U.S. Navy Commands, and was
the largest naval installation outside the United States. Its unique combination of
naval, aviation, and support facilities was essential to Seventh Fleet operations,
which comprised 20 nuclear submarines, three aircraft carriers, 22 warships, and
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about 100 auxiliary craft. It had responsibility for the area from the Strait of
Malacca to the Luzon Strait.3 Because it was the main Seventh Fleet support base
west of Pearl Harbor, without it an American naval presence in the Western
Pacific, the South China Sea, and the Indian Ocean would have been much more
difficult and expensive to sustain. Cubi Point, the naval air station at Subic Bay,
accommodated up to 200 aircraft and provided aviation, industrial, material, and
residential support to several major aviation squadrons. About 3,500 military and
over 700 foreign personnel were housed at Cubi. The naval base repair and
logistics facility at Subic Bay, with its excellent sheltered harbor and wonderful
climate were considered good for the U.S. navy.4
Clark Air Base consisted of 52,492 hectares and was located about 100
kilometers north of Manila on the MacArthur National Highway. It was the
headquarters of the Thirteenth Air Force and the key link in a world-wide U.S. Air
Force communications network, including an orbiting satellite.5
These U.S.-controlled bases have been characterized as states within a state.
Clark alone, for example, was larger than the whole state of Singapore. Although
the total base area under direct U.S. military control had been reduced from
192,000 acres to 24,810 acres by the U.S.-Philippines Executive Agreement of
1979, this area was still huge.6
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Justifications for the Bases
It is generally accepted that the Philippines bases were important to the
U.S. Former U.S. official Robert Pringle categorized the U.S. justifications for the
bases as follows:
(1) The bases are part of [US] global force structure, an
essential link in a chain of facilities which enables the
United States to project its conventional forces
worldwide;
(2) The bases help maintain great power equilibrium in
Southeast Asia and U.S. force readiness throughout the
Far East;
(3) The bases are required to meet [US] obligations under
the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1951 to defend the
Philippines;
(4) Transferring existing facilities elsewhere (e.g., the
Marianas) would be enormously expensive. Capital
expenditures might run as high as $5 billion plus $300
million yearly in additional operating expenses;
(5) The bases are a hedge against the unknown and the
unpredictable (for example, the political disintegration of
China) and a means of combatting incidents of piracy,
such as the 1975 Mayaguez affair; and
(6) Finally, the bases symbolize American determination to
remain a Pacific power. Closing them would upset not
only the Chinese, who fear Soviet encroachment, but
also the Japanese, who might feel compelled to build up
their own defense forces in the region, yet would rightly
fear the political reaction that such a move would be
likely to provoke among the Southeast Asians.7
There were many other justifications for their existence. First, the bases
were essential to the global American force structure, a part of the facilities
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important for the U.S. to project its conventional forces worldwide. For the U.S.,
the Philippines bases of Clark Air Base and Subic Bay have been regarded as
essential for the conduct of U.S. global containment policy, providing the southern
anchor for the long defense line that stretches from the northern Japanese islands,
through the Ryukyus and Taiwan, to Luzon. The Philippines bases have provided
the U.S. with the ability to control sea lanes and check the Soviet naval activities
in the Pacific and Indian Ocean, and to cut the time and the distance for combat
reinforcement efforts toward Northeast as well as Southeast Asian combat zones.8
Second, the bases balanced the great power presence in Southeast Asia.
Considering the increasing Soviet presence in Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam, the U.S.
in the Philippines helped counter a strong Soviet presence in the region. Third, the
bases assured the U.S. allies in Asia of the U.S. intent to remain a Pacific power.
With the removal of any U.S. military presence in Indochina, the ending of U.S.
presence in Thailand, and the near-elimination of that presence in Taiwan, it was
understandable that Marcos should have felt that the Philippines bases had become
more valuable.9
President Jimmy Carter’s pledge in 1977 to withdraw all American ground
forces from South Korea highlighted the importance of the bases in the Philippines.
The Carter administration concluded that the withdrawal from South Korea at that
time was as much as the U.S. could handle if it was to keep anxieties among its
Asian allies and friends to a minimum.’0 A withdrawal of the bases from the
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Philippines would be very costly if the U.S. sought to retain its existing forward
positions in the entire Pacific.
However, there were those who advocate such a withdrawal despite the
cost. According to one idea, the core of American facilities could be positioned on
Guam-a politically stable U.S. territory with a loyal, skilled work force. Other
alternatives suggested were Japan, Australia, and Tinian in the Mariana Islands.
Although shifting to alternative bases would entail much expense, in the long run,
the cost would, in this view, be less and the political dangers fewer.”
On the part of the Philippines, the following justifications were often
mentioned. First, the U.S. provided a security umbrella, which, as a consequence,
decreased the need for a large defense budget.’2 Second, the bases were a major
source of employment for Filipinos. Clark and Subic employed many thousands,
and they would be left jobless if the bases were abolished. Except for the national
government, the bases were the largest single employer in the country. In 1975,
there were 55,346 Filipinos employed in all U.S. bases with an annual payroll of
$170 million. According to U.S. Embassy sources, the estimated U.S. expenditure
at the bases amounted to $136 million in 1971, $183 million in 1972, $217 million
in 1973 and $232 million in 1974. Finally, there was a significant flow of military
aid from the U.S. relating to the bases)3
The negative aspects of the bases included the social cost of these bases,
like prostitution, smuggling, high crime rates, and the high incidence of drug abuse
in the surrounding communities.
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The 1947 Base Agreement: An Historical Context
In 1933, the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Bill providing for Philippines
independence was rejected by the Philippines Legislature on the grounds that its
provision for complete American custody of military and naval reservations in the
Philippines was repugnant and inconsistent with true independence. However, the
Tydings-McDuffie Law of 1934 provided that the president of the U.S. and the
president of the independent Philippines would negotiate the matter of base
retention.
Philippines President Roxas and American Ambassador Paul McNutt signed
the Military Bases Agreement on March 14, 1947, which was effective for 99
years)4 With it, the U.S. was granted exclusive use of 23 naval and air bases
rent-free for 99 years.15 Its twenty-nine articles dealt with both Philippines and
American rights and obligations, including sites for bases. Annex A of the
agreement listed sixteen sites for American retention, Of these, seven were actual
operational bases; three were adjacent army and air force bases in Pampanga
province near Manila, and four were navy. The other nine sites were scattered,
unspecified military facilities. Annex B listed seven additional sites for possible
later U.S. use, subject to mutual agreement)6
The rights given to Americans under the Military Bases Agreements, as
illustrated in Appendix One, included the following:
(1) The U.S. shall be granted certain lands for base use
“free of rent.”
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(2) The United States shall have the right to retain the use of
the bases listed in Annex A of the Agreement,
comprising a total area of no less than 240,000 hectares.
(3) The U.S. shall be permitted by the Philippines the extra
use of seven other alternative bases (listed in Annex B of
agreement) as American military need arises or as
required by military necessity.
(4) The U.S. may expand these bases, exchange them for
other bases or yield their rights to such bases.
(5) The U.S. shall have the right to use land and coastal
areas for periodic maneuver, for additional staging areas,
bombing and gunnery ranges, and for immediate
airfields.
(6) The agreement shall remain in force for a period of 99
years, subject to extension thereafter.
The agreement also outlined criminal jurisdictional authority. In peacetime,
on base territory, the Philippines’ jurisdiction was limited to offenses against the
Philippines security or in situations where both offender and offended were
Filipinos. Off-base Philippines jurisdiction was to be retained in all cases except
where both parties were members of the U.S. armed forces; when the offense was
against U.S. security by the U.S. serviceman; when the offense was committed by
a member of the armed forces of the U.S. while engaged in the actual performance
of a specific military duty or during a period of national emergency declared by
either government. In the event the prosecuting attorney found that the offense was
not committed in the actual performance of a specific military duty, the offender’s
commanding officer had the right to appeal the finding to the Secretary of Justice
within ten days from the receipt of the decision, and the decision of the Secretary
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of Justice was final. In wartime, the U.S. had the right to exercise exclusive
jurisdiction over any offense committed by members of the American armed forces
in the Philippines. In all cases under American jurisdiction, the right of separate
civil action was reserved to the offended party to enforce any civil liability that
arose from the offense under the laws of the Philippines.17
The Bases After the 1947 Agreement
Several developments took place after the 1947 agreement. In 1953, there
was communication between President Quirino and President Eisenhower on the
importance of expanding and developing certain U.S. military bases in the
Philippines as well as outstanding property and related questions. Nothing resulted
from this communication. In 1954, President Magsaysay opened negotiations with
the U.S. on problems arising from U.S. military presence, among which were a
clarification of the definition of American and Philippines’ rights of jurisdiction,
respectively, over base personnel)8
In February 1956, alleged Filipino pirates were shot down inside the
American bases. To resolve the jurisdiction question both countries appointed their
respective panels to meet in Manila between August 11, 1956, and December 5,
1956. The Garcia-Bendetsen conferences concerning the question of jurisdiction in
the American bases in the Philippines ended without a solution. The accused
American was transferred to the U.S. beyond the reach of Philippines
jurisdiction.’9
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In July 1956, the American government declared that the U.S. recognized
the sovereignty of the Philippines government over the base lands. This was
repeated by Vice President Nixon when he visited the Philippines in the same year.
Earlier, in August 1953, Attorney General Herbert Brownell had contended that
the U.S. held titles to and thus owned the land and water areas covered in the
military bases. This was contradicted by Senator Recto who argued that the
Military Bases Agreement confirms the view that the Philippines owned the land
involved because of the presence of the phrase “free of rent” in the text of the
Treaty.2°
On 12 October, 1959, Foreign Secretary Felixberto M. Serrano and
Ambassador Charles Bohien agreed in principle to the reduction of the 99-year
lease of bases to 25 years by mutual consent. Also, as a result of negotiations
between them, the town of Olongapo, Zambalas, which had been considered as
American territory, was turned over to Philippines jurisdiction.2’
In the meantime, there was trouble stemming from crimes committed on the
bases. In 1964, a Filipino boy on Clark Air Base was shot in the back by an
American sentry. This was followed shortly by the killing of a Filipino fisherman
by American sentries at the Olongapo Naval Base. A large demonstration was held
on January 25, 1965, denouncing American occupation of the Philippines. In 1968
another Filipino was killed by an American sentry in Cavite. The following year,
another American, who was off duty, went hunting with his service pistol in
violation of U.S. military rules, and in broad daylight shot to death a Filipino
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employee of the military base. These incidents were widely covered in the media,
caused an uproar in the populace, and generated tension in Philippines-American
relations. 22
On August 10, 1965, Foreign Secretary Mauro Mendez and American
Ambassador William Blair, Jr., signed an agreement (the Mendez-Blair
Agreement) revising Article XIII of the military Bases Agreement. Under the
agreement, which did not have the effect of law because the Philippines Secretary
of Justice did not accept it, the U.S. agreed to: (1) give up exclusive jurisdiction
over on-base offenses; (2) define clearly the term “on-duty”; (3) improve the
provisions on waivers of jurisdiction; and (4) create a criminal jurisdiction
implementation committee composed of officials of both governments. The
Mendez-Blair agreement, unlike the original 1947 agreement, conceded to the
Philippines jurisdiction over “off-duty’ offenses committed inside U.S. military
bases and deprived the U.S. of jurisdiction over Filipinos “unless they are in the
U.S. military service.”23
The Rusk-Ramos Agreement in 1966 incorporated some of the compromises
reached by Ambassador Bohien and Foreign Minister Serrano in 1958 and 1959.
Foremost among these agreements in the Philippines’ perspective was the formal
reduction in the lease for the bases from 99 to 25 years.24 In fact, the duration of
the bases agreement is reduced not from 99 to 25 years but to 45, when counted
from 1947.
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While some changes were made by the negotiations, the essential function
of these bases remained almost the same. The U.S. bases in the Philippines
supported the U.S. military operations throughout Asian territory. For example,
they provided the major support for the massive U.S. intervention in Vietnam.
By late 1968, President Marcos stated that the Philippines would have to
take into consideration the realities in Asia such as the eventual withdrawal of the
United States from Asia and the growing power of Mainland China. He implied
that after the American involvement in Vietnam was completed, the U.S. was
unlikely to get so deeply involved in the internal affairs of another country in
Southeast Asia again.25
In June 1983, in accordance with the amendment calling for a review of the
bases to be held every five years, a Memorandum of Agreement was signed that
provided for $900 million in exchange for the continued American use of the
installations for another five years.26 The new provisions amended portions of the
1979 agreement under which the Philippines received $500 million for 5 years in
economic and military assistance but which the Filipinos call “rental.” Also, with
the conclusion of the 1983 review, President Reagan promised to make his best
effort to provide the Philippines with a security assistance package worth $900
million to be distributed over the 1984-88 period.27
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Main Problems with the Bases
Jurisdiction has been a major source of irritation in Philippines-U.S.
relations concerning the bases. There were instances when Filipinos were killed in
the employ of American armed forces in Clark Field, in Pampanga and problems
arose due to the refusal of the American military to hand over the killers to
Philippines courts for trial. According to the Military Bases Agreement of 1947,
offenses committed by Filipinos against Filipinos within the American bases were
to be tried by Philippines courts. In the American view, any investigation of
killings inside the bases required consultation with the American Department of
Defense. There were cases when Americans having committed crimes were sent
home on the grounds that they had finished their tour of duty, thus preventing
Philippines courts from trying the accused.28
In the 1947 agreement, under Article XIII, Paragraph 1, the United States
had the right to exercise jurisdiction over:
(1) Any offense committed by any person within any base
except where the offender and offended parties are both
Philippines citizens (not members of the armed forces of
the U.S. on active duty) or the offense is against the
security of the Philippines;
(2) Any offense committed outside the bases by any member
of the armed forces of the United States in which the
offended party is also a member of the armed forces of
the United States; and
(3) Any offense committed outside the bases by any member
of the armed forces of the United States against the
security of the United States.
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(4) In time of war the United States has the right to exercise
elusive jurisdiction over any offenses which may be
committed by members of the armed forces of the United
States in the Philippines.29
In 1965, this was revised by the Mendez-Blair agreement. In brief, as mentioned
earlier, the U.S. renounced exclusive jurisdiction over on-base offenses. The term
“on-duty” was clarified. It was agreed that the provisions on waivers of jurisdiction
would be improved. It was also agreed that a bipartisan criminal jurisdiction
implementation committee would be created.3°
The renegotiated treaty of 1979, which will be discussed later, did not quite
confront the issue of criminal jurisdiction. The Philippines had wanted to obtain
jurisdiction over all offenses committed by American servicemen except those
committed in the performance of their official duty. It emphasized the abuses by
the American servicemen involving violence, prostitution, gambling, etc.
However, the Americans felt that the Philippines’ judicial process was both too
lengthy and discriminatory towards them. Further, it was expressed that with
martial law the ambiguous definition of subversion could undermine their
enjoyment of civil rights.
Another important issue was sovereignty. There had been widespread
criticism that the bases eroded the sovereignty of the nation. It was contended by
Filipino nationalists that permitting facilities on Philippines soil destroyed the
nation’s sovereignty and perpetuated the old colonial relationship. The renegotiated
agreement of 1979 reaffirmed Philippines sovereignty over the bases and called the
bases Philippines bases and provided that the Philippines flag alone fly over the
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bases. Where the Philippines flag was flown jointly with the U.S. flag, that of the
Philippines would occupy the “place of honor.”3’
Another problem was whether to view U.S. payment for the use of the
bases as aid or rent. The Marcos regime demanded that money for the bases should
be considered straight rental instead of aid. This was because the U.S. would cease
to play a role in administering funds allotted to the bases.32 The U.S. payment for
the bases, Economic Support Fund (FSF), was administered by the Ministry of
Human Settlements, until 1986 headed by the First Lady Imelda Marcos. The U.S.
Agency for International Development (AID), which had to approve the ESF
projects, was skeptical about Mrs. Marcos’s administrative capabilities.33
The 1979 Agreement and Foreign Policy Change
President Marcos began a redefinition or reassessment of U.S.-Philippines
relations with the ultimate foreign policy goal of abolishing the bases. Although it
would not be easy to achieve this ultimate Philippines goal in a short period, a
good alternative was to Filipinize the bases and get the most out of them in terms
of greater rental/aid and concessions. It is then important to discuss some aspects
of the negotiations and the provisions of the 1979 agreement.
The agreement of January 1979 took the form of an exchange of notes
renewing the 1947 treaty with provisions for a thorough review in 1984. The main
documents constituting the amended base agreement included the following:
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(1) Exchange of Notes Amending the Philippines-U.S. Military Bases Agreement
of 1947 (January 7, 1979), including: a) the continuation of the provision regarding
radio broadcasting facilities, b) the continued use of the U.S. relay communications
facility within the Clark Air Base, c) the continuation of the special arrangements
regarding the use of the pipeline from Subic Naval Base to Clark Air Base, d) the
immediate conclusion of an agreement on the issue of the American military
cemetery and memorial in Fort Bonifacio, e) the appropriate measures for a
smooth transition in the event of evacuating the U.S. facilities in the bases; (2) A
Letter from President Carter to Marcos (January 4, 1979), including: a) the U.S.
government’s best effort to obtain $500 million in security assistance appropriation
for the Philippines, b) consideration of the Philippines’ request for military
equipment; (3) A Letter from Secretary Vance to Romulo (January 6, 1979),
including: a) the U.S. support for President Marcos’s plans to achieve military
self-reliance, b) the assumption of perimeter security for the bases to ease the
problems of criminal jurisdiction; (4) Arrangements regarding delineation of United
States facilities at Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base; Powers and
responsibilities of the Philippines base commanders and related powers and
responsibilities of the United States facility commanders.34
There were important provisions which were viewed as gains or
improvements for the Philippines. First, there was the reaffirmation of Philippines
sovereignty and the agreement to fly the Philippines flag singly over the bases.
With the amendment of 1979, Philippines sovereignty over the bases was
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reaffirmed. However, an important provision of the 1979 agreement, which was
contradictory, was the guarantee to the U.S. for “unhampered military operations”
within the bases. There was a fundamental incompatibility between the two key
provisions of the revised agreement--assurance of “unhampered military
operations” for the United States and “Philippine sovereignty” as perceived by
Filipinos. This contradiction stimulated the controversy over the bases.35
Second, there was the installation of a Philippines commander at each
American base. Philippines sovereignty over the bases was reaffirmed and
symbolized by the appointment of “Philippines Base Commanders.” However, the
core operational areas of the bases and all U.S. forces remained administratively
distinct, under the command of “United States Facility Commanders.”
Responsibility for the security of the entire “Philippines base” perimeter, the same
as the old base perimeters, was assigned to the Philippines commanders, intending
to reduce incidents between American security personnel and Filipino intruders.
The American commanders remained responsible for the security of the core
operational areas and even within the reverted territory certain regions known as
“depicted areas” were subject to joint management. The latter included areas of the
Subic Bay and some isolated areas.36
Third, there was a reduction of areas for U.S. use on certain bases.
According to an amendment to the 1979 agreement, a provision was made for the
reversion of large areas of land and water to the Philippines as part of the
Philippines’ military bases: this consisted of about 90 percent of Clark Air Base
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and about 45 percent of the land area at Subic, in addition to most of the waters of
Subic Bay.37
Fourth, there was the issue of perimeter security and criminal jurisdiction.
Under the new agreement, the Philippines government would now provide the
perimeter security. Fifth, there was a provision for a thorough review by the U.S.
and the Philippines of all issues connected with the bases to be undertaken every
five years. This was an important point because it gave the Philippines the
opportunity to bargain on the terms of the bases every five years.38
However, many Filipinos remained unhappy about the agreement and the
amendments were viewed as unsatisfactory because they left undecided such issues
as criminal jurisdiction, immigration, taxation, customs, health inspection and
financial compensation for Filipino nationals.39
While making some significant concessions, the U.S. was able to forestall a
final resolution of the issue of criminal jurisdiction over U.S. service personnel
who would kill or shoot Filipinos on the bases. The United States got a significant
concession in the use of U.S. troops in security activities outside the base
perimeters. This was an area that could be arbitrarily defined to extend from a
few yards to several miles from the base boundaries.
The concessions made by the U.S., such as the flying of the Philippines
flag and the appointment of Philippines base commanders, appeared to be mostly
significant. But as long as the U.S. retained the right of unhampered military
operations, Philippines control over the bases would be considerably limited. As
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former Philippines Senator Salonga stated, no additional concessions were made by
the Americans to meet the Philippines’ demand for increased control over offenses
committed by U.S. personnel.4°
On the whole, the 1979 agreement contained both positive and negative
aspects in terms of increased Philippines independence. On the positive side were
the following gains: First, the duration of the existing agreement was shortened to
five years, with a requirement for a complete and thorough review and
reassessment in 1984 and on the fifth anniversary of any subsequent modification.
Second, the Amendment increased to some extent Philippines participation in the
management of the bases. However, on the other side, the appointment of
Philippines base commanders was not completely sufficient so long as Filipinos
could command only a limited portion of the resources available to their American
counterparts. There was much to be said for the insistence that a major reduction
of the U.S. presence should be made if Philippines independence was to be
strengthened in any substantial way.
To summarize, foreign policy change was reflected in the status of the
bases though not in a completely satisfactory way. Marcos called for a review of
the agreement which eventually resulted in some amendments in 1979. Although
not fully satisfactory, certain changes were made which somewhat improved the
terms regarding the bases. Further, such changes had some important value in the
sense that the Philippines needed some assurance that their sovereignty was
recognized at the bases.
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Change Toward Improved Relations with the Socialist Bloc
One of the most significant foreign policy changes in the Philippines was
the establishment of relations with the Socialist countries. As Table 2 shows, the
martial law regime during the 1970s established various kinds of economic and
political diplomatic relationships with almost every Socialist nation, including
China, the Soviet Union, Eastern European states, Cuba, Vietnam, and others.
The Philippines, as a strong anti-Communist country, had manifested itself in
extreme forms of diplomatic relations. It meant the end of the post-colonial pattern
of Philippines foreign policy, which relied heavily on the United States and the
Western countries.
President Marcos set forth various reasons why the Philippines opened
diplomatic relations with the Socialist bloc. The first reason was independence.
The Philippines had engaged in the wars of foreign nations and permitted other
countries to help in its liberation. The “special relations” with the United States
had separated the Philippines from both the Third World countries and the Socialist
states. The second reason was national interest. Marcos needed the Philippines’
effective bilateral and multilateral relations to achieve diplomatic stability and
economic growth. He decided to seek adjustment through new and diversified
external markets. The third reason was that the bipolar world system has declined.
Marcos perceived that the cold war system was no longer important in international
relations as well as for the Philippines. Fourth, Marcos wanted closer relations
with the Third World mainly because the Philippines had been alienated from the
TABLE 2
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE SOCIALIST BLOC
UNDER MARTIAL LAW
Date
Countries Established Main Events
Romania 72/03/10 President Ceaucescu’s state visit & Seven agreements on varied subjects
(75/04/09-13). Total trade (79): $21.9 million & 33rd largest trading
partner of the Philippines.
Yugoslavia 72/03/10 Agreement to waiver of non-immigrant visa (73/03/09). Vice President
Hodza’s official visit (79/06). Total trade (81): $4.1 million.
E. Germany 73/09/21 Chairman Honecker’s state visit (77/12/06-08). Trade Agreement
(77/12/07). Total trade (80): $9.2 million & 45th largest trading partner
of the Philippines.
Poland 73/09/22 Trade Agreement (76/02/12). Total trade (80): $9.1 million.
Hungary 73/09/28 Trade Agreement (76/10/14). Deputy Foreign Minister Pal Racz’s visit
(77/07/05-08). Foreign Minister Trigyes Puja’s official visit (80/02/21-
26). Total trade (79): $908,420.
Czecho 73/10/03 Trade Agreement (77/03/09). Foreign Minister Bohuslav Chnoupek’s
visit (79/07/13-17). Total trade (73-81): $18.03 million.
Mongolia 73/10/11 Mongolian Minister of Foreign Trade Ochir’s visit (79/05). Chairman of
the State committee on Labor and Wages’s visit (79/12).
Bulgaria 73/11/16 Trade agreement (75/05/02). Economic & Technical Cooperation
Agreement (79/05/10). Total trade (78-81): $1.1 million.
China (PRC) 75/06/09 President Marcos’s state visit (75/06/09). Vice-Premier Li Ziannian’s
return visit (78/03). Total trade (76-81): $900.1 million. Third visit of
Imelda (79/07/08). Agreements in various fields.
USSR 76/06/02 Marcos’s state visit (76/06/02). Trade (80): $210.87 million & 16th
largest Philippines trading partner. Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister
Nikolai Firyubin’s goodwill tour of ASEAN capitals (78/10).
Vietnam 76/07/12 Trade Agreement (78/01/06-09). Prime Minister Pham Van Dong’s state
visit (78/09/16-20). Total trade (78): $2.1 million.
Cuba 76/08/21 Mrs. Marcos’s official visit (76/08). Agreement on Scientific and
Technical Cooperation (78/10/10). Total exports (80): $82,103.
Cambodia 78/05/05 Total exports (80): $2.9 million.
Source: Jose Ingles, Philippines Foreign Policy (Manila: The Lyceum Press, 1982), 63-163.
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Third World movement. And finally, there was a crisis in internal security.
Marcos could deter political and material support for the local Communists coming
from the Socialist nations. He needed “diplomatic initiatives to establish friendly
relations with these nations on the basis of mutual respect for national sovereignty
and territorial integrity, and the principle of noninterference in each other’s internal
affairs.”4’
As evidenced in Table 2, the most critical reason for such an open-door
policy toward the Socialist countries seemed to be economic. In President
Marcos’s own words:
The tearing down of the ideological barriers that isolated the Philippines from the
communist/socialist world was in keeping with the goals of our development
diplomacy. We sought new outlets for our products to minimize dependence on a
few traditional markets.42
After establishing diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia and Romania in
1972, the Philippines government extended its relations with Socialist countries
including East Germany, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia in Eastern
Europe and the People’s Republic of Mongolia in Asia in 1973. In 1975, Marcos
established diplomatic relations with China and in 1976 with the Soviet Union. The
Philippines also opened diplomatic relations with Algeria, Cuba, Libya, and
Vietnam in 1976.~~
In June 1975, President Marcos and Premier Chou En-Lai signed a Joint
Communique which contained the declaration by both countries to respect each
other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and to observe the principle of non
interference in each other’s internal affairs. Chairman Mao also emphasized that
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the Chinese Government would not intervene in Philippines domestic affairs,
although he made a distinction between the Chinese Government and the Chinese
Communist Party. Later, the two countries signed agreements on trade, air
transport, cultural activities, and hotel construction. The Long-Term Trade
Agreement, China’s first long-term trade deal with a developing country, provided
for the exchange of goods valued at $2 billion from 1979 to 1985. The Long-
Term Agreement also provided the basis for other kinds of economic cooperation,
such as the establishment of joint ventures between Filipino corporations and
Chinese state organizations. The air agreement on May 8, 1979, provided for two
weekly flights by the Philippine Air Lines and the China Civil Aviation
Administration. The two countries also agreed on Philippines participation in the
development of China’s tourism industry, such as the construction of two 500-room
hotels in Beijing and Canton. The cultural agreement provided for numerous
exchange visits of private and governmental organizations in such fields as
acrobatics, agriculture, basketball, defense, education, folk arts, journalism, opera,
public works, and technology.~
The Philippines’ diplomatic relations with the Socialist bloc would not have
been successful without having relations also with the Soviet Union. The Soviet
Union, as a superpower in military and economic terms, has been in a position to
influence the region of Southeast Asia since 1945. President Marcos and Supreme
Soviet Presidium President Nikolai Podgorny signed the Joint Philippines-Soviet
Statement during the state visit of President Marcos on June 2, 1976. They
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affirmed that relations between the two countries shall be based on the principles of
peaceful co-existence, including respect for each other’s sovereignty and territorial
integrity, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality, and mutual
benefit. The two countries signed a trade agreement on June 2, 1976. From 1976,
official trade rose $210.87 million in 1980, representing 1.56 percent of total
Philippines trade, which made the Soviet Union the 16th largest Philippines trading
partner. President Marcos’s 1976 state visit was followed by other ASEAN
leadçrs, including the Malaysian, Singaporean and Thai prime ministers, to the
Soviet Union which apparently wished to improve relations with ASEAN
governments. On July 7, 1978, Imelda Marcos signed an executive agreement
with Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in Moscow to implement the Philippines-
Soviet Cultural Agreement for the years 1979-1980.~~
The Philippines government established diplomatic relations with many
Eastern European countries during the martial law period. After diplomatic
relations were established, the Philippines and Eastern European countries signed
numerous agreements in such fields as trade and culture: (1) an agreement relating
to non-immigrant visas with Yugoslavia on March 9, 1973; (2) an Agreement on
Cultural Cooperation with Czechoslovakia on October 8, 1974; (3) seven
agreements in various fields with Romania on April 9-13, 1975; (4) a trade
agreement with Poland on February 12, 1976; (5) an agreement on cultural
relations with Hungary on July 15, 1976; (6) a Trade Agreement with
Czechoslovakia on March 9, 1977; (7) an agreement on cultural relations with
81
Yugoslavia on September 14, 1977; (8) an agreement on cultural cooperation with
Bulgaria on June 9, 1978; (9) an executive program with Romania on January 24,
1979; (10) an Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement with Bulgaria on
May 10, 1979; (11) an agreement on scientific and cultural cooperation with
Hungary on February 22, 1980. There were also state visits by President Nicholas
Ceaucescu of Romania in 1975 and Chairman Erich Honecker of East Germany in
1977.46
The Philippines established diplomatic relations with the Mongolian
People’s Republic on October 11, 1973. The two countries had no trade relations
during the martial law period. The Philippines also, in concert with ASEAN
members, established diplomatic relations with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam
on July 12, 1976. In September 1978, during Prime Minister Pham Van Dong’s
state visit, the two countries agreed that they would discuss and settle any
differences or disagreements in a spirit of conciliation and friendship. Philippines
trade with Vietnam amounted to $1.9 million in 1977 and $2.1 million in 1978.
However, trade stopped completely when Vietnam invaded Cambodia in 1979, but
it was resumed in 1980 and the Philippines exported $2.9 million to Vietnam.47
The Marcos regime established diplomatic relations with Cuba on
August 21, 1976, during Imelda Marcos’s official visit. An agreement on
scientific and technical cooperation was signed on October 10, 1978. The
Philippines agreed to reduce its quota under the International Sugar Agreement of
1977 by 100,000 metric tons to enable Cuba to retain its basic quota.48
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Conclusion
The U.S. military bases in the Philippines have been an aspect of
Philippines-U.S. relations generally considered salient and which was often a
source of irritation in the relationship. The situation surrounding the U.S. bases in
the Philippines is a major indicator of Philippines foreign policy change.
In the mid-seventies, at the same time that the Philippines was talking about
a change in its foreign policy, it called for a review of the bases agreement. In the
agreement of 1979, Marcos obtained some concessions. These were: reversion of
certain base land to Philippines control, reaffirmation of Philippines sovereignty,
and Filipino soldiers becoming base commanders. The flying of the Philippines
flag over the bases also constituted an improvement in the Philippines’ position.
The automatic review of provisions for the bases after 5 years was a further bonus
for Manila. However, upon closer examination, it appeared that these concessions
were not so substantial considering other provisions, like the guarantee of
unhampered operations for the U.S. and the limited authority of the Philippines
base commanders.
Certainly, the true measure of foreign policy change during the martial law
period would have been if the Philippines had eliminated the bases. However,
considering the constraints that existed against doing so, such as treaties giving the
Americans the right to retain the bases until 1991, plus the perception of some that
the Philippines wanted to keep the bases to maintain the balance of power in the
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region, some measure of foreign policy change can be seen in the greater
Philippines control over the bases.
As the historical background has shown, negotiations on the bases have
occurred over time. Gradual improvements have been attained as part of a
sequence of improvements. It should also be noted that one of the major
Philippines foreign policy changes in the seventies was the establishment of
diplomatic relations with the Socialist countries. The foreign policy posture of the
seventies contrasted sharply with that of the previous decades when the Philippines
had no relations with the Socialist bloc. In particular, the Philippines, as one of
the leading anti-Communist states, took steps to improve its relations with the
world’s two leading Socialist countries, the Soviet Union and China.
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FOREIGN POLICY SHIFT TOWARD ASEAN COOPERATION
In addition to the major issues surrounding the U.S. military bases, the
clear tilt in the Philippines’ foreign relations toward ASEAN represents another
important element of its foreign policy change. This chapter focuses on the
ASEAN shift and includes a discussion of the Sabah territorial dispute between two
ASEAN members, the Philippines and Malaysia.
ASEAN’s Formation
The record of regional cooperation in Southeast Asia was not successful
before ASEAN was established on August 8, 1967. Exercises in regional
cooperation had been weak and divisive. Southeast Asian nations that had
traditionally avoided regional efforts began to pursue a major interest in the
prospects of regionalism. There were some organizations in the region before
ASEAN, including the U.N. Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East
(ECAFE), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and the Asian and Pacific Council
(ASPAC).
There were two bodies directly related to the creation of ASEAN, the




established in 1963, which was a device to try to resolve the controversy over
Malaysia. MAPHILINDO became superficial because of Indonesia’s
confrontational policy towards Malaysia and the Philippines’ claim over the Sabah
territory. These two bodies helped regional countries establish the foundation for
regional relationships. Basically, ASEAN was formed with the membership of
these two bodies, except for Singapore, which officially achieved an independent
separation from Malaysia in 1965. Brunei joined ASEAN in January 1984.
Table 3, below, presents the basic characteristics of ASEAN members.
TABLE 3
BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF ASEAN COUNTRIES
Brunei Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Thailand Singapore
Population in millions, in mid-1978
0.256 136.0 13.3 45.6 44.5 2.3
Area in thousands of square kilometers
6 2,027 330 300 513 1
GNP per capita circa 1982 in U.S. dollars, with real average annual growth, 1970-1982 in percentages
17,000 580 1,860 820 790 5,910
— 4.2 4.3 2.8 4.5 7.4
Average annual inflation circa 1970 1982 in percentages
-6.9 19.9 7.2 12.8 9.7 5.4
Life expectancy at birth circa 1980
76 59 68 59 62 71
Adult illiteracy circa 1980 in percentages
29 28 25 15 11 .2
Note: Brunei in 1990.
Source: World Bank, World Development Report (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992, 218-219); Gale
Research Inc., Countries of the World (Detroit: Gale Research Inc., 1993, 344-347); Woridmark Press,
Worldmark Encyclopedia of the Nations (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1988, 39-42). Economic
Society of Singapore, ASEAN: External Economic Relations (Singapore: Chopmen Publishers, 1982), 14, 21;
Tan Loong-Hoe and Narongchai Akrasanee, ASEAN: U.S. Economic Relations (Singapore: Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies, 1988), 68, 83.
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ASA
ASA (The Association of Southeast Asia) was the most significant regional
precursor organization to ASEAN. ASA was created on July 31, 1961. The
foundations of ASA were laid down by Carlos Garcia, the president of the
Philippines, and Tunku Abdul Rahman, the prime minister of Malaya (Malaya
became Malaysia in 1963) when the latter visited Manila in 1959 and agreed on a
regional organization for mutual assistance in the economic, social and cultural
fields. Thailand accepted the invitation to join the Association in 1961. ASA was
not created by nor did it include non-regional powers, and it was not an ideological
organization. Tunku Abdul Rahman pointed out its characteristics in 1961:
[ASA] is in no way intended to be an anti-Western bloc or anti-Eastern bloc, or,
for that matter, a political bloc of any kind. It is not connected in any way with
the various organizations which are in existence today; it is purely a Southeast
Asian Economic and Cultural Cooperation Organization and has no backing
whatsoever from any foreign source.’
ASA was an indigenous Southeast Asian effort to provide more stable
domestic development and a new sense of regional identity, which had been
distorted and destroyed by colonial powers. In the early years of ASA, its
members, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand, concentrated on economic
cooperation. With a group of senior officials representing each government, ASA
tried to achieve cooperation in various fields, including agriculture, education,
fishery, marketing, and trade. However, unlike the original purpose of regional
cooperation, the organization became unsuccessful. The failure of ASA was
90
caused and started mainly by the Philippines’ territorial claim to Sabah, which
served to upset relationships between leaders in the Philippines and Malaysia.
One of the strongest opponents of the claim was president of the
Philippines. Ferdinand Marcos helped resume and lay the groundwork for
reconciliation between Manila and Kuala Lumpur. In addition, there was an
abortive coup in Indonesia which led to some major changes in the Southeast Asian
political environment. As the new regime in Indonesia ended its anti-Malaysia
policy, the relationship between the two ASA members was a revival of regional
cooperation.
While ASA emphasized economic and cultural cooperation, it was not
separated from security issues. As Abdul Rahman put it, there has always been an
interest in the political-security field:
[Wie believe sincerely that the best possible way of preventing the Communists
from trying to destroy the lives and souls of our nations is by improving the lot of
our peoples... we must make ASA an inspiration and an example of sustained
effort in growth and development.2
In this statement a clear connection between the security issue and regional
cooperation was evident. The containment of Communism in Southeast Asia
primarily meant stopping internal subversion, which was different from other
regions and continents. The internal subversion was caused mainly by economic
inequality and poverty. Ending economic discontent was thus an important priority
in achieving regional cooperation.
Although ASA failed to achieve tangible cooperation, there were some
positive benefits. It represented a practical, indigenous Southeast Asian
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experience. It helped set the agenda for the future. It created a strong sense
among the indigenous elites toward regionalism.
MAPHILINDO
MAPHILINDO was created on July 31, 1963 and signed by Macapagal of
the Philippines, Rahman of Malaya, and Sukarno of Indonesia. It was a
consultative body of the three Malay nations. Indonesia seemed to give more
importance to MAPHILINDO than to the other regional organizations, such as
ASA which it did not join. The creation of MAPHILINDO later gave important
momentum to the establishment of ASEAN. However, MAPHILINDO was
created to serve personal agendas. For Sukarno of Indonesia, it was used to get
the Philippines’ cooperation for his anti-Malaysian campaign (Konfrontasi).
Philippines President Macapagal hoped to prevent the incorporation of Sabah
territory into the Malaysian federation and proposed the notion of a Philippines
Malayan confederation. Thus, from the beginning, these ambitious desires made
regional cooperation unlikely.
ASEAN’s Evolution
ASEAN was the first general, indigenous, and politically neutral effort in
Southeast Asian regional cooperation. It was general because ASEAN was to serve
multiple functions, including economic, cultural, political, and security. It was
indigenous because ASEAN was obviously distinguished from such organizations
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as SEATO and others which had been based on external support, especially from
the U.S. ASEAN was the product of the Southeast Asian governments themselves.
It was neutral in the sense that ASEAN included Indonesia, whose foreign policy
of nonalignment was supported by all member states.
The main impetus to its formation was Indonesia’s domestic political
change in 1965. A movement led by the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) failed
on September 30, 1965, and weakened Sukarno’s political system of “Guided
Democracy” which significantly affected the entire region’s political environment.
That event and its consequences not only made possible a transfer of power to
Suharto and the military in Indonesia in March 1966 but also led its foreign policy
toward regional reconciliation and a pro-Western posture. Suharto, for example,
ended direct confrontation with Malaysia in 1966, and broke off its diplomatic
relations with China after it had backed the PKI. Indonesia’s political change
provided the original five member states with common interests with respect to
politico-economic development and their foreign relations.
The instrumental priority of ASEAN was regional reconciliation because
conflicts among its member states were serious. The maln object of regional
cooperation was to promote and strengthen the domestic stability of the member
regimes by reducing disputes among them.
Internal stability and the development of each ASEAN member could be
achieved by economic growth, social progress, and cultural enrichment. The
problems of regional security and stability were not top priorities at the outset.
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For ASEAN there were two aspects of security: first, “the assurance of
security within each state through positive programs, such as the development of
all sectors of society in the hope that it will lead to economic well-being and to
social peace, social justice and social stability”; and second, “the forging of a
viable regional unity” by each member’s own approach (i.e., national resilience for
Indonesia; self-reliance for the Philippines; “Rukunegara” for Malaysia). The
logic is that “if a country were socially and economically sound, then political
well-being would follow.”3
ASEAN was not so successful in its early interactions. Severe limitations
in economic cooperation and political reconciliation remained among the member
states. There was also a revival of intra-regional conflict between members of
ASEAN. In 1968, the Philippines and Malaysia had a period of diplomatic
interruption over the Sabah territory. In the same year, two Indonesian marines
were found guilty of murder and sabotage during a confrontation between
Singapore and Indonesia. These serious problems suggested a very pessimistic
future for the organization.
On the other hand, these same problems stimulated a rearrangement in
ASEAN’s agenda for cooperation. Initially members failed to see the connection
between their cooperation for economic development and support for their
respective internal political development. In light of the early problems, the
member states began to re-examine the utility of political cooperation for the
common role of ASEAN, especially with regard to foreign interactions.
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Malaysia proposed a plan for the neutralization of all of Southeast Asia, to
be guaranteed by the major powers in the region. Since there was not a common
strategic perspective in the region, it was more difficult to include all the Southeast
Asian states. This proposal, however, provided a motivation for the ASEAN states
to put together a proposal for the establishment of a Zone of Peace, Freedom and
Neutrality (ZOPFAN). The proposal offered the basic foundation of regional order
by excluding an intervening role for foreign powers, and it was strong enough to
provide a direction that ASEAN states could pursue. It also provided the new
Indonesian government with a continuing independent strategic policy.
In 1975, the successful Communist unification of Vietnam was a major
event in the evolution of ASEAN. The event reinforced regional polarization and
ideological competition. Furthermore, the fall of the Cambodian regime
immediately after the Vietnam unification in 1975 was given serious attention by
the ASEAN members. ASEAN member states’ heads of government met on Bali,
Indonesia, in February 1976 for the first time. At this first meeting, ASEAN
agreed to establish a permanent secretariat in Jakarta. The Bali summit displayed a
confident response to the turmoil in Indochina and suggested an absence of any
sense of imminent external threat.
In 1978, the second summit meeting was held in Kuala Lumpur. The most
successful achievement at this meeting was the renouncement of President
Marcos’s claim to Sabah, which eliminated the “cynicism and skepticism”
surrounding ASEAN’s viability and capability.4
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There was insufficient progress, however, to develop a strong relationship
with Vietnam. Vietnam and Laos, at the Colombo conference of non-aligned
countries in 1976, attacked the legitimacy of the ZOPFAN proposal as well as the
role of ASEAN in the Southeast Asian regional order. They asserted that the
organization was a tool of “American imperialism” and called for the full support
of the nonalignment movement against “neocolonialism.”5
Although ASEAN’s activities were initially limited to economic, social, and
cultural cooperation, the motives behind its establishment were mainly regarded as
political and diplomatic in nature. The Bangkok Declaration of 1967 indicated that
the goal of the member states was to “ensure their stability and security from
external interference.”6 The ASEAN governments have tried to deny that ASEAN
is a military organization. Nonetheless, ASEAN provided an intangible but
significant security function by creating a common sense of cooperation among
member states that were confronting their internal problems and an uncertain and
complex external political environment:
Considering that the countries of Southeast Asia share a primary responsibility for
strengthening the economic and social stability of the region and ensuring their
peaceful and progressive national development, and that they are determined to
ensure their stability and security from external interference in any form or
manifestation in order to preserve their national identities.... Affirming that all
foreign bases are temporary and remain only with the expressed concurrence of
the countries concerned and are not intended to be used directly or indirectly to
subvert the national independence and freedom of states in the area.7
Clearly, the creation of ASEAN has given the member states a confidence and
symbolic solidarity as a political entity among neighboring countries and not
merely as a traditional security alliance. Nevertheless, ASEAN made no significant
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progress in such economic, social, and cultural fields mainly because of dissimilar
natural resources, diverse ethnic groups, and various religious traditions.
Following the breakdown of the non-Communist governments in South
Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia in 1975, the ASEAN states began to enhance their
solidarity in a more significant way. At its first summit meeting in Bali,
Indonesia, on February 24, 1976, ASEAN began to exhibit some political
cooperation. One of the major statements from the conference was a Declaration
of ASEAN Concord, which was an agreement outlining the collective security
function of the Association, directed against the member states’ internal threats.
The statesmen of member states also reaffirmed a commitment to the Zone of
Peace proposal which had become the symbolic expression of a common external
relations. Another outcome was the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation that allowed
other regional states accession to the Association, including Vietnam. The highest
decision-making body in the Association became the heads of government meeting.
In this way ASEAN cooperation continued to function until 1979, when a new
development occurred in Indochina.
When the anti-Communist regimes in South Vietnam and Cambodia fell,
the ASEAN countries agreed to recognize the two new governments. This
recognition of Communist regimes was not easily done by the conservative anti
Communist governments in the ASEAN nations. But each government successfully
defended its policy of recognition of the regimes by referring to the collective
position of ASEAN. At the same time, when Communist Vietnam invaded
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Cambodia in 1979, Thailand’s Kriangsak government did not recognize the new
pro-Vietnamese government of Heng Samrin, referring to the ASEAN collective
position.
ASEAN’s Functions
The most significant sources of tangible support for ASEAN came from the
U.S. and its allies. As Table 4 shows, economic relations with Japan, the United
States, and the Western countries are very important even as significant intra
ASEAN economic cooperation has been maintained. Since the member states’
economic development strategies generally have been export-oriented, foreign
capital investment and transnational aid has been essential.
ASEAN increasingly received support from external powers as it moved
forward aggressively with its collective activities. At the beginning, there was
much criticism from the former Soviet Union and China, accusing it of being an
imperialist-inspired organization. Horn pointed out that “viewing the region as a
whole, Moscow has been suspicious of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN)” since its formation in 1967.8 The Soviet Union saw it as a U.S.
influenced military character. China has given moderate support to ASEAN, in
contrast to the Soviet Union. But it received much warmer support from the two
countries after Vietnam’s unification .~
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World Total 100% 100%
Sources: Gale Research Inc., Countries of the World (Detroit: Gale Research Inc., 1993), 344-347;
Worldmark Press, Worldmark Encyclopedia of the Nations (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1988), 39-
42; Tan Loong-Hoe and Narongchai Akrasanee, ASEAN: U.S. Economic Relations (Singapore: Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies, 1988), 79, 102-103.
ASEAN has grown to serve the status and legitimacy of each of its member
governments. For example, ASEAN has given strong support to Indonesia’s
independent foreign policy. It gave the Razak government of Malaysia a political
advantage with the endorsement of its ZOPFAN proposal. As for the Philippines,
the organization provided a new momentum to deal with nationalists’ complaints
about the United States. Singapore has secured an equal footing with her much
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larger neighbors. The members of the Association also enjoyed more flexibility
with their foreign policy, particularly with respect to Indonesia. Finally, both the
Philippines and Thailand have been able to maximize their effectiveness in
bargaining with the U.S. on military base issues.
Collective political defense increasingly has become more important to
ASEAN member states. Collective political defense connotes solidarity and mutual
support among members. It has been useful in dealing with external powers as
well as domestic matters.
The ASEAN nations have made great efforts for collective security
cooperation. For example, after the meeting of Suharto and Razak in Medan in
November 1975, the Indonesian Defense Chief, General Panggabean, mentioned a
mutual security perception: “Whatever problem Malaysia faces is considered to be
a problem of Indonesia too and vice-versa.”10 Also, ASEAN states have often
cooperated militarily among themselves, as shown in Table 5. Singapore utilizes
military facilities in the Philippines for its combat pilot training. The former
Singaporean prime minister, Lee Kwan Yew, negotiated with the Brunei leadership
to establish a bilateral defense connection, to allow training of its armed forces in
Lakiun. Malaysia provided an intra-ASEAN military training site at its Jungle and
Combat Warfare School in Jojore. Indonesia allowed Malaysian special troops to
be trained at the Batu Djajar Commando Training Center in Bandung, Indonesia.
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Indonesia, Malaysia a. “Malindo Jaya’ naval exercises
a. August 1975, to train for enforcement of joint
July 1977/ archipelago boundary in Malacca
b. October 1975-Annual! Straits.
c. 1977, intermittent!
d. December 1977- b. “Elang Malindo” air defense
Annual/exercises, exercises.
e. September 1981/
f. August 1983) c. “Cahaya Bena” joint anti-insurgency
patrols, sea patrols on Thai-Malay
border-refugee control--Joint Border
Commission regulates “right of hot
pursuit and other aspects of exercises.
d. “Kekar Malindo” series alternating between
Malaysian and Indonesian territory in the
Sarawak-Kalimantan area; these anti-
insurgency exercises upgraded in 1980
(“Aram Malindo”) and 1981 (‘Tatar
Malindo”).
e. Conduct seventh joint air exercises at
Butterworth Air Base to improve operational
capabilities in border operations.
f. A land exercise at Kota Kinabalu in Malaysia
under the name of Tatar Malindo Dua.
Indonesia, Malaysia, “Sea Ex Thermal I” joint naval exercise
Thailand oriented toward straits and archipelago
(November 1979) defense.
Indonesia, Singapore a. Joint patrols have been conducted in the
a. 1974-! conducted in the Malacca and Singapore
b. September 1975! straits against smugglers.
c. September 1978!






c. Indonesia and Singapore deploy
four warships each in South China
Sea.
d. Indonesia and Singapore hold
six-day joint air force exercise in
East Java-- “Elang Indopara I.”
e. Englek’ naval exercise--four
Singapore patrol vessels and two
Indonesian guided missile equipped
destroyer escorts.
Malaysia, Thailand a. A joint border force, in
a. 1959- / operation since 1959, was
b. August 1980/ significantly upgraded to combat
c. August 1983) insurgencies on both sides of the
border.
b. First major joint naval exercise
ranging from the southern tip of
Malaysia to the Thai port of
Sattahip near Cambodia--20
warships deployed, anti-submarine
warfare (ASW) and surface maneuvers
were conducted.
c. Maritime exercises in South
China Sea and Gulf of Siam under
the name of Thaly and See III.
Indonesia, Thailand a. First joint air exercise--
a. January 198 1/ computer simulation only--no combat
b. August 1983) units involved. Combined with
Indonesian ASW exercises in South
China Sea.
b. Maritime exercises at Java Sea,






Malaysia, Philippines Agreement was reached to act
(1967) against smuggling and other illegal
passage on the borders of both
states.
Indonesia, Philippines a. Accords were negotiated to
a. 1964 & 1967/ cooperate in limiting smuggling and
b. March 1975/ unauthorized immigration.
c. October 1975/
d. 1978) b. Joint border patrol agreements
were consummated denying
sanctuaries to persons involved
in illegal activities in either
state as well as adjacent states.
c. Joint naval exercises commenced.
d. A border crossing agreement was
signed.
Sources: Robert Rau, Southeast Asian Security in the 1980s: An Intraregional Perspective, in William Tow
and William Feeney, eds., U.S. Foreign Policy and Asian-Pacific Security: A Transregional Approach
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1982), 97-98; William Tow, ‘U.S. Alliance Policies and Asian-Pacific Security: A
Transregional Approach,” in Ibid.; Sheldon Simon, The Future of Asian-Pacific Security Collaboration
(Lexington: Lexington Books, 1988), 84.
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Singapore and Thailand exercised together in their training camps.’1 Also, Table 6
shows the current levels of ASEAN defense capabilities.
TABLE 6
ARMED FORCES OF ASEAN COUNTRIES
Army Navy Air Force Paramilitary




Indonesia: 216,000 38,000a 27,000 Police mobile
3 sub- 84 combat brigade: 12,000






Malaysia: 90,000 9,000 11,000 90,000
36 in- 4 fri- 61 combat People’s
fantry gates; aircraft Volunteer Corps
battal- 12 fast- : 350,000
ions; attack
7 artil- craftb;
lery re- 21 large
giments patrol craft
Philippines: 70,000 26,000w 17,000 Constabulary:
5 infan- 7 fri- 88 combat 50,000; Civil
try di- gates; aircraft Home Defense








Army Navy Air Force Paramilitary
Singapore: 45,000 4,500 6,000 7,500 Police;
1 armored A fleet Over 100 30,000 Home
brigade of 34 combat and Guard
ships transport
aircraft
Thailand: 166,000 42,000e 48,000 Volunteer






a. including naval aviators and marines.
b. missile-equipped.
c. including 9,500 marines and 2,000 in the coast guard.
d. in March 1987, the government announced that the Civil Home Defense force
was being disbanded and would be replaced by a national police force.
e. including 20,000 marines.
Source: Worldmark Press, Woridmark Encyclopedia of the Nations (New York: John Wiley &
Sons, Inc., 1988).
The political solidarity of ASEAN has enhanced each member’s bargaining
position in bilateral negotiations with great powers. With the exception of
Singapore, in 1975-76 all ASEAN states supported Indonesia’s occupation of East
Timor. When there was tension between Thailand and Vietnam after the 1979
Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, the Vietnamese were not as inclined to engage
in a direct confrontation with Thailand. ASEAN made it clear that it was interested
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in the borderline dispute. Likewise, the ASEAN states signed a joint resolution for
consideration by the UN Security Council when China invaded Vietnam in 1979.12
These examples suggest that collective action of ASEAN has been somewhat
successful. On the other hand, it could not significantly affect the Sino-Vietnamese
conflict nor the Vietnamese invasion into Cambodia. Also, some ASEAN members
often relied on external powers to reduce or minimize the subversive activities in
their territory.
Another major example related to collective political defense dealt with was
the massive influx of refugees from Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. The ASEAN
nations, except Singapore, had serious difficulties absorbing any refugees because
of the economic burden they posed. In addition, an influx might provoke ethnic
unrest (i.e., anti-Chinese sentiments in Indonesia and Malaysia) and security
problems (i.e., revolutionary and terrorist movements in Malaysia or Thailand).
Thus, even though some members were not much affected, they all sought
collectively to distribute the refugees. ASEAN made contacts with the United
States and other countries for admission of the refugees, and they held an
international conference to discuss the problem in Jakarta.’3
The process of consultation has contributed to ASEAN solidarity and the
prevention of conflicts among its member states. It has been generally understood
within the ASEAN states that a government should consult with other members
before undertaking any major decision that might affect others’ interests. This
understanding was formalized in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation signed on
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February 24, 1976, at Denpasar, Bali, in Indonesia. The Treaty specifies that
ASEAN members “shall maintain regular contact and consultations with one
another on international and regional matters with a view to coordinating their
views, actions, and policies.”14
The earliest example of such consultative exchange was at the 1971 Kuala
Lumpur conference when the member governments agreed to consult on their
policies toward China. When Malaysia became the first ASEAN nation to propose
diplomatic normalization with China in 1973, it consulted with Indonesia and
delayed recognition for a year to accommodate Indonesian interests.
Following the Vietnam war, there was a series of bilateral ASEAN summit
consultations prompted by the considerable differences among members regarding
their appropriate responses. As the most affected country, Thailand believed that it
should lead in formulating a unilateral ASEAN voice. On the other hand, Malaysia
and Indonesia were unhappy when Thailand permitted Chinese military aid to flow
to Pol Pot forces through its borderline. Malaysia argued that such support would
significantly hurt ASEAN’s neutral policy on the issue of Indochina.
The ASEAN member states do not individually have enough resources to
lend financial aid since most of them, except for Singapore, have been very
dependent on a few agricultural products for their export-oriented industrialization.
They desired more active foreign investment and foreign aid. ASEAN has actively
participated in the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) and the developing nations’ (Group of 77) North-South economic
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dialogues. ASEAN has sought specific support such as the establishment of an
Integrated Commodity Program including a Common Fund. For that purpose, and
despite an increased external debt as shown in Figure 1, ASEAN has been
successful in getting external support from the developed as well as the developing
countries. Except for Singapore, which has developed into a creditor country,
every ASEAN nation, especially Indonesia and the Philippines, has received a
great deal of development assistance from developed countries.
ASEAN increasingly expanded its discussions with Australia, New Zealand,
Canada, and the United States during the 1970s. The industrialized nations
recognized the importance of ASEAN’s economy. Undersecretary of State for
Economic Affairs Richard N. Cooper said in the first U.S.-ASEAN trade dialogue
held in Manila in 1977 that ASEAN is “a source of numerous commodities
important for industrializing and industrialized nations” and “an area with unusual
growth potentials.”5 ASEAN nations rapidly built their bilateral relations with
industrialized nations, such as the Philippines with the United States and Canada,
Malaysia with Australia, and Indonesia with Japan and the EC. This method of
engaging in collective dialogues has been much more useful in securing external
support than bilateral interstate relations alone. For example, following the U.S.
ASEAN ministerial dialogue in 1978, American firms became more interested in
the region. As indicated in Figure 2, U.S. exports and imports as well as direct
investment greatly increased during the period.
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Figure 1. Total External Debt of ASEAN Countries
Sources: World Bank, World Development Report (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980, 1985,
1992); World Resources Institute World Resources (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992, 239).
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As stated in the ASEAN Declaration of August 8, 1967, benefits from their
economic cooperation were clearly expected. Before the 1976 Bali summit,
however, intra-ASEAN economic cooperation had not been very successful.
ASEAN sought a long-term development project with the United Nations which
undertook a study of means to enhance economic and trade cooperation among its
member states. This effort produced a UN report suggesting that each ASEAN
market should be complementary and liberalized on a product by product basis.
The report provided the basis of economic cooperation among member states with
full participation of economic ministers from each country.
In fact, the most significant form of intra-ASEAN economic cooperation
was in the area of trade liberalization. In 1977 the member states agreed to sign an
Agreement on Preferential Trading Arrangement (PTA) that included tariff
preferences, long-term quantity contracts, purchase finance support at preferential
rates of interest, and other forms of commercial advantages. Still, the impact of the
PTA on intra-ASEAN economic cooperation has been minimal, consisting of less
than 20 percent of total trade during the 1970s.
It is not easy to categorize ASEAN based on its functions. ASEAN does not
belong to a security organization such as NATO or to an economic organization
such as the EC. Its objectives have been somewhat limited. Its primary goal has
been to strengthen its member states’ regimes. Unstable domestic environments
have precluded large-scale economic cooperation or a broad-based military
alliance. The essence of ASEAN is its rejection of interference by external powers.
Figure 2: U.S. Trade and Investment with ASEAN, 1975 and 1987
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Note: Direct investment is the yearend book value of US direct investors’ equity in, and net
outstanding loans to, their foreign affiliates. This does not include US oil company expenditure in
exploration and development. Also, it does not include investment in Brunei.
Source: Tan Loong-Hoe and Narongchai Akrasanee, ASEAN-U. S. Economic Relations (Singapore:
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1988), 83, 163; Gale Research, Countries of the World
(Detroit: Gale Research Inc., 1993), 1868.
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The Sabah Territorial Dispute Between the Philippines and Malaysia
The Philippines’ territorial claim to North Borneo was officially made in
1962 by Philippines President Macapagal. British decolonization in Southeast Asia
provided an opportunity for the Philippines to initiate its claim to Sabah.16 The
decolonization process was to create in 1963 a federal state incorporating
independent Malaya and Sabah, Sarawak, and Singapore. Since the formation of
Malaysia, both the Philippines and Malaysia have claimed sovereignty in Sabah.
The Philippines claim became the most serious issue affecting the bilateral relations
between the two ASEAN states and by extension ASEAN unity. The Sabah issue
has become further complicated by alleged Malaysian support for Philippines
Muslim separatist groups in Mindanao, the best known of which is the Moro
National Liberation Front (MNLF). The MNLF received money and weapons from
Libya which were transported through Sabah. Up until the mid-1976, Sabah’s chief
minister was Tun Mustapha, who was Muslim and anti-Philippines and who
provided a supply route for arms and a sanctuary to the MNLF. The Malaysian
government apparently tolerated Mustapha’s activities and allegedly provided
military training to the MNLF.’7
The Sabah claim was raised by the Philippines when it was one of the
member states of the Association of Southeast Asia. By pressing the claim, the
Philippines terminated the activities of ASA. The controversy dates back to the
mid-l6th century, but the fateful year was 1878, when the Sultan of Sulu and two
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Figure 3. The Location of Sabah in Southeast Asia
European businessmen who were the founders of the North Borneo Company
reached an agreement on who was going to have sovereignty over the territory.
The legal issue is whether the Sultan “ceded” or “leased” his territory to the
businessmen. In 1946, the North Borneo Company gave all its rights to the British
Crown. When the Philippines declared its sovereign claim to North Borneo, North
Borneo had been a British Protectorate for some sixteen years.’8
At the time of the Sabah claim, according to Noble, the Philippines
probably had two motivations: (1) “pursuit of the claim was a demonstration of
their ability to act independently to protect what they defined as their rights, and/or
honor and hence to improve their national image,” and (2) “the claim had
I
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possible--but no critical--benefits and no costs.”19 These two motivations have been
very important in terms of the Philippines’ understanding of appropriate and
acceptable behavior within the context of ASA. It could be argued that the
Philippines miscalculated the implications of its Sabah claim to ASA and its
bilateral relations with Malaya since the Philippines policy makers thought that its
claim would be more beneficial than costly to the Philippines. This miscalculation
might have occurred because mutual understandings in terms of intra-ASA conflict
resolution between the ASA states had not developed. Indeed, the Philippines
policy makers were not sufficiently prepared to justify the claim fully. Noble
points out that the Philippines policy makers usually lacked both broad historical
background and precision. Noble argued that there was no evidence that the
Philippines realized before formally announcing the claim that the boundaries of
the 1878 act did not comply with the boundaries of North Borneo.20 Noble
indicates that “Macapagal and most Filipinos involved in making policy assumed
that they could avoid conflict between the two aims--claiming North Borneo and
maintaining cooperation with Malaysia in ASA--by pressing a claim against Britain
before Malaysia came into being.”2’
The Sabah Claim Before Martial Law
An attempt to correct the strained relations between the Philippines and
Malaya was made by President Macapagal, who advocated the formation of the
“Greater Malay Confederation,” generally known as MAPHILINDO, among
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Malaya, the Philippines, and Indonesia. Officially, MAPHILINDO was based on
an assumed common ethnic identity of Malay origin and the principle of
“mushawarah” (friendly and regular consultation). On the other hand, the
Philippines and Indonesia intended to prevent the formation of Malaysia. There is
substantive evidence to suggest that Macapagal’s proposal for MAPHILINDO was
a tactic to help press the Philippines’ claim. A confidential study commissioned by
Macapagal and done by the University of Philippines states that:
This clearly leaves two courses of action, which are not mutually exclusive, that the
Philippines can pursue. One course of action is already being pursued: i.e.,
President Macapagal’s confederation proposal. This course of action would be
fruitful provided it succeeds in superseding, or preventing the formation of, the
Federation of Malaysia, as the President apparently intended. The idea is twofold:
(1) to prevent the British from unilaterally transferring sovereignty over North
Borneo to a federation which excludes the Philippines; and (2) to keep open the
avenue to a negotiated settlement of the status of North Borneo.22
Gordon also indicates that Indonesia’s real foreign-policy goals (including perhaps
expansion or dominance over Malaysia) and long-standing anti-Malaya attitudes
provided a political base for its efforts to disrupt Malaya’s plans for a new state.23
A United Nations mission was sent to Sabah, Sarawak, and Singapore to
confirm the desire of the peoples to join Malaya in a federal Malaysia. It
concluded that the majority of the peoples of these areas were in favor of joining
the Federation of Malaysia. Malaya, however, declared the establishment of
Malaysia before the mission’s report became public.24 Because of this swift
declaration, and other reasons, the Philippines and Indonesia did not accept the
mission’s report or the establishment of Malaysia. Malaysia, in turn, severed its
diplomatic relations with these two states. Indonesia’s confrontational policy
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against Malaysia became intensified because Indonesian leaders thought that
Malaysia was an imperialist state. In doing so, the extended conflict among the
three states looked insoluble for the time being.
However, by mid-1966, significant political changes in leadership had taken
place in the Philippines and Indonesia. In the Philippines, Ferdinand Marcos had
became the president, and in Indonesia, an abortive military coup of September 30,
1965, led to the deterioration of President Sukarno’s political power. Since the
military coup attempt was alleged to have been associated with the Communist
Party of Indonesia (PKI) and China, which had became very closely associated
with the PKI by that time, Indonesia under the leadership of Suharto and the
Indonesian Army outlawed the PKI and froze diplomatic relations with China.
Without the PKI and Sukarno, there was only the Indonesian military able to
control Indonesian political processes with an emphasis on economic development
through Western economic assistance and investment.26
Since 1966, Indonesia has joined pro-Western and pro-capitalist Southeast
Asian states of Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. All these states
have outlawed their Communist parties. Of these five states, Thailand, Malaysia,
and the Philippines were the founding states of ASA, whereas the Philippines,
Malaysia, and Indonesia were associated with the MAPHILINDO. It seems that
ASA and MAPHILINDO have made it easier for the five states to launch a new
start.
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After a period of relatively normal relations between the Philippines and
Malaysia from 1965 to 1967, the Sabah dispute suddenly resurfaced. The
Corregidor incident took place in March 1968, less than one year after the
formation of ASEAN. It was revealed that there was a secret military training
camp on Corregidor Island in Manila Bay. The trainees were allegedly preparing to
infiltrate Sabah. The trainees were recruited from Sulu Province where the people
speak the same dialect as those in Sabah. However, there was a revolt by the
trainees causing the deaths of some of them. Malaysia quickly reacted, sending a
“note” to the Philippines government as a formal protest and demanding an
investigation. Some armed Filipinos were arrested in Sabah and were found to
possess the same type of weapons as those found among the trainees at Corregidor.
Without reaching a solution to the Sabah dispute and the Corregidor incident, the
foreign ministers of the two states agreed to have a “cooling-off” period.27
The cooling-off period soon ended. An “Annexation Law” or the Base Line
Act of 1968 specifying the territory of the Philippines was passed by the
Philippines Congress and signed by President Marcos. The law did not change the
existing Philippines claim and position over Sabah, but for Malaysia, it caused
deeper anxiety about Philippines intentions. What the law intended to demonstrate
was that:
the Philippines had acquired the right to sovereignty over Sabah, but did not
actually have Sabah as its possession; when its right to exercise sovereignty over
Sabah received international confirmation, then the Republic would redefine its
boundaries accordingly .~
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Malaysia was outraged by the legislation. The Sabah dispute had reached yet
another level. Muslim dissatisfaction and separatism in the southern Philippines
increased, and Sabah was regarded as a staging base for Filipino Muslim
separatism by the Philippines government.29 The Moro National Liberation Front
(MNLF) was established soon after the Corregidor incident. Partly because of
increasing subversive activities of the MNLF and the Communist New People’s
Army, Marcos declared martial law in 1971.
ASEAN had to take action to prevent any further deterioration in relations
between the Philippines and Malaysia, which might lead to the failure of ASEAN
itself.3° The two nations were prepared to use force in order to settle the conflict.
Consequently, ASEAN offered to mediate. Thailand and Indonesia attempted to
reconcile the dispute. Malaysia was willing to allow ASEAN mediation because it
knew that it would receive support from its more cordial relationship with the new
government in Indonesia. Moreover, Singapore has been Malaysia’s partner in the
Five Power Defense Agreement. Therefore, the Philippines was reluctant to
accept ASEAN’s mediation.3’
It seemed that ASEAN would collapse because of the dispute among its
members. Moreover, it was rumored that some officials concerned with ASEAN
affairs had spoken of possibly forming a new regional organization without the
Philippines. ASEAN diplomats sought to ease tensions throughout 1968 and 1969.32
Efforts aimed at resolving the issue enough to let ASEAN function again
were started in Thailand. On October 10, 1968, Thailand’s foreign minister
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attended the meeting of an ASEAN Expert Advisory Group along with ECAFE
officials. The five ASEAN foreign ministers and Australian Minister of External
Affairs Paul Hasluck held informal discussions on regional cooperation and the
Sabah dispute. The ASEAN foreign ministers subsequently agreed to a joint
communique that was submitted by Razak and Ramos to their respective
governments for approval. Although it appeared that some type of compromise had
been reached, the conflicting reports from Manila and Kuala Lumpur over what
was agreed upon led the Philippines government to reject a specific timetable for
negotiation. This led to general confusion over whether an understanding had been
reached~
Although ASEAN’s efforts to settle the Sabah dispute had not been
successful at the December meeting, member states continued their attempts to ease
tension by calling on the Philippines to compromise. Finally, in the spring of 1969,
the Philippines agreed not to raise the issue at a proposed May meeting of the
heads of the ASEAN National Secretariats, and Malaysia indicated its willingness
to again attend ASEAN meetings.34
From the beginning, Malaysia did not show any sign that it would consider
negotiation or bargaining with the Philippines in relation to the Sabah issue.
Malaysia simply kept denying that there was such an issue. Prime Minister Tunku
Abdul Rahman of Malaysia stated in April 1969 that Malaysia was ready to attend
an ASEAN meeting any time, “so long as the Sabah issue is not raised by the
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Philippines at such meetings,” and the Philippines Deputy Foreign Minister Cruz
replied that such an issue would not be discussed.35
The Philippines Sabah Claim During the Martial Law Period
The two governments resumed their diplomatic relations by setting aside the
Sabah dispute. Indeed, the Sabah issue has been kept under control. Foreign
Secretary Carlos P. Romulo stated in December 1973, “We are holding [the
Philippines claim to Sabah] in a very low profile.”36 Romulo stated in August 9,
1975 that the Philippines and Malaysia agreed to “put in the background” the
Philippines claim to Sabah for the sake of ASEAN cooperation because the Sabah
issue had “hurt” ASEAN.37 In 1980, Foreign Secretary Tolentino stated, “As far
as we are concerned, there is no more Sabah claim. It’s closed. We are not raising
it any more.”38
Late in August 1977, after the positive announcement made by Marcos at
the second ASEAN summit meeting held in Kuala Lumpur, the Philippines Justice
Secretary Vicento Abad was reported to have indicated that the abandonment of the
Sabah claim did not require a constitutional amendment by stating that:
the Philippine renunciation of the Sabah claim does not require the amendment of
the constitution [because] national territory as defined by the Constitution does not
include Sabah whether expressly or by inference [and] the definition of the national
territory in the constitution made no specific reference to the Sabah territory.39
However, this statement is very misleading because the “Annexation Law” or the
Philippines Base Line Act of 1968 and the 1973 Constitution directly or indirectly
indicate that Sabah is a part of the Philippines. For example, the 1973 Constitution
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specified that the national territory comprises “the Philippines archipelago with all
the islands and waters” and “all the other territories belonging to the Philippines by
historical right or legal title including the territorial sea, the air space, the subsoil,
the sea bed, the insular shelves and the other submarine areas over which the
Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction.”40 The latest Philippines constitution
ratified by plebiscite seems to indicate that the Sabah claim is just an artificial
formality.4’
The Philippines government, however, did not take definitive steps to drop
the claim. The most serious attempt to abandon the claim came after President
Marcos was ousted by new President Aquino in 1986. Her Vice President and
Foreign Minister Laurel stated in April 1986 that “The final resolution of the
Sabah question would signal the beginning of a new era in the relations between
the two countries concerned, while reinforcing the growth and closer ties and
cooperation among all ASEAN members.”42 In 1987, President Aquino introduced
a bill calling for the exclusion of Sabah from the Philippines’ territory. She wanted
the Congress to pass the bill into law before the scheduled third ASEAN summit
meeting in Manila on December 15, 1987. But it did not happen.
Malaysia indicated that if the bill became law before the summit, it would
be willing to sign a treaty of friendship and cooperation with the Philippines
covering such matters as trade, piracy, smuggling illegal Filipino immigrants into
Sabah, and Filipino refugee repatriation. It was reported that if the Congress had
acted, Prime Minister Mahathir would have stayed one additional day in Manila on
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an official bilateral visit as a signal of his appreciation for the Philippines’
goodwill. Mahathir reportedly told Aquino at the ASEAN summit meeting that the
Philippines’ Sabah claim was like a “fish bone” in his throat.43
Explanation and Implications
The Philippines was quite aware of implications of the Sabah issue to
ASEAN unity. The Philippines decision-makers, including Marcos, made reference
to ASEAN when they talked about their intentions to take steps to drop the claim
to Sabah. The Marcos announcement was made at the second ASEAN summit held
in Kuala Lumpur in 1977. This suggests that Marcos was willing to show his
goodwill to Malaysia even though he did not have to do so. In addition, Indonesian
President Suharto was very aware of the negative implications of the Sabah dispute
to ASEAN unity, so he made considerable efforts to convince President Marcos to
cool the tensions between the Philippines and Malaysia. There are clear indications
that Marcos’s authoritarian regime during the 1970s tried to prevent the Sabah
issue from getting out of control and causing adverse effects on ASEAN. It would
appear, therefore, that the Philippines handled the Sabah dispute according to their
understanding about intra-ASEAN conflicts and conflict settlement.
There were discussions among the ASEAN states in 1973 about the
establishment of a body for intra-ASEAN conflict resolution. The Philippines and
Thailand were in favor of setting up an ASEAN body to mediate intra-ASEAN
regional disputes and in so doing, the ASEAN states could prevent outside powers
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from intervening in intra-ASEAN disputes. This proposal was made officially in
the context of the ZOPFAN proposal. Philippines Foreign Minister Romulo stated
that “Thai and Philippines governments feel that in pursuit of the problem of
creating a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality, ASEAN should begin to make
concentrated efforts towards creating a body which can help mediate in the solution
of problems among ASEAN countries.”~ He continued to state that “We feel that
the members of ASEAN should consider it an obligation to settle their problems,
through tested methods of peaceful settlement, and thus prevent the intrusion of
other powers in the solution of regional problems.”45
In the meantime, the Sabah dispute also suggests that in the early years of
regional associations like ASA and ASEAN, the Philippines, one of the member
states of these two associations, miscalculated the impact of the Sabah claim upon
the friendly bilateral relations existing with Malaya and ASA and later with
Malaysia and ASEAN. Of course, the early Philippines governments believed that
their claim had a solid legal foundation and would not disturb its bilateral relations
with Malaya and the activities of ASA. However, since the early 1970s, the Sabah
issue has become static for the most part and has hardly affected the activities of
ASEAN. This suggests that the Marcos regime learned the lesson that its claim to
Sabah would not serve the interest of the Philippines, but would harm its
diplomatic relations with Malaysia and other ASEAN states. This further indicates
that the Philippines government valued its relations with other ASEAN states more
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than its own interest in Sabah. Based on his in-depth interviews with selected
ASEAN bureaucrats, Ahmad suggests that:
It was generally felt that bilateral problems among the member-states of ASEAN
could be more easily resolved as a consequence of ASEAN. Because of ASEAN,
“a lot of bilateral irritations are reduced.’ According to one Filipino respondent,
the Philippines had “paid the highest political price” by joining ASEAN since it
meant giving up the Sabah claim.~
As noted earlier, President Marcos at least attempted to drop the Philippines’
Sabah claim unilaterally, which was a significant foreign policy change compared
to pre-1970s attitudes.
Finally, one of the major reasons why the Sabah conflict has remained
potential since the early 1970s is the Philippines’ adherence to its mutual
understanding among ASEAN states that they have agreed on explicitly. In
addition, the Philippines has valued the maintenance of good bilateral and
multilateral relations between the ASEAN states rather than merely pushing its own
interest. The Sabah issue has remained under control.
Conclusion
This chapter discussed some basic characteristics of ASEAN and the Sabah
territorial dispute between two ASEAN member states, the Philippines and
Malaysia. ASEAN emerged as important in the process of Philippines’ foreign
policy change. The new Philippines’ foreign policy emphasized a vigorous effort
on regional cooperation and Asian identification. This meant a more active role in
the ASEAN.
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The Sabah dispute suggests that since the early 1970s, the Philippines
moderated its claim to Sabah in order to maintain good relations with members of
ASEAN. In particular, the Philippines government became aware of the adverse
effects on its bilateral relations with Malaysia. Although the Sabah dispute has
been regarded and treated by the ASEAN states as a bilateral issue, the existence
of ASEAN and their cooperation has made it more difficult for the Philippines to
push its claim. Since the martial law period of the 1970s, the Sabah dispute has
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CHAPTER FIVE
AUTHORITARIAN RULE AND FOREIGN POLICY CHANGE
One of the main explanatory variables of Philippines foreign policy change
is authoritarianism. Under conditions of martial law, the decision-making process
is centralized. Marcos ruled the Philippines under martial law from September
1972 to January 1981, and it was during this same period that the Philippines
began to change its foreign policy. This chapter will investigate the relationship
between martial law and foreign policy change, including the ways in which
authoritarianism is related to foreign policy change and how martial law affected
the conditions of foreign policy change.
Authoritarianism
Under martial law the Philippines underwent profound changes in its
political structure. The declaration of martial law meant the suspension of the
1935 Constitution based on the principles of separation of powers, and checks and
balances. It also provided for a strong executive ruling by decrees, general orders,
and letters of instruction issued by the president who enjoyed the powers of both
president and prime minister under the transitory provisions of the 1973
Constitution. All decrees, general orders, and letters of instruction became part of
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the law of the Philippines just like statutes passed by the legislature. Political
power became concentrated in the hands of the president with the assistance of the
military.’
Authoritarianism can be theoretically related to foreign policy in two ways.
First, it may affect the kind of foreign policy preferred. Second, it may affect the
process and timing of foreign policy. Authoritarianism can affect the foreign policy
preference in the sense that a martial law regime may likely prefer a foreign policy
that would contribute to its political legitimacy. With political legitimacy as a goal,
it would likely emphasize both the economic aspect, since rapid economic growth
and visible economic progress would justify the authoritarian regime, and the
nationalistic aspect to gain popular support. Regarding the two aspects of foreign
policy change, authoritarianism can be related to them in the following way:
Authoritarianism ----> legitimacy & popular support, achieved through rapid economic growth
& nationalism ----> foreign policy change, manifested in diplomatic diversification (ASEAN
and the Socialist bloc) and disengagement from the U.S.
Given the need to emphasize economic growth, policies include the
attraction of foreign capital investment and extension of overseas marketing
opportunities. Diplomatic diversification contributes to the goal in the sense that it
can give wider opportunities for trade and investment. Rapid economic growth may
be used to legitimize the rule of authoritarianism disregarding established
constitutional and political rules. It may also create broad popular support for the
authoritarian regime and undermine opposition forces, providing people with a
sense of prosperity, safety, and order.
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An authoritarian regime tends to emphasize nationalism to get popular
support. Foreign policy change like disengagement from a great power would have
a popular appeal. In short, under the circumstances of authoritarianism or martial
law, it is rational to utilize a kind of foreign policy change which is directed
toward achieving rapid economic growth and a nationalistic policy.
Martial law facilitates foreign policy change by concentrating power in the
authoritarian ruler, thereby simplifying the decision-making process. Martial law
also represses civil rights and, therefore, stops potential opposition to the change.
Finally, martial law facilitates control over the media and lends support to
government policies.2
Martial law affects the foreign policy process in the sense that decision-
making structures are modified and, typically, oriented toward the military. While
in a normal democratic political structure several legal procedures are involved in
foreign policy decision-making, under martial law these functions and
responsibilities are discontinued. Martial law accelerates both decision-making and
implementation.
Martial Law in the Philippines
Martial law was declared by Marcos during his second four-year term as
president. Under the existing constitution he could not be reelected again. The only
legal chance to keep his presidency was to declare martial law under the name of
the existence of armed rebellion against the political system.3 Marcos invoked the
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1935 constitutional provision (that stipulated invasion, insurrection, or rebellions,
or imminent danger thereof) to claim that such action was to remove anarchy in the
country so that it would be achieved through the abandonment of electoral politics
and the use of presidential decrees.
The statement accompanying the martial law declaration also identified the
agenda for the regime:
We will eliminate the threat of a violent overthrow of our Republic. But at the
same time we must now reform the social, economic and political institutions in our
country... to remove the inequalities of that society, the cleanup of government of
its corrupt and sterile elements, the liquidation of the criminal syndicates, [and to
encourage] the systematic development of our economy.4
Marcos, according to Noble, made it clear that the goal was to create a New
Society; the method was “constitutional authoritarianism”; and the major targets
were the “anarchists” on the left who “exploited the popular disaffection” and
“oligarchs” on the right who controlled the society, which was characterized by
inequalities and corruption.5
A variety of explanations for the declaration have been offered in the
literature.6 Some argue that Marcos simply wanted to perpetuate himself in power
for self-aggrandizement. Others contend that he was influenced by American
business and multinational corporations to opt for an authoritarian solution to rising
disorder and economic nationalism.7 Also, there is an argument that martial law
was a product of an elite struggle or a civilian-military conflict.8
When Marcos declared martial law, he took over almost all of the functions
of government and its administration. Critics and dissenters were arrested and
imprisoned and military courts were established. Immediately after the declaration
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of martial law, Marcos decreed the dismantling of Congress and political parties.
Many opposition political leaders, including Senators Benigno S. Aquino, Jr.,
Jovito R. Salonga, Jose W. Diokno, and Francisco “Soc” Rodrigo, were arrested
and detained.9 In particular, Senator Aquino was perceived as a major threat to
Marcos himself. Aquino had been the mayor of his town in his early twenties and
thereafter the governor of Tarlac. He became a senator at thirty-five, the minimum
age under the constitution for that office. He was most likely to succeed Marcos.’°
Freedom of speech and expression were totally suspended and press censorship was
imposed. Strikes and demonstrations were prohibited.” Steinberg characterized
the situation as follows:
To some people, these firm acts by Marcos seemed the only means by which social
chaos could be prevented. To others, including many students and intellectuals
within Philippines society, Marcos was less concerned with protecting the Republic
and its democracy than with ensuring his own position and political future.’2
Also, Marcos ordered the disbanding of private armies and the surrender of
unlicensed firearms and fired one-tenth of the 60,000 civil servants for corruption
and incompetence. He jailed thousands of individuals on the right and left without
proper charges. Some of those who were detained were political rivals, including
Senators Aquino and Diokno, and some fifteen leading newspaper publishers and
columnists. The universities were raided and public utilities taken over by the
armed forces. 13
Martial law overtook the “Constitutional Convention” that had been called to
frame a new constitution responsive to the demands for reforms. The Constitutional
Convention was originally scheduled to begin review of the 1935 Constitution in
134
June 1971. Many of those elected delegates were young professionals, not
politicians. Several politicians elected were regarded as anti-Marcos reformers.
After the declaration of martial law, the Convention, in 1973, was asked to hasten
its work and in seventy days the delegates fully complied by adopting a new
constitution which provided for a parliamentary form of government.14
Under the proposed constitution, Marcos would be a long-term president.
The transitory provisions that were altered to the requirements of the martial law
regime enabled the president to enforce the constitution selectively. One such
provision provided for an interim national assembly to be convened by Marcos to
act as a transitional legislature. Another would ensure the legal validity of all
presidential decrees and other acts even beyond the period of martial law. A third
provision empowered the president to remove and replace any official or employee
in the executive or the judiciary. Marcos was authorized by the transitory
provisions to hold the old powers of the president, the new powers of the prime
minister, plus the continuation as the law of the land of all decrees and orders
issued by him after the proclamation of martial law. Under the transitory
provisions, an interim National Assembly was to be created that would remain in
office until it voted to terminate itself and to call an election for a regular
Assembly.15
Marcos, on January 15, 1973, immediately put his regime on a
constitutional basis by presenting a draft of the constitutional convention to 30,000
handpicked citizen assemblies or barangays throughout the islands for approval.’6
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Voting by show of hands, a 90 percent affirmative vote was gathered. On January
17, Marcos announced that these public meetings had ratified the constitution and
had given him the people’s mandate. He declared the new constitution adopted but
temporarily suspended. Marcos based his right to govern on provisions of the new
constitution that called for the incumbent president to exercise full authority
pending the convening of an interim national assembly at the president’s direction.
On September 17, 1974, the Supreme Court formally approved the constitutionality
of martial law, which eliminated any potential political opposition to Marcos’s
authoritarian rule.’7
On January 17, 1981, martial law was lifted when Marcos issued
Proclamation 2045, formally ending it, but the situation afterwards, in terms of
returning to democracy, continued to be uncertain. Marcos retained the right to
order arrests without charge, legislate by decree, overrule the Assembly, and ratify
treaties.’8 The years of martial law had several important consequences for the
Philippines’ politics and economy.’9
The Economy of Martial Law
During the early period of martial law, the government performance was
relatively good. The growth rate of the gross national product (GNP) was constant
at about 6 percent per year, compared to about 5 percent during the previous
decade, and foreign investment increased partly due to an accommodating policy of
incentives in 1969 and in 1973.20 Construction of condominiums and large hotels
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presented an optimistic view of prosperity. According to an economist, the first
five years of martial law were generally characterized by solid economic policies.2’
In the initial martial law years, the government’s deficits were stabilized to
lower levels mainly through increasing the efficiency of the tax collection
machinery. However, the overall deficit of the central government dropped from
an annual average of 0.1 percent of GDP during the 1966-1970 period to 1.1
percent during the 1975-1980 period.22 There was a balance of trade deficit in
1975 and it remained negative in 1976. The Philippines’ external debt at the end
of 1976 was $5,554 million, up by $1,804 million in a single year, but its
accumulated financial reserves still amounted to $1,143 million, an increase of
some $50 million in 1976.23
As Figure 4 shows, little improvement is evident in the average annual
growth rates for various economic indicators for two time periods, i.e., before the
martial law years (1965-1973) and most of the martial law period (1973-1983).
Rather, the growth rates were reduced in the fields of agriculture, industry,
manufacturing, and services during the later period.
Because of an effective population control program, the annual rate of
population growth declined under martial law from about 3.0 percent to less than
2.5 percent in 1980. Finally, the average GDP annual growth rates increased from
5.3 of 1967-1971 to 6.3 percent of 1972-1980. In the latter part of the martial law
period, however, growth became slower: in 1978 the real GNP growth rate had
fallen to 5.5 percent, declining further to 5.3 in 1980.24
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Taxation and tax collection became more effective enabling the government
to collect more revenues.25 Although there was aggregate economic growth in the
Philippines, the poor remained in the same situation. In early 1970s, as shown in
Figure 5, while the richest 20% took 54.0% of total household income, the share



















on the world market, the workers on sugar and other plantations experienced no
improvement in their working condition.27 When sugar prices rose to sixty-five
cents per pound in 1974, the Philippines expanded its acreage and built new mills,
held back sales and piled up a huge surplus in warehouses. Then the price declined
to a low of nine cents per pound and the government was obliged to unload
450,000 metric tons to China and 600,000 metric tons to the Soviet Union. The
planters, lacking money for current operations, could not even pay the workers
their low wages.28
Partly because of fairly rapid inflation, the living standards of the average
Filipino declined.29 With illegal strikes and demonstrations, there were widespread
reports of violations of the minimum wage laws and of workers being dismissed
for labor union activities.30 The per capita availability of calories in 1973 and
1974 declined and the quality of diet worsened.31
To attract large foreign investors, Marcos implemented an export-oriented
industrialization which showed a bias toward large scale and capital intensive
industries. Partly because of this, a new oligarchy emerged composed of members,
kinsmen, and friends of the ruling family, who received substantial favors in the
form of government loans and other forms of assistance in establishing themselves
as owners of new industries.32
A former Philippines deputy minister of economic planning, Florian Alburo,
and a World Bank economist, Geoffrey Shepherd, summarized the effects of
martial law politics on the economy as following:
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Most important was the considerably increased intervention in the economy. Much
of this was ad hoc and discriminatory (and did not rely on any corpus of economic
theory). This intervention led to the development of public and private monopolies,
or created market-distorting privileges for specific individuals or firms. Another not
very productive outcome was a large growth in public and publicly guaranteed
investment. This development was a principal cause of the external debt crisis of
1983. It also led to an ad hoc extension of the public sector when some of the
publicly guaranteed investment projects failed. The corollary to such politically
motivated intervention was a growing incoherence in public economic management:
constitutional authoritarianism” eventually proved less capable of rational
economic government than the congressional system it replaced.33
Land Reform
Land reform is a typical policy of martial law. This is because the ruler can
take personal credit for having freed farmers from their dependent bondage. This
was not possible under the old regime in the Philippines where the elites who
dominated Congress hindered land reform and worked for their own interest.34
The objective of land reform under martial law was to transfer 3.75 million
acres of rice and corn land in Luzon from the rich landlords to the 915,000 tenants
and sharecroppers who worked on the land. The idea was to give the tenants
either title to the land they cultivated or to provide satisfactory leasing
arrangements. In addition to some 200,000 lease arrangements which were
satisfactorily concluded, an equal number of land-transfer certificates were issued.35
A certificate was given to a tenant when the terms of transfers were agreed
upon or when the downpayment was made. The landlord received total
compensation from the Land Bank, partly in cash and partly in government bonds,
but he still probably would have preferred to keep his land. The land-transfer
certificate was not the title to the land, which was to remain with the Land Bank
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until all the annual payments were made. While the pace of land transfer in the
first three years were impressive when compared with an equally long period
before the declaration of martial law, the claims were far greater than the reality.36
There was ample grounds for criticism. Compensation levels and various
exclusions severely restricted the number of potential beneficiaries. Only tenant
farmers on rice or corn lands of more than seven hectares were to receive land,
thus excluding landless laborers, tenants working other corps (more than 20
percent of tenant families), and those on smaller plots of land (estimated at 56
percent of tenants). The government made little effort to reduce the conditions on
the sugar or coconut plantations.37
Even though there was a decision in principle to include lands larger than
seven hectares in the land reform, a number of categories of landlords owning
between seven and 24 hectares of land were exempted from the land transfer, thus
reducing the number of tenants affected by almost half. There was substantial
progress made on about half the program in the first four years of martial law, but
landowners found ways to get around the land reform decrees. Landlords
dismissed tenants, switched crops, subdivided their holdings, mortgaged their land
to corporations not covered by land reform, or took advantage of innumerable
administrative delays.38
William Overholt commented that the Philippines’ land reform programs
were tied “neither to any integrated view of the national economy and its principal
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trends (e.g., industrialization, urbanization), nor to any explicit vision of the
national political future.”39
The Political Structure of Martial Law
When martial law was declared, Marcos abolished Congress, assumed its
lawmaking responsibilities, and ruled by decree, orders and letters of instruction.
He dismantled the autonomy of the judiciary by establishing military courts. Before
1972, the constitutional separation of powers, similar to that of the United States,
was generally observed. Each of the three branches took care of its domain.
Although political power was centralized in Manila, it was shared by two equally
influential institutions, the Presidency and Congress. The checks and balances
were working between them, and there was neither one person nor one party rule
due to the competition between the Nationalista and Liberal parties.4°
The constitution, the shrinkage of civil court jurisdiction, and the existence
of several military courts all tended to undermine official assertions of judicial
independence.41 There was a distinct increase in the concentration of political
power within the central government, especially in the urban areas. Power was
shared exclusively by President Marcos, his closest allies, the technocrats who
gradually controlled and directed the economy, and the military and national police
who were in charge of the major enforcement agencies. The technocrats consisted
of former university professors and corporate executives who were recruited to
serve as special assistants and advisers. They were believed to have both the
-~
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capability and the credibility to negotiate with foreign institutions such as the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.42
The upper level of the martial law power structure consisted of some 200
high ranking officials, elected and appointed and some key provincial governors.
Several of the top government officials were allied with or were drawn from a
privileged minority of economically powerful families throughout the nation. When
martial law was declared, Marcos ordered the disbanding of the private armies in
the service of the elites and reviewed the economic activities of these families. The
old traditional elite families, called oligarchs by the president, were blamed for the
ills of Philippines society, and so their large holdings were taken by the
government. In the New Society, a new elite emerged which was composed of
people close to the president and they were often referred to as the allies.43
New institutions were set up.’” Barangay assemblies replaced pre-martial
law barrio councils. The Barangay was the basic political unit in the Philippines.
The members were clusters of 100-500 families organized as citizen assemblies
“designed to broaden the base of citizenship participation in the democratic process
to afford ample opportunities for the citizens to express their views on important
issues.”45 They were to be used to:
ratify the new Constitution in a national referendum in January 1973; vote on
national issues such as the continuance of martial law and the necessity of elections;
handle the sale and distribution of government-controlled rice and other
commodities in local communities; maintain peace and order; monitor “subversive”
activities like the clandestine distribution of anti-martial law literature; implement
development projects like the “Green Revolution”; promote tourism; organize
cooperatives; and act as the basic units of local government in lieu of the old
system of elective barrio councils.’~
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However, unlike the councils which had been elected, and thus subject to local
political pressures, the barangay assemblies were appointive. They were at the
bottom of a hierarchy of similarly structured organs that culminated in the
Katipunan ng mga Barangay or Society of Barangays.47 Kann observed that:
Many of the claimed 35,000 assemblies never met at all. Where they did meet the
results often were prepared before the vote was taken. Local officials in charge of
the exercises scarcely had to be told which way the vote was supposed to go. If the
voters needed any elucidation, the local officials provided it. The voting, in nearly
all cases, was conducted by show of hands.~
A similar structure was imposed on town and municipal government; municipal
councils called Sangguniang Bayan were established in 1975-1976 in cities and
municipalities to replace the elective town assemblies. At the top of the town
council hierarchy was the National Legislative Advisory Council, which included
barangay, youth groups, labor, agricultural, employer, and other sectoral
representatives and acted as a kind of consultative body to the president.49
Youth were organized in April 1975 under the Kabataang Barangay (Youth
Association) a hierarchy of youth groups extending from the barangay level to the
center whose leaders underwent special training programs.5° Filipinos in the 15 to
18 age group were given the right to vote in the national plebiscites. They were
forced to participate in the Youth Civic Action Program, which was a school
related community work program, and, in general, to take part in the many youth
oriented activities of the government.5’
Marcos had considerable control over the bureaucracy and local
governments. All local police forces became integrated into one national police
force under a national commission and the Philippines Constabulary. By virtue of
145
the 1975 referendum, the president gained additional basis for appointing or
replacing provincial, city, and municipal officials whose elective terms had expired
in December 1973. This gave him direct control of their tenure.52
In a plebiscite in 1976, it was approved that there would be amendments to
the constitution in order to set aside the interim National Assembly, which was
never convened, and to establish an interim Batasang Pambansa as the parliament,
with President Marcos continuing to exercise the constitutional powers of prime
minister under the 1973 Constitution and of the president under the 1935
Constitution. One amendment would also authorize him to act outside the
Parliament when he judged it necessary. The Batasang Pambansa would continue
to be composed of cabinet and other officials appointed by Marcos and those to be
elected in 1977 or later.53
An election took place on April 7, 1978, for the 165 regional representatives
to the interim Batasang Pambansa. However, this did not change the basic political
structure of constitutional authoritarianism. Marcos formed the Kilusang Bagong
Lipunan (KBL: New Society Movement), which was to identify candidates and
conduct the campaign in all regions, headed by cabinet members and others loyal
to the president. In Metro Manila, the KBL candidates were led by Imelda Marcos.
There was an organized opposition only in Metro Manila--the Lakas ng Bayan
(People’s Power) or Laban (Fight)--to contest the elections. Laban was led by
former Senator Benigno Aquino who campaigned from his prison. The KBL led by
Imelda Marcos swept all 21 seats in Manila amidst widespread charges of fraud
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and corruption. Even in the local election held in January 1980, the KBL won 69
of 73 governorship, and 1,550 of 1,560 mayoral elections. Marcos’s sister was
elected Governor in Ilocos Notre, and Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., was elected vice
governor at age ~
During the martial law years, Imelda Marcos became a powerful force upon
her assumption of the position of Metro Manila Governor and Minister of Human
Settlements. Alongside the officers of the armed forces, civilian technocrats
exercised appointed presidential authority as cabinet members and heads of
departments, agencies, or government corporations. They acted as presidential
advisors, government executives, drafters of presidential decrees, and advocates
and defenders of the New Society.55
To broaden his power base, Marcos appointed more of his close assistants to
strategic positions in the army, constabulary, cabinet offices, and special agencies
until his personal appointees extended to every provincial, municipal and local
government establishment.56 It was reported that the corruption formerly
associated with politicians was taken over by Marcos’s inner circle and the
military.57 The character of political power during martial law is properly
summarized by Abueva:
President Marcos--with the fullest collaboration of Mrs. Marcos, who as first lady,
Governor of Metro Manila, and diplomatic troubleshooter, is the president’s alter
ego and de facto assistant president--is the undisputed head of a new national power
structure or grand coalition. It consists of: the military; cabinet members,
technocrats, and the bureaucracy under them; persons close to the president or Mrs.
Marcos, whether relatives or loyal friends and former politicians; local officials,
who also hold office by presidential appointment; and several big businessmen who
enjoy the political stability and economic incentives which the administration
provides. At the base of this political pyramid are the millions whose welfare is the
-I
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avowed aim of the New Society, in whose name change and reform are being
initiated, and whose support or acquiescence provide the regime with legitimacy
through referendums, citizen assemblies and the local sangguniang bayans and
barangays.58
The Role of the Military
During martial law, the size and the importance of the armed forces
increased.59 Thousands of people were enrolled in the constabulary and village
militias. During martial law the armed forces more than quadrupled, from 60,000
to 275,000. This expansion was accompanied by rapid promotion and pay raises
for all ranks, the increasing involvement of officers in non-military spheres of
government, and for the first time reports of large-scale corruption and self-
enrichment in the higher ranks of the officer corps.6° Basic compensation for the
AFP had been raised four times during the martial law period, exceeding the salary
scales of comparable civilian institutions.6’ The president also integrated the home
defense and local police units into a National Police Commission headed by the
secretary of national defense.62
Top leaders of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) were loyal to
Marcos. By mid-1974 the size of the AFP was about two thirds greater than
before martial law; by early 1977 it was more than twice as large. In May 1973,
Marcos decreed the first military draft in the Philippines’ independence history.
Moreover, the government took steps to merge all local police forces into a
national force, further centralizing the means of coercion in Marcos’s hands.63
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The Secretary of National Defense and top military officers played a central
role in decision-making and enjoyed a close relationship with the president.
Defense spending increased from $136 million in 1972 to $420 million in 1977.
Notably, military expenditures in the Philippines between 1971 and 1980 increased
the fastest among the five ASEAN nations although the growth of the Philippines’
economy was the slowest.M Budget allocations for the armed forces increased 500
percent in the 1972-76 period, and officers and personnels enjoyed new privileges
and power.65 The expanded role of the military included new security, law and
order roles, i.e., the enforcement of all decrees, orders, letters of instruction, and
regulations issued by the president as commander-in-chief of the military forces;
the judicial function--special courts were set up to try cases involving military
personnel, national security and laws of nations, violations of the espionage and
hijacking laws; administrative functions--control of all communications media all
over the country and the control and management of all public utilities.66
The military played a prominent and strategic role as the president’s power
base and right arm in law enforcement, counterinsurgency, containment of civilian
opposition, civic action, and developmental activities as well as in reinforcing the
people’s orientation toward the national community.67 There were thousands of
persons arrested and detained whose names appeared in a black list on General
Order 2. The list included many leading opposition politicians and leaders of so
called subversive organizations. The military was also charged with the
implementation of the nationwide night curfew until 1978, confiscation of
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unlicensed firearms, suppression of rallies, strikes, and demonstrations, and seizure
of privately owned water-transport facilities required for national security
purposes.68 Under martial rule, the Secretary of National Defense and the top
military leaders worked directly with the president. The power, prerogative
advantages, and prestige of the military establishment were never greater. In fact,
the military officers replaced the traditional politicians as patrons in the political
system. General Order No. 8, for example, created Military Tribunals, and
General Order No. 12 listed 42 specific crimes or offenses, headed by “crimes
against national security” and “violations of the Anti-Subversion Law,” over which
the Tribunals had jurisdiction.69 The list included crimes of subversion, rebellion,
espionage, illegal possession of firearms and explosives for use in the commission
of murder, robbery in bands, usurpation of military authority, title, ranks, or
illegal use of military uniforms and insignia, offenses committed by military
personnel in the performance of duty, distribution of subversive materials, and
crimes undermining the security of the country.7°
The military also played management and administrative roles. Since 1972,
retired military officers had increasingly been recruited into management and
administrative positions in the public sector as well as private business. Until
October 1979, six out of twelve PRODs (Presidential Regional Officers for
Development) were military officers. In their region, they enjoyed huge power in
regional activities and enhanced the military’s political influence. Many military
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officers also became heads of various agencies, such as the Ministry of Muslim
Affairs, National Housing Authority, the Bureau of Posts, and Ambassadors.7’
The growth of the military in terms of size and importance may partly be
attributed to other consequences of martial law, like the suppression of civil
liberties. Because of the new and heavier duties, the military needed more funds.
This may likely have affected reorientation in the sense that it deepened
dependence on military assistance funds supplied by the U.S. The absence of legal
channels of dissent, the suppression of human rights, violation of civil liberties,
and the worsening economic situation of the country increased discontent, which
the military needed to control. In terms of its influence on decision-making, the
military did not serve as a check on the executive, but rather as a close partner to
the government and an implementor of its policies.
The Repression of Civil Liberties
Before martial law, the mass media was allowed a wide expression of
views. Although given to sensationalism at times, the press was a critic of public
affairs and an effective check on government excesses. During martial law, the
once-critical mass media became a subordinate of the government through
government directed self-censorship.72
On September 22, 1972, in Letter of Instruction No. 1, President Marcos
ordered Press Secretary Tatad and Defense Secretary Enrile to take over and
control or cause the taking over and control of all such newspapers, magazines,
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radio and television facilities and all other media of communications, wherever
they were, for the duration of the emergency in question. Letter of Instruction No.
12 created the Department of Public Information, which provided rules for local
and foreign news censorship.73 The new regulations expressly prohibited, among
other things:
a. Materials that tend to incite or otherwise inflame people or individuals
against the government or any of its duly constituted authorities.
b. Materials that undermine the people’s faith and confidence in the
government or any of its instrumentalities.
c. Materials that are seditious, not based on facts, or otherwise without
definitely established and well-identified verifiable sources, or based on
mere allegation or conjecture.
d. Materials that downgrade or jeopardize the military or the law enforcement
authorities, their work and their operations.
e. Materials that abet, glorify, or sensationalize crime, disorder, lawlessness,
violence.
f. Materials that destroy or tend to destroy public morals as well as morale.
g. Materials that foment opinions and activities contrary to law.
h. Materials that sow and generate fear, panic, confusion, ignorance and
vulgarity among the people.74
These guidelines were quite general and vague. There were also unwritten
guidelines issued to editors and publishers. The guidelines prohibited stories that:
(1) are critical of the Marcos family, (2) discuss corruption in high positions, and
(3) tend to cast aspersions on the military.75
On November 2, 1972, Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 36 which
provided a new rationale for government censorship. It was justified as necessary
to dismantle the oligarchic structure of ownership of the media. The major targets
of the new decree were the media owners who had previously been hostile to
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Marcos. The decree canceled all the existing franchises granted by the Philippines
Congress to media owners whose facilities had remained unused by their holders
and those who had violated the terms under which they were issued. This meant
the permanent closing of the news media that had been shut down at the outset of
martial law.76
The President stated that he would no longer tolerate a private monopoly in
media ownership. The decree also created the Mass Media Council, chaired by the
secretary of public information and the secretary of national defense, which was
authorized to review applications for permission to operate any mass media;
however, only the president could certify the authority to publish. Certificates of
authority were valid for six months and were then reviewed by the council.77
Several publishers and journalists were immediately arrested and detained,
although all of them were subsequently released without being tried for any
offense. The Manila Times, The Manila Chronicle, and The Philippines Free Press
were closed down. Other journals, like The Nation and The Graphic, simply
stopped publishing. Television stations belonging to the family of Eugenio Lopez
were closed. Relatives and friends of the Marcos family set up their own
newspapers, radio and television stations. Eventually media ownership became the
monopoly of Marcos’s friends and allies. Although in the past the Philippines
press had been tightly controlled by members of the elite, it at least permitted
expressions of a wide range of views. Under martial law, the media became the
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private preserve of one elite family and its loyal supporters. The media became
essentially controlled under Marcos.78
The government also established a Department of Public Information to
expand its own informational programs and oversee the various communications
media. They were further controlled through the Print Media Council and the
Broadcast Media Council, which were responsible for watching the
communications industry.79
Presidential Decree No. 191 was issued on May 11, 1973, to make the
media an effective instrument in the achievement of social change. It also
provided for the expansion of government information services. Marcos also
decreed the removal of direct government supervision of the mass media by
abolishing the Mass Media Council and instead created the Media Advisory
Council, composed of representatives of the media and headed by the president of
the National Press Club. Government supervision was supplemented by the Media
Advisory Council which could review licenses to operate media, but they were
only valid with the president’s approval. It worked closely with the Department of
Public 80
During 1975 a temporary relaxation of the control over the media was
evident. Temporarily, official censorship was lifted, and representatives of the
private mass media were asked to institute a self-regulating system consistent with
the strict reporting rules of the New Society. Several probable reasons could
explain this change. First, the authorities gained confidence in their power and
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popular support; second, the Philippines was heavily criticized for its tight political
control abroad and, furthermore, ejected from membership in the International
Press Institute; and third, American authorities criticized the press situation
heavily, and it was important not to endanger U.S. assistance to the Philippines.
However, after 1976, the government tightened its control again until 1981 ~
The Nationalism Sentiment
In late sixties and early seventies, nationalist sentiments grew. Large parts
of the population were against imperialism, and many demonstrations were held to
protest the abuses in the U.S. military bases and the U.S.-dominated World Bank
and IMP policies.
According to Theodore Friend, modern Philippines nationalism began with
the revolution of 1896 against Spain and reemerged in the fierce resistance against
the Japanese.82 He argues that because opposition to imperial power is so
fundamental to Philippines nationalism, increasing criticism of and resistance to the
U.S. are natural.83
In the late 1960s, Filipino journalists criticized Filipino people for
undignified imitation of American style and policies.84 In movies, television,
popular music, fiction, and comics, American influence has been and remained
overpowering. A Filipino critic of the American movie industry, Renato
Constantino, saw it as “omnipresent ideological force, cudgeling and subverting
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Filipinos of all kinds, cheating them of their heritage and substituting American
ways and outlooks.”85
In December 1968, the Communist Party of the Philippines was established
as a result of an internal division in the Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP).
Earlier, a radical student group, Kabataang Makabayan (KM) was formed. It was
active in organizing demonstrations and rallies condemning the presence of U.S.
military bases on Philippines soil. The bases were viewed as endangering rather
than enhancing Philippines security and were also seen as a violation of national
sovereignty. The Filipino nationalists, including Recto, Tanada, and Diokno,
regarded American installations as a possible target for attack rather than a
bulwark of defense.86
Thus, intellectuals and labor leaders became attracted to radical ideologies
which included a wide range of opinion. To be a nationalist not only meant having
Marx or Mao as ideological leaders, but also having a negative attitude toward
American influence and its involvement in the Philippines.
When martial law was declared, Marcos pursued policies which appeared to
be consistent with nationalist demands. He then called for a review of the bases
agreement and pronounced that the Philippines would be pursuing an independent
foreign policy.
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Martial Law and Foreign Policy Change
I have suggested that a martial law regime requires rapid economic growth
in order to legitimize the concentration of political power and the defiance of
democratic constitutional rules to create popular support at the same time.
Diversification, in terms of searching for new allies and new trading partners, may
contribute to this central goal. A second proposition is that there can be political
value in showing added independence towards the former colonial dominant power.
It is conceivable that the latter is also connected to the nationalistic aspects of the
policy such as increased emphasis on the national language as an example.
Nationalism is emphasized in an attempt to increase the popular support and
legitimacy of the martial law regime.
In the Philippines, the effort for legitimation included, among other things,
an encompassing economic development p~1icy.~7 The Philippines’ line of
diplomacy during martial law was called development-oriented. As regards to
investments, the government offered economic incentives other than formal
guarantees of non-discriminatory treatment. There was an array of tax incentives
as conditions of entry and new areas were opened to foreign investors including
rice and corn processing. A marked increase in the flow of American foreign
investment in the Philippines was noted from $8.2 million in 1972 to $72.8 million
in 1973.88 Marcos actively pursued policies to create an attractive environment for
foreign investment. He stressed the need for more foreign investment in the
Philippines partly because foreign investment was interpreted as a sign of the
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international support that Marcos sought to reinforce and legitimize his domestic
position. Thus the marked increase in foreign investment was seen as a “vote of
confidence” in the New Society.89 Manila was made one of the most attractive
Asian sites for corporate headquarters. Among other incentives, a law was passed
allowing the opening up of commercial banks to foreign investment that guaranteed
return of capital and profits. Forgiveness of royalties was liberalized and tax
obstacles reduced. There was also an easing of the entry and clearance
requirements for multinational executives. Marcos further opened up a large
number of new areas of the economy to 100 percent foreign investment.90
On the question of divestment of foreign holdings required under the
expiration of parity, Marcos became tolerant. Earlier, he supported the Supreme
Court, which ruled in August 1972 that American property rights acquired under
parity must be turned over to Filipinos when the Laurel-Langley Agreement
expired. Marcos issued a decree to set aside this ruling, gave a grace period of one
year in May 1974, and by early 1975 a mutually acceptable procedure had been
worked out. As the divestment question was clarified, new American investment
increased and accounted for 46 percent of all new foreign investment in the
Philippines in l975.~’
The second aspect, a nationalist stance or the use of nationalism to
contribute to the regime’s legitimacy, can be seen in the demand for the review of
the terms regarding the American bases. The martial law regime used rising
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nationalistic sentiment to focus on the unequal aspects of Philippines-American
relations. This is further discussed by Wurfel:
[Marcos] is using another classic tool for building legitimacy--nationalism. This is
most obvious in a foreign policy that has wisely tried to counterbalance the once
lopsided reliance on the American connection... Economic nationalism, on the other
hand, has had to be abandoned, given the decision to rely heavily on foreign
capital. The regime’s pursuit of nationalism when it is convenient, and its avoidance
when not, is much easier under conditions of media controlY2
Another proposition regarding the relationship between martial law and
foreign policy change concerns the role of martial law as a facilitator of foreign
policy change. Martial law can facilitate foreign policy change by such features as
its centralized leadership, repressed or eliminated opposition, and control of the
media.
The merits of the martial law system were described by Marcos in a speech
in January 1975 in terms of its:
crisis government that had the real power to make quick decisions to implement
them without obstruction from any source... to attack problems with immediacy and
directness.. .to deal with both the unknown, the uncertain and the unexpected, to
adjust with swiftness, adequacy and efficiency to unprecedented situations.93
Martial law thus facilitated foreign policy change by providing a strong and
centralized leadership. Rosenberg argued that “with all its disadvantages,
centralization of power has considerably facilitated ‘effective administration’ and
‘rational planning,’ which appear to be the key catchwords of leadership.”94 With
the abolition of Congress, for example, decision-making in terms of foreign affairs
became concentrated in the president who ruled by decree and became the sole
representative of the country in foreign affairs. The President could now more
easily shape and control foreign policy without opposition from Congress, and
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determine more fully the scope and pace of adjustments in foreign relations.95 For
example, he could now ratify treaties himself. The repression of domestic political
processes under martial law gave the government more freedom to maneuver in
foreign policy and to that extent facilitated attempts to diversify foreign relations.
The opening of diplomatic relations with Communist countries, for example, would
probably not have passed the Congress.
Conclusion
This chapter examined the ways in which the declaration of martial law has
affected Philippines foreign policy change and how a domestic factor may have had
an effect on foreign policy in a broader sense. Martial law can create a need for
legitimacy, which is fulfilled by a new foreign policy because of its authoritative
and oppressive nature. The change in foreign policy can be seen as an attempt to
fill the need for legitimacy.
Certain aspects of Philippines martial law were examined together with the
changes that took place became of its declaration. One of them was the decision
making structure in the Marcos government, which was characterized as the
centralized power held by the President and shared with his wife, the military, the
technocrats, and a new elite. The centralization of power facilitated whatever
innovation Marcos wanted to introduce because there was no other institution like
the Congress to check and balance the President’s decisions.
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Another factor was the growth in size and significance of the military. This
growth, which was essential to the very nature of martial law, did not allow
sufficient self-reliance vis-a-vis the U.S. because more military aid was needed to
finance the expanded military complex. The increase in its significance in support
of the executive did not result in the military providing a check to balance the
power of the president.
A third factor was the suppression of civil liberties, particularly the
censorship and control of the mass media and, therefore, severely limiting the
freedom of expression under martial law. This could have had an effect on foreign
policy in a sense that it could be directed to mobilize the population by influencing
their thinking, emphasizing nationalism. The control of the media could have had
an effect both on the martial law regime itself by legitimizing its rule and on a
foreign policy change that people would tend to support, such as diversification,
because in a sense the merits and importance of what the government decides is
always shown in a positive manner.
Each of these aspects facilitated and simplified the process of foreign policy
change. In terms of diversification of relations, authoritarianism could more easily
direct foreign policy without much resistance from certain groups. Thus, martial
law appears to have played a significant role in the Philippines’ foreign policy
change regarding its relations with the U.S. Suhrke stated that “the Philippines
found it easier to accept a less intimate relationship with the U.S.,” in part because
the imposition of martial law made it easier to institute such changes.96 Under
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martial law conditions, the government got more freedom to maneuver in foreign
policy because of the suppression of domestic political processes. In this sense,
martial law facilitated the attempts to diversify the Philippines’ foreign relations.
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CHAPTER SIX
U.S. POLICY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND FOREIGN POLICY CHANGE
The changes in Philippines’ foreign policy were caused by many factors,
both domestic and international. In this chapter, the role of the external
environment as a contributing factor to the Philippines’ move toward a foreign
policy change will be examined, with a special focus on the United States. In
addition, the new balance of power in the region and its impact on the foreign
policy change will be discussed. The following questions are examined: (1) In
what ways could the environment possibly have contributed to the Philippines’
foreign policy change? and (2) Was there any change in the environment which
may have influenced the Philippines’ foreign policy to adapt, adjust, or react? Two
aspects of the environment will be the focus. The first will be the role of U.S.
foreign policy in the Asian region, and the second will be the role of the newly
emerging regional balance of power.
U.S. Foreign Policy in Southeast Asia Until the Early Seventies
U.S. foreign policy in Southeast Asia in the sixties and early seventies was
dominated by its relationship with Indochina, as indicated in Table 7. The U.S.




MAJOR USES OF U.S. FORCES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, 1949-1990
Incident Month/Year
1. France-Viet Minh war: Dienbienphu 3/54
2. France-Viet Minh war: Dienbienphu 7/54
3. Political-military crisis in Indonesia 2/57
4. Indonesia-Netherlands crisis 12/57
5. Political-military crisis in Indonesia 2/58
6. Civil war in Laos 8/59
7. Civil war in Laos 2/61
8. Civil war in Laos 5/62
9. Civil war in Laos 4/63
10. Buddhist crisis in South Vietnam 6/63
11. Assassination of Diem in South Vietnam 11/63
12. Coup in South Vietnam 1/64
13. Civil war in Laos 4/64
14. Tonkin Gulf incident 8/64
15. Viet Cong attack Bien Hoa barracks 11/64
16. Viet Cong attack Pleiku air base 2/65
17. Viet Cong attack Qui Nhon barracks 2/65
18. War in Vietnam: w/d of troops from Europe 7/65
19. North Vietnamese offensive in South Vietnam 5/72
20. Breakdown in peace talks with North Vietnam 12/72
21. Civil war in Laos 2/73
22. Civil war in Cambodia 2/73
23. Collapse of regime in South Vietnam 3/75
Source: Bradley Lian and John Oneal, Presidents, the Use of Military Force, and Public Opinion,”
Journal of Conflict Resolution 37, 2 (1993), 295-298.
basis for American foreign policy in the region. In broader terms, this policy was
characterized by lack of involvement in distant places. This was a modification of
the U.S. policies from the late forties to the seventies, which were characterized by
large numbers of interventions in different forms and in many countries. Table 7
documents U.S. foreign policy toward Southeast Asia during the Cold War era. It
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is notable that there has been no major U.S. military force involved after the
collapse of the South Vietnamese regime.
The world political system after World War II was characterized by
bipolarity. The scope of competition soon extended to other parts of the world,
and America’s containment policy carried a strong increase in its involvement in
other parts of the world. Continuous concern and efforts were needed to protect
these parts, and many of these challenges took place at the farthest points from the
United States. At the same time, the U.S. believed that deterrence, basic and
extended, required the opponent to believe that the U.S. would honor its
commitments in a bipolar system. America’s allies and friends believed that their
defense depended upon the U.S. They were therefore constantly conscious to signs
of a weakening will on the part of the U.S.’
A new political mood emerged in America in the late sixties and early
seventies. It reflected weariness, disillusionment, and retreat from global
commitments and involvement. One feature of this mood was the attempt to
inhibit presidential power in foreign policy, especially the power as commander-in
chief to commit American forces to battle. A second symptom of the new mood
was that there was a tendency to put higher priority on the nation’s domestic
problems. To some, America could only take care of its own needs, serve as an
example for mankind, and remain pure in a morally wicked world if it stayed out
of or minimized its political involvement in it. This somewhat resembled the old
isolationism 2
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In short, U.S. policy in the early 1970s was said to be undergoing changes
from involvement to retrenchment. The late sixties and early seventies were
characterized by some rethinking on the part of the U.S. regarding its role in
Southeast Asia. Whereas the U.S. was the only nation available to respond to the
weaknesses and needs of Southeast Asia to any major degree at the close of World
War II, the situation had changed 25 years later for the U.S. by adjusting to these
changes. It sought a greater measure of multilateralism and reciprocity,
particularly in the 1970s.3
Brandon characterized American foreign policy in the seventies as follows:
(1) a clearer understanding of the limitations of American power, whether military,
financial, or economic, (2) “a fatigue with foreign commitments and a
disenchantment with the world, a rebellion against the American values of the last
fifty years,” (3) “a despair about the intractability of domestic problems,” and
(4) an overall disposition to reduce and withdraw.4 Over the years since the cold
war began, the U.S. became involved in a troubled world. But from the early
seventies on, there was more caution before intervention was made in crisis. The
Vietnam War helped to bring about this attitude that led to a shift in U.S. foreign
policy.
The changes in the world were said to be an important factor to which U.S.
foreign policy was adjusting when it sought to modify its involvement in Southeast
Asia. In 1972, some of these, according to Deputy Secretary of State John Irwin,
were: the movement from bipolarity to multipolarity, the nation-state being
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subjected to stress, other entities gaining roles, the gradual erosion of the barrier
between domestic and foreign affairs, and the greater involvement of the general
public in foreign policy.5
It was in this spirit that the Nixon doctrine was enunciated in July 1969,
which held simply that the U.S. would leave the primary defensive role in Asia
and other regions to its allies while limiting itself to the necessary support
functions. Nixon’s aim was to reduce direct U.S. international commitments so as
to lighten the military and economic burden of the U.S. and to stabilize the
situation at home. Simply stated, Nixon wanted no more Vietnams.
However, to what extent Nixon meant to withdraw or lessen U.S.
involvement in Southeast Asia is often debated. In a discussion of U.S. foreign
intervention and assistance in Southeast Asia, specifically Vietnam, it was stated
that “the Nixon Administration changed the military strategy in 1969 to try to
make it more politically acceptable. Although it reduced the numbers of American
ground troops, it increased the intensity of the air war.”6 According to this line of
reasoning, the Nixon doctrine as foreign policy was a response to domestic
pressure. After the American experience in Vietnam, public opinion was against
direct military involvement in other places.
U.S. Foreign Policy in Asia: 1967-1972
I examined many relevant official speeches published in the Department of
State Bulletin (~~) for the years 1967 to 1972. A total of about 50 speeches
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were selected and deemed relevant to the study. The following major features of
U.S. foreign policy toward Asia from 1967 to 1972 are derived from my review of
1~ speeches.
The Importance of Japan
A greater role in Asia by other developed nations like Japan in terms of
economic assistance and cooperation was viewed as an important development.7 It
was hoped that the growth of the Philippines’ relations with Japan would expand
further and this was viewed as “another encouraging development in the interest of
both nations and a further impetus to ever growing mutual cooperation in this
region of the world.”8 The importance of Japan’s role was repeated in 1969.
There was specifically a speech by Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and
Pacific Affairs Robert W. Barnett about Japan’s economic dynamism and U.S.-
Japanese common interests in Asia.9 The common objectives of the U.S. and
Japan in the region were discussed:
We and Japan favor progression to greater and greater reliance upon multinational
agencies in the growth processes of developing countries. We both find ways to
encourage regional cooperation in economic and other undertakings, and Japan has
become an active participant.’°
Japan’s tremendous economic progress was praised together with the helpful
contributions of Japan to stability and progress in Asia. It was also stated that the
U.S. and Japan were seeking to achieve understanding and common outlook
necessary to keep the policies following compatible lines.” Secretary of State
William Rogers outlined the importance of Japan to the U.S. when he said that a
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close and friendly relationship between the two countries would be “the most
important single factor bearing on future events in the area.”12
Regionalism in Asia
Regional cooperation was a most dominant theme as early as 1967. This
was glorified by many officials as an extremely reliable development in Southeast
Asia.13 This is interesting because there was a tendency for some people to
separate the U.S. identification from that of the Philippines with regional
neighbors. Judging by the speeches, the U.S. was very positive about regionalism
and hoped the trend would continue. In the words of the Administrator for the
Agency for International Development (AID), William Gaud:
The United States is deeply interested in this trend toward regionalism. The peace
and stability of Asia and the Pacific are inseparable from world peace. Regional
cooperation and regional strength offer the best chance of peace and stability on the
Far East. It is the United States policy to support regional development by backing
cooperative Asian initiatives. We also encourage international organizations and
other developed nations to support such efforts.14
Particularly, the Philippines’ friendship with its Asian neighbors was seen as
“a crucial link in a chain of mutual interdependence among the free peoples of the
Far East to assure their continued freedom.”5 The growth of regional spirit and
the emergence of new regional institutions was taken as an extremely encouraging
sign.’6 The seeds of regional cooperation were seen as having taken root in such
institutions as the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East and the Asian
and Pacific Council.’7 What would the U.S. role be in a regional community?
Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Marshall Green said that the
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U.S. would like to see a truly Asian community evolve at Asian initiatives in
which the U.S. could participate in an appropriate partnership relation through the
larger Asian-Pacific community. 18
Social and Economic Progress
Assistant Secretary of State William Bundy, in his speech “East Asia
Today,” enumerated the constructive developments in East Asia.’9 In 1968, the
situation was described as progressive and a remarkable transformation was said to
have occurred in terms of economic and social progress, increased political
stability, expansion of political democracy, etc.2° In 1969, W. W. Rostow, Special
Assistant to the President, summarized the situation for the years of 1965-68. A
view of optimism was apparent. According to Rostow, a new wave of confidence
swept through Asia, and “there was a beginning of Asian regional cooperation for
the first time in recorded history.”2’
The speeches noted Japan’s emergence as the world’s second largest
industrial nation as well as the high growth rates of the East Asian economies of
South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand as higher than those of
the industrially developed world. The emphasis on social and economic progress
was summed up by the Department of State as follows:
Most Asian nations display a growing sense of national identity and pride, a greater
self-confidence. They now can rely increasingly on their own resources, can sustain
economic growth, and can build a framework of regional cooperation even though
they continue to require some outside assistance.22
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Shared Responsibility and Self-Reliance
It was also emphasized that the U.S. intended to remain a Pacific power
despite its seemingly low profile. This theme represented what was new in
American foreign policy toward Asia. It was consistent with concrete U.S.
behavior like the pull-out from Vietnam and the withdrawal from Southeast Asia in
general. Modified involvement in terms of emphasis on shared responsibility
appeared first in 1969. In the previous years of 1967-68, the emphasis was on:
(1) U.S. responsibility in Asia, especially in Vietnam--according to Assistant
Secretary Bundy, the U.S. would continue to use its power as long as it was
needed to help preserve Vietnam’s right to determine its own destiny free from
external interference and to help preserve the right of other nations to do the
same,23; (2) the importance of the security of Southeast Asia, which was said to be
essential to the security of the U.S.,24; and (3) the importance of a treaty
commitment specifically regarding the allies in the region.25
In 1967-68, the U.S. presence in Vietnam was regarded as necessary since
it was considered as helping a beleaguered nation fight against aggression. It was
stated by the Department of State Bulletin that the U.S. did not intend to solve the
problems of the world by itself, but areas of Asia were presented as the threat to
the stability of the world.26 In 1969, there was a shift in foreign policy from an
emphasis on American responsibility in the region to the limits of its power. It was
said that the U.S. could not surrender its responsibilities as the greatest industrial
power in the world but that other nations must share the burden. As W. W.
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Rostow stated: “what we can do, and are doing, is to use our influence and power
to help organize the world community in ways which distribute the burdens more
evenly and give to others a sense that they, too, are shaping the destiny of man.”27
The theme about the proper and responsible role for America as sharing
responsibility was further elaborated in a speech by Assistant Secretary for
International Organization Affairs Joseph I. Sisco regarding what the American
people want: “To make sure that our power and responsibility overseas are
exercised properly to accomplish basic American purposes. . . . And they want to
make sure that other nations pull their weight and share the responsibilities of
collective security and building the peace.”28 He emphasized the needed balance
between isolation and involvement in American foreign policy and that the U.S.
must reject equally the illusion of isolation within fortress America and the
opposite illusion of total involvement.29 Defense was emphasized in terms of
sharing responsibility. According to Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific
Affairs Marshall Green, due to dynamic growth rates in East Asia together with
rising nationalism, the U.S. allies in East Asia were at the time in a position to
share more of the burdens of defense in the area with the U.S.3°
In 1971, shared responsibility was included in the Nixon doctrine progress
report. The Nixon doctrine was said to relate not only to military burden-sharing
but to economic and political programs as well. As viewed by Assistant Secretary
Green, burden-sharing was taking place in the economic as well as the military
field, and Western Europe, Australia, Japan and others had increased their aid to
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developing countries.3’ This was to be in line with the Nixon doctrine. It was said
that without reducing the credibility of American commitments in East Asia, the
U.S. was undertaking to assist its friends and allies in this area to develop a better
capacity to defend themselves individually and collectively.32 Nixon called for a
redefinition of the American role in the world. He stated that “this new sharing
responsibility requires not less American leadership than in the past, but rather a
new, more subtle form of leadership.”33 He stated further that the U.S. intended to
give its allies the time and the means to adjust materially and psychologically to a
new form of American participation in the world.34
The Nixon doctrine signalled the low profile the U.S. took in the region
during the seventies. Some analysts have interpreted the Nixon doctrine as a major
shift in the priorities of American national interest in East and Southeast Asia and
have proposed that the U.S. was in the process of massive withdrawal from the
Asian region.35 Accordingly, from 1969 to April 1975, the U.S. withdrew over
600,000 men from its Asian military outposts. Although it is said to mark the
withdrawal of America from the region, U.S. officials, including Nixon himself,
assured everyone that the U.S. would honor its commitments in Asia and that it
intended to remain an Asian power.36
The central thesis of the doctrine was, according to Nixon, that the U.S.
would participate in the defense and development of allies and friends but that
America could not and would not conceive all the plans, design all the programs,
execute all decisions, and undertake all the defense of the free nations of the
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world.37 The U.S. did not, however, have any intention of withdrawing from the
world.38 Self-reliance by other nations was a central principle of the doctrine.
According to it, America’s allies should assume more of the responsibility for their
security and well-being. The U.S. would continue to provide the nuclear shield
but it would look to its allies to provide the necessary conventional power.39
Three basic propositions in the Nixon doctrine were discussed in the
progress report by Assistant Secretary Green: (1) The U.S. would keep its treaty
commitments; (2) The U.S. would provide a shield if a nuclear power threatened
the freedom of a nation allied to the U.S. or of a nation whose survival America
considered vital to its security or to the security of the region as a whole; and
(3) In cases involving other types of aggression, the U.S. would furnish aid and
economic assistance when requested and appropriate, but it should look to the
nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the
manpower for its defense.4°
Detente with China
The discussion of reestablishment of high-level communications with China
first appeared in 1971. Although there was a discussion of remaining firm in its
commitments to friends and allies,4’ it was said that the growing assumption of
responsibility by Asians of their own affairs should allow the U.S. to develop more
of its attention to two countries with which its relations would grow more
important in future decades. They were Japan and the People’s Republic of
180
China.42 Mention should also be made about the change of assumptions regarding
China. The U.S. used to talk about and incite fear regarding a hostile China, but
this was no longer the case. As pronounced by Assistant Secretary Green in 1971:
“Changes appear at long last to be emanating from China. . . .The reduction in our
forces in Asia helps to mitigate imagined Chinese fears and undercuts their charge
that we have been surrounding and threatening them.”43
In 1972, Nixon visited China and high-level relations with China
commenced. He also visited Moscow, which resulted in an agreement on the
limitation of strategic arms and a wide range of cooperative endeavors. It was
mentioned by Secretary Rogers that U.S. foreign policy at this period was based on
the belief that the U.S. should expand relations with China and the Soviet Union to
attain a peaceful world.’4 Nixon spoke positively about having closer contact with
China. Among other things, he said that the U.S. had agreed with China to pursue
cultural, journalistic, educational, and other exchanges so that “the world’s most
prosperous nation and its most populous nation can get to know one another
again. “a
Secretary Rogers characterized the new relationship with the Soviet Union
and China in the following way: U.S. foreign policy was based on the belief that
communication between strangers--and negotiation between adversaries--helped the
cause of a more peaceful world. Since this was the case, the U.S. placed such
importance on its expanding relations with the Soviet Union and on the new
relationship with China.46 To illustrate the change of attitude towards China, the
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following quotation from Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs Harold
Kaplan in 1967 is an example regarding the earlier view:
There is nothing in our 20th century experience to suggest that allowing Communist
China to bully, blackmail and subvert her neighbors with impunity will in the long
run guarantee peace in the area or hasten the day when the Chinese Communist
government will be ready and willing to abandon its paranoid fantasies and assume
a peaceful posture in the world.47
U.S. foreign policy in Asia underwent significant changes. From 1967 to
1968, a high priority was given to the importance of U.S. involvement in Southeast
Asia, particularly in preventing aggression in the region. The treaty commitments
in Southeast Asia were deemed significant, thus making the U.S. responsible for
playing an essential role in protecting the region. From 1969 to 1972, the
priorities seemed to change. Although the U.S. declared its intention to remain a
Pacific power, it shifted emphasis from involvement and commitment to a more
cautious stance emphasizing both shared responsibility with other states and the
limits of American power.
A call for self-reliance on the part of the Asian countries was made. The
change in the American involvement in Asia was said to be due to, among other
things, the changes in the Asian region itself, being characterized by progress and
economic development which created a quite different situation immediately after
World War II; the change in the international system from bipolarity to
multipolarity; and the change in American public mood regarding directly
involvement in far away places. The new policy was designed to accommodate
public opinion characterized by an unwillingness to sustain and support a prolonged
land war in the name of containing Communism.
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The Unites States Withdrawal from Vietnam
The American role in Indochina was important in the eyes of its allies since
it was a test of how the U.S. would conduct itself in terms of fulfilling its
commitments. Successive U.S. leaders asserted that a failure to meet any
commitment would jeopardize all other commitments and inevitably the U.S.
itself.48 Secretary of State Dean Rusk commented on the importance of U.S.
commitments: “if either our adversaries or friends begin to doubt that the U.S. will
honor its alliances, the result could be catastrophe.”49
Vietnam taught a lesson to both the U.S. and the Philippines. Especially on
the part of the U.S., it translated into a deep reluctance to become involved again
in a foreign intervention. The role that Nixon chose was one in which U.S.
leadership should exercise great caution and limitation. Two conditions were set
before America would respond to a crisis. First, there should be a collective
response by the nations of the region to contain the threat by themselves. And
second, if that failed, a collective request to the U.S. for assistance would be
needed ~°
It may be reasonable to say that the American withdrawal from Vietnam
brought about a fear and insecurity among the allies in the region. In the words of
Bull, “It now seems likely that the U.S., unconvinced that the global balance of
power is at stake, will be prepared to allow aggression to succeed and Communism
to expand in Indochina and possibly in other areas of Asia and the Pacific, rather
than intervene directly to prevent it.”5’ Marcos expressed the fear that the
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Indochina disaster could lead to an increase in insurgency in other parts of
Southeast Asia.
The Action-Reaction Model
Political actions are functions of certain interactions in the environment. The
action-reaction aspect is sometimes referred to as the stimulus-response model,
which is a part of a bargaining approach. A bargaining approach assumes that one
type of analytical system that can be created is the system of interactions made up
of the behavior of states towards each other. Bargaining implies a udynamic
situation of states in interaction, each acting partly because of what it thinks its
action will produce in the opponent and also reacting to the opponent’s actions. “52
Although it is primarily used in crisis situations, it is used in other situations as
well.
Dean Pruitt, a psychologist aiming to contribute to a theory about pairs of
nations, has investigated the effect of one actor’s behavior on another and has
shown the similarity between the effects experienced by international actors and
individuals. In his thinking, change in the behavior of one member of a dyad is
often responded to by the other member. Reciprocation is produced arising from
change in one party’s level of output on a given dimension.53 The above concerns
interactions between nations and not the response of one actor to another’s actions.
Even if the action-reaction cycle in this case stops after the original action by one
actor and the response of the other, it is still believed to be interesting to point out
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this connection to the general reasoning, even though this might not be strictly
applicable.
One way of examining the Philippines’ foreign policy is in terms of looking
at it as a response to U.S. behavior. While the action-reaction analysis concerns
continuous reaction, my interest is limited to the Philippines’ response to a
particular behavior. A change in the behavior of both sides in the U.S.-Philippines
structure may be seen as reciprocation. An important aspect that should be
mentioned, however, is the fact that reaction may come in different dimensions and
directions. As Boulding states that “the relations of nations are reciprocal, so that
I’s attitude toward J is the same as J’s toward I... .This is a very severe restriction
and certainly violated in fact: there are unrequited loves and hates among the
nations as there are among individuals.”54 However, it is likely to go in the same
direction and dimension because, as he continues:
We can recognize a tendency... for the matrix to become symmetrical. There is a
certain instability about an unrequited feeling. If I loves J and J hates I, then either
J’s constant rebuff of I’s affections will turn I’s love to hate, or I’s persistent
wooing will break down J’s distaste and transform it into affection.55
The Philippines’ foreign policy change can be characterized by the stimulus
response model. There are different ways in which a state may react to a particular
stimulus. The relevant questions here are: first, what kind of response occurs
considering where or from whom the action comes?; second, what kind of response
occurs considering the kind of action?; and third, what kind of response occurs
considering the time when the stimulus is introduced? In the first two questions,
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the object of interest is the United States, while in the third question the object of
interest is the Philippines.
Where or from whom does the action originate, i.e., an enemy, a neutral,
or an ally? One gets more easily disappointed with an ally who does what one
perceives to be wrong because there are certain expectations involved with friends
which do not exist with enemies. For example, an ally is expected to help its
friends in times of need. In the case of Philippines-U.S. relations, the U.S. has
been considered by the Philippines as a close ally, the latter having been an
American colony for almost 50 years and also with notable consideration to the
connection of treaties that bind the two countries. The kind of reaction expected
when the U.S. disappoints the Philippines is at least a reassessment of their
relations.
What is the kind or type of action? One example would be a perception on
the part of the Asian states that the U.S. would withdraw from the region and
would not care about its commitments toward these states. A likely response by the
Asian states would be to consider ways to cope with the new situation, hence a
reassessment of any special relations and a search for new alternatives. Further,
insecurity is a natural consequence since in the Asian states’s view, one can no
longer depend on the ally. In this connection one can explain the Philippines’
foreign policy change based on the following proposition: The Philippines, because
of its disappointment with the behavior of the United States in its treatment of an
ally, started to reassess and modify its special relationship with the U.S. The
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American loss of credibility in the eyes of its allies contributed to a reassessment
of the special relations. The insecurity brought about by U.S. withdrawal from the
region forced its allies in Asia to seek other alternatives, among them, diplomatic
diversification.
modification of special relations
U.S. policies and behavior > &
diversification of relations
A change in the foreign policy behavior of the U.S. led to a corresponding
change in the foreign policy behavior of the Philippines in its relations with the
U.S. The type of change that the Philippines perceives the U.S. to make is
characterized by a loosening of ties and so the response is reciprocated. A more
specific model then would appear as follows:
Nixon doctrine and the U.S. Withdrawal from Vietnam >
Philippines Insecurity/Disappointment >
Review of the bases agreement &
Pronouncement of emphasis on regional diversification
Considering timing, a response is likely when a country may be insecure
because treaties are expiring or at a time when the domestic environment is
volatile. For example, it is noted that the announcement of the Philippines’ foreign
policy change coincided with the end of the Laurel-Langley Agreement, an
important economic treaty between the Philippines and the U.S. This was also the
time when nationalistic sentiments were on the rise, when people were sickened by
U.S. dominance, and when President Marcos started to consolidate his power and
legitimize his martial rule.
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To summarize, the change from close ties to diversification should be
viewed as a likely reaction to prior U.S. foreign policy behavior, especially
American withdrawal from the region. In general terms, a state is likely to change
its foreign policy behavior if it perceives an ally as changing its behavior or
reducing its commitment. Specifically, the Philippines’ foreign policy change was a
reaction to American behavior, which called for a modification of the relationship
with the Asian region states. It may be seen as an adjustment to the United States’
new global strategy.
Reaction of the U.S. Allies in Asia
The Southeast Asian region had engaged U.S. interests since the end of
World War II. In Indochina, the United States fought the longest and most
indeterminate war in its foreign policy history. In the Philippines, the United States
had maintained its largest air and naval military bases outside the country.
Moreover, the Southeast Asian nations were becoming some of its most significant
trading partners. However, as Simon pointed out, the United States was seen as a
faithless supporter:
one whose foreign policy has changed mercurially from deep military involvement
during the second Indochina War (1965-1975) to general indifference in the war’s
aftermath (1975-1980) and more recently to a renewed security concern with
Southeast Asia derived from its geostrategic location (1980- )•56
Nixon comforted U.S. allies by stating that America would become involved
when it was in its strategic interest to do so. But the U.S. willingness or ability to
honor treaty commitments as in the past had been seriously eroded. A number of
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U.S. allies were looking to other alliances or neutrality as a means of guaranteeing
their security. Thailand’s long time foreign minister, Thanat Khoman, criticized the
groups which helped force the elaboration of U.S. involvement with bitterness.
Addressing an American Chamber of Commerce luncheon, Thanat blamed
everything on the “anti-war Congress, the liberal press and the hippies and the
yippies.” Seeking the cause of the discontent in the U.S. that had prompted
American attempts to reduce its involvement in Asia, the foreign minister critically
observed it critically as “in times of stress and strain [in the U.S.], the scum comes
to the surface.”57 It was an important concern in Southeast Asia whether the U.S.
would have the will and strength to stick it out, because many of these countries
believed that their security depended on the defeat of aggression in South Vietnam.
Marcos frequently pointed out in his speeches that all American defense
guarantees to East and Southeast Asia needed Congressional approval before they
became operational. Earlier, both President Eisenhower and President Johnson
restressed the defense commitment in terms of action by the American executive
branch. He then questioned the worth of those assurances when Congress, vis-a-vis
Vietnam, strongly demonstrated its ability to decrease or even override the
executive on Southeast Asian matters. Marcos stated that “I do ask whether our
mutual defense treaty in the light of Indochina has not become a dead letter serving
no function, yet productive of suspicions amongst our own people and amongst
Asians.”58 The reaction to America’s policy and behavior in Asia is described by
Neuchterlein:
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Southeast Asian leaders today are deeply disturbed by the Ford Administration’s
apparent lack of ability to carry through on U.S. foreign policy commitments made
by the previous administrations in Washington, and they worry about the U.S.
withdrawing completely from responsibility in that area. American behavior in
Indochina in the spring of 1975 shocked the governments of the Philippines,
Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia and raised serious questions about
whether the U.S. would honor defense commitments anywhere in Southeast Asia.59
Apprehension that the U.S. might back out on its Asian commitments
beyond Vietnam was evident in President Marcos’s sharp questioning of the value
of the American commitment to the Philippines. He declared that:
We are disturbed by an emerging view that commitments made by U.S. presidents
are nothing more than statements of intent that do not bind the American people or
Congress.. .We have to ask ourselves whether we can continue to be involved in
conflicts and animosities engendered by policies not our own.6°
Even though the Carter Administration responded to the fear, in particular,
by reviewing the base agreements with the Philippines in January 1979, some
remaining ambiguity existed about the extent of U.S. commitment. As Ronquillo
observed, “since the Indochina debacle, there seems to have been a turn-about in
Philippines foreign policy to a point of moving from American sphere of
influence.”6’ After the American defeat in Indochina, the Philippines reviewed its
own perceived position as the strongest U.S. ally in Southeast Asia. The
Philippines decided that it was time to review the Americans’ “little brown
brother” image and seek a greater measure of independence, particularly with a
view to becoming accepted as a member of the Third World group. The
government therefore called for a new review of the bases which were something
of an embarrassment under the existing treaty.
The American forces were also withdrawn from Thailand and the U.S.
bases in that country were closed by the end of 1976, while serious questions were
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asked by other American allies in Asia regarding American intentions to remain an
Asian power. Reportedly, Singapore’s Foreign Minister Sinnathamby Rajaratnam
stated that “the U.S. is our biggest enigma. We used to think of the inscrutable
Chinese and the inscrutable Russians. Now we’re not precisely sure about the
intensity of the American commitment to this part of the world.”62 On the other
hand, the U.S. allies also were relieved that the Vietnam war had finally ended.
In the meantime, President Nixon visited Indonesia as a part of his Asia-
Pacific tour to consolidate Indonesia’s major role in Southeast Asian security.
Unlike his predecessors, Nixon sought a positive move toward regional stability
although he did not propose any collective defense arrangement. However,
Indonesian leadership saw the U.S. policy as similar to the same containment
policy. The U.S. economic assistance program was viewed as an exchange for the
expected Indonesian cooperation.63
Malaysia’s Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, expressed criticism
during the Nixon trip to the U.S.-dominated security policy for the pro-Western
Southeast Asian countries. He called for a more realistic and friendly policy for
regional countries. Malaysia argued that an independent security policy was more
realistic than the traditional reliance on the Western assistance. For the Malaysians,
the Nixon doctrine seemed inapplicable because they had more important regional
problems, including the territorial dispute over the Sabah with the Philippines,
security cooperation with Indonesia and Singapore, and reconciliation with
Indonesia over Malaysian Peninsula hegemony.6”
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Thailand, a traditional U.S. strategic ally since the founding of SEATO in
1954, also began to move toward a self-defense capability after the U.S.
disengagement from Vietnam. The U.S. urged the Thais to withdraw their troops
from Vietnam and to defend themselves against the Communist insurgencies along
the Thai border. After several years, the U.S. gradually withdrew its forces
stationed in Thailand. Except for the continued presence of some military
advisers, the withdrawal was completed by July 1976. Thailand then urged that
ASEAN replace the American military power vacuum in the region.65 Despite
Nixon’s assurances about U.S. security interest, the Thai press questioned the
applicability of U.S. security commitment in the region:
Would the United States be able to honor its commitments to Thailand, which
President Nixon reaffirmed during the visit, when internal and external pressure of
the communists was applied?... Can a President faced with significant problems at
home, the hope of establishing his party’s majority in Congress, and an excessively
dangerous autumn on the campuses and the streets resist the pressures which would
have him desert the Asian challenge?~
By the end of the mid-1970s, it became clear to the Southeast Asian
community that the United States was making a significant policy adjustment in the
region. The Nixon Doctrine resulted in a withdrawal of U.S. ground forces from
the region and rapprochement with China. The new relationship with China
ultimately meant that the United States would not recognize a long-standing anti
Communist security ally, Taiwan, with whom it had a security treaty. This change
in U.S. policy forced the Southeast Asian nations to confront a new dimension to
their security circumstances. Nixon’s foreign policy in Southeast Asia undermined
the credibility of the United States as a security partner.
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The defeat of South Vietnam and the Vietnamese Cambodian intervention in
1975 prompted all the Southeast Asian capitalist countries, like the ASEAN
nations, to worry about the regional security guarantee. Malaysia, Thailand, and
the Philippines very quickly moved to normalize diplomatic relations with China.
Thailand, which had hosted U.S. forces during the Vietnam War, negotiated the
complete withdrawal of U.S. forces to have a good relationship with China and the
Soviet Union. The Marcos administration not only established diplomatic relations
with China, but also in June 1976 established formal diplomatic relations with the
Soviet Union. Furthermore, the ASEAN nations pursued normalization with
Vietnam, at least until Hanoi’s 1978 military intervention in Cambodia.
In press communiques issued at the end of the eighth ASEAN Foreign
Ministers meeting in Kuala Lumpur on May 15, 1975, the ASEAN member states
called for a “friendly and harmonious relationship” with Vietnam on the basis of
the principles of “peaceful coexistence and mutual beneficial cooperation, non
interference, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, equality and justice in
the conduct of their relations.”67 By that time Southeast Asian security became
uncertain vis-a-vis Vietnam. Table 8 indicates that the number of Vietnam-allied
forces well surpassed that of ASEAN-allied forces. Even Vietnam alone had
enough forces to defeat the ASEAN nations. This balance of power was enough to
invite Communist involvement throughout the region.
ASEAN member states were very concerned about regional security. The
United States made no specific efforts to maintain the regional security balance.
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TABLE 8
VIETNAM-ALLIED/ASEAN GROUND FORCES IN S.E. ASIA
Vietnam-Allied Ground Forces ASEAN-Allied Ground Forces
Cambodia 20,000* Indonesia 195,000
Laos 46,000 Malaysia 90,000




Note: There were approximately 200,000 Vietnamese troops occupying the country at the time.
Source: William Tow, “U.S. Alliance Policies and Asian-Pacific Security: A Transregional
Approach,” in William Tow and William Feeney, eds., U.S. Foreign Policy and Asian-Pacific
Security: A Transregional Approach (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982), 22.
The ASEAN states, however, had already moved to establish a more autonomous
regional security mechanism. This movement emphasized a collective effort on
economic development to deal with their domestic political stability rather than
relying on military capabilities.68
President Ford, in the meantime, had tried to reestablish the United States
security commitment role in Southeast Asia by invoking what came to be known as
the “Pacific Doctrine.” However, the Southeast Asian states well recognized that
the Ford administration lacked the needed Congressional support for any defense
commitment in the region because of public opinion. Consequently, the Pacific
Doctrine was considered by the ASEAN nations as only a “vague gesture of good
will” toward them.69
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Ultimately, the ASEAN states extended diplomatic relations to the new
Communist governments in Indochina as a means to keep the peace, and, at the
same time, they could not completely reject the containment security strategy of
the U.S. until they could replace it confidently with a self-reliance system.
Human Rights Policy
Another U.S. policy in the region to which the Philippines reacted was the
issue of human rights. Human rights can be defined in terms of three categories:
(1) “freedom from government torture or other cruel and degrading treatment,
including arbitrary arrest”; (2) “the right to fulfillment of basic needs, including
food, shelter, health, and education”; and (3) “the right to civil and political
liberties, including freedom of movement, and the right to participate in
government.”70 During the Carter administration, human rights was among the
most important issues in U.S. foreign policy. Considering the disillusionment of
the American people with Watergate and Vietnam, President Carter tried to restore
America’s faith in its ability to improve the moral character of the world by
emphasizing the importance of human rights as part of its foreign policy. The
Congressional policy between 1973 and 1975 linked human rights policy to the
granting of military and economic aid. Human rights policy was originally
initiated by the U.S. Congress during the Nixon administration when Congress
imposed specific human rights restrictions on both military and economic aid to
Third World countries. The U.S. Congress also demanded the establishment of a
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Coordinator for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs in Department of State
whose position was elevated to the assistant secretary level.7’ In the words of
former Congressman Fraser, the general Congressional policy was as follows:
military aid should be reduced or terminated in a country guilty of a consistent
pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights. We define
gross violations as those involving the integrity of the person: torture, prolonged
detention without charges or trial, and other cruel and inhuman treatment, On
economic aid, we state that when a country is engaged in gross violations of human
rights, the aid may go forward only if it goes to the needy.12
During the Carter Administration there was persistent talk of punishing the
Marcos regime by reducing military aid to the Philippines. According to James
Gregor, Philippines’ economic growth “was lost because of Carter’s preoccupation
with Marcos’s record of human rights infractions.”73 In the Philippines, in fact,
several thousand people were detained and tortured during the martial law period.
While most Southeast Asian countries (i.e., ASEAN members) have been major
recipients of American military and economic aid, they often disregarded the
political value of human rights as they imprisoned domestic political opponents
without trial, sometimes under degrading or inhumane circumstances. As Table 9
indicates, most of Southeast Asian nations, such as ASEAN members, should have
recorded very unfavorable freedom ratings during the late 1970s.
How did America react to reports on violations of human rights in the
Philippines? In 1974, the Senate voted to terminate military aid to the Philippines
as a result of political detentions.74 In 1977, the Congress reduced security
assistance by 8.5% ($3.5 million) below the administration’s request, and, despite
continuing base negotiations, a similar cut was made in the summer of 1978. On
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two occasions in 1976, the U.S. prominently abstained from voting on Asian
Development Bank (ADB) loans for the Philippines not related to “basic human
needs.” The U.S. also intervened diplomatically on behalf of a human rights
victim, Trinidad Herrera, a meeting organizer detained and tortured in May 1977.~~
TABLE 9
COMPARATIVE MEASURES OF FREEDOM OF SOUTHEAST
ASIAN NATIONS
ountry Political Civil Freedom Average
Rights Liberties Rating Rating
Brunei 7 6 Not Free 6.5
Indonesia 6 5 Partly Free 5.5
Malaysia 5 4 Partly Free 4.5
Philippines 6 5 Partly Free 5.5
Singapore 4 5 Partly Free 4.5
Thailand 4 5 Partly Free 4.5
Notes: 1 represents the most free and 7 the least free category. The definitions of the survey:
Political rights enable people to participate freely in the political process; Civil liberties are the
freedoms to develop views, institutions and personal autonomy apart from the state.
Source: Adapted from Freedom House Survey Team, Freedom in the World: The Annual Survey of
Political Rights & Civil Liberties 1992-1993 (New York: Freedom House, 1978-1993).
In March 1980, the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House
Foreign Affairs committee successfully recommended the full committee to cut $5
million from the Carter Administration’s request for security assistance to the
Philippines. This was an expression of disapproval of Marcos’s policies.76 This was
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also an example of a situation in which a strong human rights policy actually saved
the U.S. large sums of money because it helped move Marcos to settle with the
Carter administration for far less than Ford and Kissinger had offered. An
agreement in principle had been reached between the Ford administration and the
Marcos government that the U.S. would provide $1 billion over five years. On the
other hand, President Reagan pledged to President Marcos that the administration
would provide $900 million during the 1985-1989 period: $475 million in
economic grant aid; $125 million in military grant aid; and $300 million in military
credits.77 Bonner discussed American foreign policy regarding Marcos’s violations
of human rights in the Philippines. On several occasions, the U.S. sent messages to
Marcos about taking human rights seriously. However, the Carter Administration
could not abandon Marcos. While Carter himself was reaffirming America’s
commitment to human rights at a commencement address at Notre Dame
University in May 1977, during the same month the U.S. supported a World Bank
loan for $88 million to the Philippines.78
The U.S. concern for human rights in the Philippines was overridden by
other security considerations. When Congress nevertheless reduced aid to Marcos,
the Carter Administration tried to channel American assistance through multilateral
institutions like the World Bank. The Philippines was also readmitted to the
International Development Agency (IDA), primarily at the urging of the U.S. The
U.S. was not willing to make more than token changes in security relations,
including Congressional military aid, because of human rights violations. Actually,
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the Philippines, during the Carter administration in the late 1970s, was able to
maintain its military assistance while other Southeast Asian countries did not.79
While the U.S. concern for human rights in the Philippines was an irritant
in Philippines-U.S. relations, Marcos viewed it as an interference in Philippines
internal affairs. From the Southeast Asian point of view, the U.S. policy on human
rights was not appropriate to them in the sense that their cultural and historical
tradition have been different from the Western-oriented ideal standards of political
freedom: the ASEAN nations contain “many ethnic groups, all of whom have
strong authoritarian traditions. Statutes which permit long detention without trial
and which restrict freedom of speech, of the press.. .are deeply ingrained
in.. .[ASEANI history and tradition, although contrary to internationally recognized
human rights.”80 Although they admitted a lower degree of human rights conditions
in their countries, the Southeast Asian nations argued that they were facing a real
Communist threat in and outside of their nations in addition to economic and
societal instabilities.81 In 1977, Marcos seriously threatened to end the military
base agreement with the U.S. because the U.S. had criticized the human rights
situation in the Philippines.82 Thus, there is reason to believe that U.S. human
rights policy contributed to Marcos’s behavior of wanting to modify the special
relationship.
Figure 6. Foreign Military Sales Agreement in Southeast Asia
Note: All amounts rounded up to nearest thousand.
Source: William Tow, “U.S. Alliance Policies and Asian-Pacific Security: A Transregional
Approach,” in William T. Tow and William R. Feeney, eds., U.S. Foreign Policy and Asian-
Pacific Security: A Transregional Approach (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982), 53.
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The Balance of Power in the Region
Balance of power is an ambiguous term. It is sometimes referred to as a
situation or condition implying an objective arrangement in which there is a
“relatively widespread satisfaction with the distribution of power.”83 It is also
sometimes referred to as a new arrangement of forces in the region, which is the
way it will be used in this study.
What did the world look like during the late sixties and early seventies when
the Philippines made the move of reorienting its foreign policy? What were some
of the major characteristics of the new balance of power in the seventies?
A Greater Role for Japan
Japan showed a rapid and impressive rise to rank as a top economic world
power, with its implied and assumed implications in the political and military fields
as well. In the seventies, it was one of the Philippines’ most important trading
partners. It has been stated that the 1970s marked not Japan’s emergence as a
potential superpower, but a slow recognition of that fact. By 1968-69, Japan’s
GNP had finally exceeded that of West Germany and put Japan’s economy in the
third place only after the U.S. and the Soviet Union.83
A remarkable change in the power relationships in the region was the rise in
the position of Japan as a source of aid, investment, and trade. The Philippines’
dependence on the U.S. lessened to a certain extent because part of what the U.S.
used to be for the Philippines was taken over by Japan. The distribution of
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Manila’s foreign trade began to shift in the mid-1960s from its exclusive
dependence on the U.S. Nevertheless, the source of new foreign investment in the
Philippines did not begin to shift until the 1970s. Some have argued that it was the
changing relative strength of the Japanese and American economies that accounted
for these latter shifts.85
Japan also emerged as an economic superpower, giving attention to bilateral
relations with the ASEAN countries. There were many reasons for this. One was
that Japan was constantly seeking new markets for its exports, and the rapid
economic growth of the ASEAN countries had attracted many Japanese firms.
Another was that Japan was seeking new sources of raw material imports which
ASEAN countries could supply. ASEAN countries were willing to permit foreign
firms to have equal participation in their development of natural resources, which
served Japan’s desires to enlarge its foreign investment.86
Japan has both a complementary and a competitive relationship with the
U.S. in Asian affairs. In the economic area, Japan has come to rival the
importance of the U.S. As a matter of fact, it became one of the most important
sources of new investment capital in the Philippines.87 However, one must see the
link between Japan and the U.S. It is urged by some that the success of American
policy in Asia, indeed in the whole world, has depended upon the continuation of
strong ties with Japan, a nation dominating all others in the Asian Pacific
community, and a country that the U.S. wants to continue as its ally.88
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The Soviet Military Buildup
A development that was alarming to the U.S. and its allies was the
persistent strengthening of Soviet military forces in Asia during the 1970s. The
increase in Soviet interest and influence in the area had been visible. In addition to
stationing 45 divisions on the Sino-Soviet border, the Soviet Union deployed
surface combatants as well as ballistic missile submarines in its already large
Pacific fleet, occupied former American air bases at Da Nang and former naval
facilities at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam, garrisoned division-size ground forces on
the islands in north of Japan’s present border, and introduced SS-20 intermediate-
range missiles and long-range bombers to the Asian Pacific basin.89 The Soviet
buildup of forces was significant in the balance of power situation in the region,
especially in view of the reduction of U.S. naval and air units for operations in the
Indian Ocean. The Soviet role in Southeast Asia, in contrast to its earlier stance,
was then a permanent one. As described in a 1969 news report:
While in the past Soviet involvement in the region fluctuated in the level of its
commitment, the need for consolidation of its position against China has ensured
that in the foreseeable future the Russians will not abandon the area. Indeed even
the Philippines is gingerly moving toward diplomatic relations with Moscow and the
Russians are encouraging it by all possible means.9°
China and Its Detente with the U.S.
The key to a balanced continent, today as well as in the past, has been
China. The American objective seemed to be an independent China, strong enough
to preserve stability, but prevented from gaining control over its major neighbors.
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Though China has been regarded with suspicion in the region, it also has been
considered as a counter to Soviet ambition in the area. The U.S.-Chinese detente in
1972 changed the attitude of some Asian countries toward China. Awareness grew
among Southeast Asian leaders that in the era of detente among great powers, they
must find a way to restore normal diplomatic relations and reach accommodation
with China after years of hostility. Southeast Asian leaders came to understand that
U.S. policy could no longer be relied upon when it came to fighting dissident
forces, and since local Chinese minorities in most Southeast Asian countries have
been viewed as potential, if not real, subversives by local governments, good
relations with China was a means of weakening the propaganda appeals of these
subversive groups.9’ In the case of the Philippines, there was a tremendous fear of
Communist countries for a long time. The new situation emphasized the benefits
from trade and economic benefits.
Other Influences
Aside from the influences discussed above, there were other factors which
characterized and affected the new balance of power in the region. First, there was
the previously discussed U.S. withdrawal from Asia. Second, a transformation of
the international system from bipolarity to multipolarity. The harsh bipolarity of
the early 1950s had been replaced by a “multi-hierarchical” or “polycentric” and
emergent “multicentric” world.92 The power struggle of the region could be seen
to be gradually moving towards a new multipolar equilibrium, containing at least
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four powers: the U.S., the Soviet Union, China, and Japan. The international
system in the fifties was sharply divided. The Huk campaign in the Philippines
reinforced the fear of Communism. The Philippines saw the possibility of
Communist advancement in its territory. It was understandable that the Philippines
pursued increased security ties with various countries as the best help to what it
considered its vulnerable position. In the seventies, it was perceived that in a less
polarized world, the Philippines might need U.S. cooperation less.
Third, there was the assertiveness and growth of self-confidence and
regional cohesion among the nations of Southeast Asia and Third World countries
in general. In 1967, ASEAN was formed, and this marked the willingness of these
states to cooperate and strengthen their ties through economic activities. It was a
great leap considering the differences that existed among them. The Philippines
spoke for identification with Asia and its common interest with the other countries
in the region.
Fourth, the rise of a strong Europe willing to trade and invest in Asia also
had some influence on the balance of power in the region. Europe became
increasingly aware of the profitability of doing business with Asia. Fifth, China
broke out its self-imposed isolation after the Cultural Revolution, as evidenced by a
significant revival of its diplomatic activities in various parts of the world. Finally,
there came the break in Sino-Soviet relations.93
In broader terms, the new balance of power in the seventies was
characterized by a United States exhibiting a low profile in terms of involvement in
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Asia, a prosperous Japan, a strong Soviet Union whose presence was felt ever
more in the region, and a not so dangerous China friendly to the United States.
How could these changes affect Philippines foreign policy? In the case of China,
there was a perception of a smaller Chinese threat, and the U.S. president’s visit to
Beijing gave the message that detente was forthcoming between the two countries
and so the Philippines could diversify its relations even with other Communist
states. Ideology decreased the perceived benefits of economic interaction. As
regards to the Soviet Union, its presence in the region might be interpreted as
filling in the vacuum that the U.S. created.
In brief, the new balance of power provided the Philippines with
opportunities to diversify. Instead of being forced to concentrate on the U.S. and
Japan, among others, a new regional balance of power provided the Philippines
with an alternative of trade with various countries. Also, the Philippines did not
need to be as a firmly anti-Communist as before in its foreign policy.
Conclusion
This chapter examined the Philippines’ foreign policy change in the context
of the role of the environment in affecting its decision to change. The question
posed in the beginning was: Is it possible to explain the Philippines foreign policy
change by way of looking at the environment at the time that this foreign policy
change was being announced? What I have tried to do was to present the
plausibility of using the environment as an explanation for Philippines foreign
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policy behavior. By looking at U.S. foreign policy and behavior in the region, and
at the new balance of power, I conclude that there are reasons to believe that these
factors may have played a role.
One way to draw a connection between the environment and foreign policy
change was by proposing that the Philippines’ decision to change was a reaction to
the U.S. modification of policy in Asia. With regard to the Nixon Doctrine and the
U.S. pullout from Vietnam, it was proposed that these two examples of policy, by
inciting insecurity, disappointment, etc., contributed to the decision to change. The
U.S., for its part, spoke of the change in its foreign policy in Asia as a reaction to
the changes that occurred in the region, like the increasing strength of Japan and
the economic progress prevailing in Asia, among other things. Another factor for
the change in U.S. policy was the rise of public opinion negatively inclined to
support American intervention in distant territories.
Another aspect of U.S. policy that the Philippines was said to have reacted
to was the human rights policy, particularly during the Carter Administration.
Modification of the relations may partly be due both to the U.S. concern about
human rights in the Philippines, and also to Marcos’s reaction to U.S. criticism
concerning his human rights violations. The martial law regime of Marcos drew
Washington’s attention by its suppression of civil liberties and its violation of
human rights through a huge number of illegal detentions and torture.
In addition, other factors in the environment may have played a role in the
Philippines’ foreign policy change, especially in terms of diversification. First,
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there was the decline of the U.S. economy. In the late sixties and early seventies,
the U.S. economic position weakened compared to earlier post-World War II
years. Thus, it was logical for the Philippines to diversify its markets. Second, this
period also marked the increasing role of Japan in the world economy. Third, there
was the change in the world environment in which the Third World began to
increase its assertiveness in international affairs.
A note may be made about American and Philippines’ foreign policies
concerning regionalism. In the new foreign policy, the Philippines government
emphasized the importance of having close relations with its neighbors in the
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The first president of the Philippines Republic, Manuel Roxas, framed a
foreign policy which was unidirectional in a sense that it focused almost
exclusively on the U.S. This was understandable because the U.S. had been the
colonizer and liberator of the Filipinos from the Japanese and it had emerged as the
most powerful nation in the world after World War II. Philippines dependence on
the U.S. continued even after the Philippines was proclaimed an independent
republic on July 4, 1946.
While many Filipinos accepted the policy of very close and dependent ties
on the U.S., there were also those who expressed dissent. One was the
Hukbalahap, a group who struggled with the Japanese invaders and who feared
being exploited by the Americans. Another was a group of nationalists led by
Claro M. Recto, who criticized the unequal treaties with the Americans. An
example of these treaties was the Military Bases Agreement of 1947. It became
the source of the irritants in Philippines-American relations in the years that




In May 1975, during a period of authoritarian rule, Marcos issued a set of
foreign policy guidelines that included closer ties to ASEAN, closer identification
with the Third World, establishment of relations with China and the Soviet Union,
and review of relations with the U.S. compatible with the emerging realities in
Asia. While a renewed relationship with the U.S. was called for, the new policy
had to be compatible with the emerging realities in Asia. In 1974, an important
economic treaty, the Laurel-Langley Agreement, was allowed to expire by the two
countries. Further, a review of the bases treaties was urged and the unequal
stipulations in these treaties was emphasized, especially by the nationalists. At the
same time, the Philippines opened diplomatic relations with Communist countries
for the first time, and it became an active member of the Third World movement.
The Philippines emphasized the nation’s Asian identity and the importance of
regional cooperation. Thus, a more independent foreign policy seemed to have
emerged.
Nature and Extent of Philippines Foreign Policy Change
Several questions were posed in the beginning of this study. The first
concerns the question of whether the foreign policy change that was announced in
the early seventies as a new policy by the president and his officials was carried
out. This foreign policy emphasized diversification of relations and identification
with the Asian neighbors and the Third World. It also called for an assessment of
special relations with the Philippines’ traditional ally, the U.S. This policy would
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mean the end of special relations and the start of a more independent and self-
reliant policy.
Philippines-U.S. special relations were quite ambiguous. This refers to the
friendship acquired by having fought the war together. This also refers to the
cultural ties which remained even after independence. According to one author, it
is an “amalgam of security connections, historical ties, and emotional hangups.”
In this study, several indicators were chosen to measure the extent and
timing of foreign policy change, e.g., treaties, trade, and the territorial dispute. As
a further indicator, the status and new arrangements concerning the U.S. military
bases during the period studied were discussed. The major findings are the
following. First, the intent to change foreign policy in terms of diversifying
relations was evident. The major themes of Marcos’s martial law regime took up
the issue of the desire to be independent, self-reliant, and nonaligned.
Diversification was valued as a goal and making new friends regardless of ideology
was emphasized. Another major theme was the significance of regional
cooperation. ASEAN took an important place in the foreign policy change.
Regarding the U.S., it was mentioned that some adjustments in the Philippines’
relations with its former colonizer was made in the light of new developments.
While there were no hostile remarks regarding the U.S., the Philippines tried not
to make the U.S. the cornerstone of its foreign relations.
Concerning the bilateral treaties that the Philippines had signed,
diversification was quite evident in the seventies when Manila signed treaties with
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countries it did not have relations with before. The number of treaties signed with
the U.S. also decreased compared to earlier years, and an important treaty, the
Laurel-Langley Agreement, expired and was not renewed in July 1974. Its
termination ended aspects of the relationship which may be termed special.
Trade diversification was encouraged by the government, and so while the
U.S. still figured as a substantial trade partner from 1972 to 1980, an increase in
trade with some non-traditional partners made the role of the U.S. much less
important than before. The trend was the same in terms of investment. Japan at
certain periods superseded the role of the U.S. as a major source of trade, aid, and
investment. As shown in Table 10, Japan accounted for approximately 30 percent
of Philippines foreign trade during the martial law period, just about the same
percentage contributed by the U.S. Japan’s share grew rapidly from the previous
decades, accompanied by the gradual reduction of Philippines dependence on the
U.S. both as a market for exports and as a supplier of imports. The decline in
trade of both countries in the 1970s was attributable to the fact that Marcos tried to
diversify Philippines’ foreign relations with the Socialist countries and other
countries. As Crone pointed out, the policy of diversification showed results:
the Philippines has achieved the most change in three areas: reduction of
concentration on the single largest partner, shifting trade away from the large
industrial nations, and generally spreading trade more widely.... Although President
Marcos is probably quite deserving of much of the criticism leveled by
nationalists, in this regard his regime is not lacking in progress.2
In terms of the status of the bases, some U.S. concessions seemed to have
been reached during the agreement in 1979, which indicates change to a certain
extent. These include the confirmation of sovereignty represented by the presence
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TABLE 10
DIRECTION OF PHILIPPINES TRADE, 1970-1980 (Percentage)
Exports Imports
Year U.S. Japan Others U.S. Japan Others
1970 41.7 39.6 18.7 31.0 31.5 37.5
1971 42.5 32.8 24.7 26.7 30.6 43.0
1972 42.5 31.9 25.6 27.0 32.2 40.7
1973 36.5 36.7 26.8 28.2 32.5 39.4
1974 42.3 34.8 22.9 23.2 27.5 49.2
1975 28.5 37.7 33.8 21.8 27.9 50.3
1976 35.8 24.2 40.3 22.0 26.9 51.1
1977 35.0 23.1 41.9 20.4 24.9 54.7
1978 33.4 23.9 42.7 21.0 27.2 51.8
1979 29.8 26.1 44.1 22.8 22.8 54.4
1980 27.2 26.5 46.3 23.1 19.8 57.1
Source: U.N. Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1972-1983.
of Filipino commanders and the flying of the Filipino flag alone; the return of
some base lands; and a review of the status of the bases to be conducted every five
years. However, the new agreement had also faced some criticism, especially from
Filipino nationalists who contended that the concessions gained were not so
significant, since the U.S. was guaranteed unhampered operation in the bases and
the Philippines commanders did not have substantial authority.
Concerning Explanations
The second major aim of this study was to provide some plausible
explanations for the occurrence or non-occurrence of foreign policy change.
Internal and external factors were examined which may have been connected with
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the Philippines’ foreign policy change. These are authoritarianism, as exemplified
by martial law in the Philippines, and great power policy in the region, in this
case, U.S. policy in Southeast Asia. While there may be many and various factors
which could explain foreign policy change, the two main factors mentioned above
were chosen for reasons discussed in chapter one.
The first explanatory factor, authoritarianism, was chosen as a concept to
be examined regarding its relation to foreign policy change partly because this
argument is widely supported in the literature on developing countries.
Authoritarianism may have an effect on foreign policy for three reasons. First,
because a regime of this type would tend to need a scapegoat to legitimize its
undemocratic rule. Second, such a rule needs to appear nationalistic to obtain
support domestically. Third, authoritarianism tends to emphasize economic
development to justify its continued hold on power. Martial law, which was
imposed in 1972, established authoritarianism in the Philippines. The imposition of
martial law was an important event in Philippines politics, bringing about radical
changes in the political structure. The uniqueness of this period in Philippines
history is one of the reasons why this study was concentrated on the years of 1972-
1981 as the time frame. Thus, this was a study of Philippines foreign policy
change during the martial law period. The conditions of martial law made it simple
to change foreign policy because every power of decision making was concentrated
in the authoritarian ruler himself. Marcos could stop most opposition by repressing
it through various means. Authoritarian regimes, as mentioned above, have a need
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for a scapegoat in its foreign policy. And it has a tendency to appear to be
nationalistic to get internal support, and also to emphasize economic development,
which implies efforts to diversify. On the other side, martial law also made foreign
policy change difficult because the new kind of regime had an increased need for
foreign support to repress its opponents, who became both larger in number and
more active because of the fact that opposition forces had lost their opportunities to
express their views legitimately. As a result of this, U.S. military and economic
aid became more important for Marcos to maintain himself in power. Thus,
authoritarianism, or martial law in particular, could be both an incentive for and at
the same time an obstacle to foreign policy change.
The second explanatory factor, the U.S. policy in the region in the late
sixties and early seventies, was examined on the basis of the existence of an action-
reaction framework in international relations. The changing environment of the late
sixties and early seventies seemed to have affected Philippines foreign policy. The
Nixon Doctrine, the emergence of an economically strong Japan, the Sino
American rapprochement, among others, provided a challenge to many of the
premises of the special relationship with the U.S.
The Philippines changed its foreign policy at the time that the U.S. was
preparing to adjust its relationship with the region as announced in the Nixon
Doctrine. The Philippines’ action can thus be seen as a reaction to adjust to the
new situation. The new foreign policy can be seen as generated by the U.S. and as
a reaction to new U.S. objectives in the region to lessen its direct involvement in
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Asia. The U.S., for its part, spoke of change in its foreign policy in Asia as a
reaction to the changes that occurred in the region, like the end of the Vietnam
War, the increasing strength of Japan, and the economic progress in Asia, among
other things. Another important factor for the change in U.S. policy was the rise of
public negative opinion toward any direct American intervention in distant
territories. There followed an emphasis on human rights in the foreign policy of
the Carter Administration that ran counter to the martial law situation in the
Philippines. In short, the changing environment of the late sixties and early
seventies seemed to have affected Philippines’ foreign policy. The assumptions of
the action-reaction model presented earlier were supported. The Philippines was
disappointed with the U.S. policy and became concerned about the new balance of
power in the region. The following Table 11 is a brief summary of explanations.
Concerning Hoisti’s Model
Holsti’s model of restructuring is discussed in chapter one. This study is an
attempt to test Hoisti’s model for restructuring. First, the case of the Philippines
provides one concrete example of the applicability of the model. This study
provides an empirical application of his framework. The Philippines announcement
in the seventies that it would change its foreign policy and diversify relations as a
modification of its traditional policy of special relations with the United States is an
additional example of a country studied that may be thought to belong to that group
that moves from dependence to diversification. Holsti noted four kinds of orientations,
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TABLE 11
A SUMMARY OF PHILIPPINES FOREIGN POLICY
CHANGE EXPLANATIONS
Philippine Foreign Policy Change, 1972-198 1:
1. Toward a close cooperation with ASEAN and its members.
2. Toward a renewed relationship with the U.S.
3. Toward a new diplomatic relations with the Socialist countries.
Internal Sources (An Authoritarian Regime):
1. Need to legitimate the martial law regime.
2. Need to achieve economic growth.
3. Need to confront political opposition.
4. Need to embrace the increasing nationalist sentiment.
4. By expanding the military roles and its support.
5. By repressing civil rights including mass media.
6. Through consolidating decision-making process.
7. Others
External Sources (the U.S. Policy in Southeast Asia):
1. Withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam.
2. Implications of Nixon doctrine.
3. A strong Human Rights policy.
4. Decline of U.S. economic power.
5. A regional Communist threat.
6. Others
as shown in Figure 7, and the Philippines can be said to have demonstrated the




Figure 7. Directions of Foreign Policy Change Dependence
Source: K. J. Holsti, ed., Why Nations Realign: Foreicn Policy Restructuring in the Postwar World
(London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982), 5.
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However, it is not entirely correct to state this because it is difficult to
study foreign policy change as a movement from one classification to another. A
reason for this is the non-exclusiveness of the categories. In this study, the
Philippines’ identification with Asia and the Third World would not necessarily
mean moving entirely away from the U.S. because the two do not have to be
regarded as mutually exclusive. The Philippines diversified its foreign policy by
opening diplomatic relations with countries it had not had relations with before,
e.g., Socialist countries, and yet its special relations with the U.S. remained
healthy in terms of the U.S. still being a primary source of trade, aid, and
investments.
The new Philippines policy in the seventies was said to modify the special
relations with the U.S. that had existed since independence. However, it is argued
in some of the literature that the elements in the so-called special relations with the
U.S. that were weakened might not be as important as the result that the
Philippines has made during the martial law period. According to Noble, “the
results of the reassessment of Philippine-American relations which Marcos
announced in April [1975] were less dramatic than the announcement itself.”3 The
close relationship was maintained, but in a different form. One reason why some
view the special relationship as having persisted is the continued economic
dependence of the Philippines on the United States. In short, diversification would
not necessarily be the opposite of close ties with the U.S. But, given the fact that
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the lease of U.S. bases in Subic Bay and at Clark has expired in recent years, the
relationship is not any more special.
The study of the Philippines sheds some light on the question of foreign
policy change of small states towards a great power. This analysis shows that small
states tend to change their foreign policy partly to lessen the negative consequences
of dependence such as sensitivity, vulnerability, and limited freedom of action.
However, the same factors can slow them in their attempts to change foreign
policy. Authoritarian government facilitates foreign policy change because of the
absence of effective legal opposition. At the same time, small states can be
discouraged in their attempts to change foreign policy because several
circumstances inherent in them force continued dependence on the great power.
In Hoisti’s framework, certain factors are given which are asserted to bring
about foreign policy change. However, what is absent is a way of giving value or
weight as to which indicators were most important in terms of assessing how much
change or diversification took place. Again, this is difficult because it perhaps
belongs to the classical debate of what is the most essential aspect of a relationship,
the economic indicators or political or cultural ones.
Another contribution that this study may be said to have made to
restructuring theory is that it examined specific domestic situations as factors
causing or having an effect on foreign policy change. The concepts used in this
study were either omitted in Hoisti’s model or sometimes stated in a general
manner. An example of the former is authoritarianism and the state of martial law.
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Authoritarianism as a domestic factor can be an independent variable which can
lead to foreign policy change, especially if it is a new phenomenon, because such a
regime in its search for legitimacy will try to find a scapegoat to gain support.
Authoritarianism can also be an intervening variable between other domestic and
external factors on the one hand and foreign policy change on the other. For
instance, authoritarianism can accelerate foreign policy change because of the
concentration of power into the hands of the authoritarian leadership.
Another independent variable which may be included in Hoisti’s model is
the role of the international or external environment. While Holsti discussed
military and non-military threats as external factors leading to reorientation, this
study provides a specific example of how these threats can be real. In this study,
foreign policy reorientation was viewed partly as a reaction to a partial withdrawal
of a superpower from the region. This may have an effect on what a country
perceives to be a threat or not. In the case of the Philippines, insecurity was felt
because of the partial U.S. withdrawal from the region.
Finally, this study emphasized the importance of the relationship between
the external and internal variables for explaining foreign policy in general and its
change in particular. The Philippines’ foreign policy change involved the external
variable, great power policy, and the internal variable, authoritarianism, as sources
for change. The internal variable, authoritarianism, also served as an intervening
variable between the sources and foreign policy change itself.
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Military Bases Agreement (March 14, 1947)
WHEREAS, the war in the Pacific has confirmed the mutuality of interest
of the Republic of the Philippines and of the United States of America in matters
relating to the defense of their respective territories and that mutuality of interest
demands that the Governments of the two countries take the necessary measures to
promote their mutual security and to defend their territories and areas;
WHEREAS, the Governments of the Republic of the Philippines and of the
United States of America are desirous of cooperating in the common defense of
their two countries through arrangements consonant with the procedures and
objectives of the United Nations, and particularly through a grant to the United
States of America by the Republic of the Philippines in the exercise of its title and
sovereignty, of the use, free of rent, in furtherance of the mutual interest of both
countries, of certain lands of the public domain;
WHEREAS, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines has
requested United States assistance in providing for the defense of the Philippines
and in developing for such defense effective Philippine armed forces;
WHEREAS, pursuant to this request the Government of the United States
of America has, in view of its interest in the welfare of the Philippines, indicated
its intention of dispatching appropriate assistance in the development of the
Philippines armed forces;
WHEREAS, a Joint Resolution of the Congress of the United States of
America of June 29, 1944, authorized the President of the United States of
America to acquire bases for the mutual protection of the Philippines and the
United States of America; and
WHEREAS, Joint Resolution No. 4 of the Congress of the Philippines,
approved July 28, 1945, authorized the President of the Philippines to negotiate
with the President of the United States of America for the establishment of bases
provided for in the Joint Resolution of the Congress of the United States of
America of June 29, 1944, with a view to insuring the territorial integrity of the
Philippines, the mutual protection of the Philippines and the United States of
America, and the maintenance of peace in the Pacific;
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THEREFORE, the Governments of the Republic of the Philippines and of
the United States of America agree upon the following terms for the delimitation,
establishment, maintenance and operation of military bases in the Philippines.
ARTICLE I
GRANT OF BASES
1. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines (hereinafter referred
to as Philippines) granted to the Government of the United States of America
(hereinafter referred to as the United States) the right to retain the use of the bases
listed in Annex A attached hereto.
2. The Philippines agrees to permit the United States, upon notice to the
Philippines, to use such of those bases listed in Annex B as the United States
determines to be required by military necessity.
3. The Philippines agrees to enter into negotiations with the United States at
the latter’s request, to permit the United States to expand such bases, to exchange
such bases for other bases, to acquire additional bases or relinquish rights to bases,
as any of such exigencies may be required by military necessity.
4. A narrative description of the boundaries of the bases to which this
Agreement relates is given in Annex A and Annex B. An exact description of the
bases listed in Annex A, with metes and bounds, in conformity with the narrative
descriptions, will be agreed upon between the appropriate authorities of the two
Governments as soon as possible. With respect to any of the bases listed in Annex
B, an exact description with metes and bounds, in conformity with the narrative
description of such bases, will be agreed upon if and when such bases are acquired
by the United States.
ARTICLE II
MUTUAL COOPERATION
1. It is mutually agreed that the armed forces of the Philippines may serve
on United States bases and that the armed forces of the United States may serve on
Philippine military establishments whenever such conditions appear beneficial as
mutually determined by the armed forces of both countries.
2. Joint outlined plans for the development of military bases in the
Philippines may be prepared by military authorities of the two Governments.
3. In the interest of international security any bases listed in Annexes A and
B may be made available to the Security Council of the United Nations on its call




1. It is mutually agreed that the United States shall have the rights, power
and authority within the bases which are necessary for the establishment, use,
operation and defense thereof or appropriate for the control thereof and all the
rights, power and authority within the limits of territorial waters and air space
adjacent to, or in the vicinity of, the bases which are necessary to provide access
to them, or appropriate for their control.
2. Such rights, power, and authority shall include, inter alia, the right,
power and authority;
(a) to construct (including dredging and filling), operate, maintain,
utilize, occupy, garrison and control the bases;
(b) to improve and deepen the harbors, channels, entrances and
anchorages, and to construct or maintain necessary roads and bridges
affording access to the bases;
(c) to control (including the right to prohibit) in so far as may be
required for the efficient operation and safety of the bases, and within the
limits of military necessity, anchorages, moorings, landings, take-offs,
movements and operation of ships and water-borne craft, aircraft and other
vehicles on water, in the air or on land comprising or in the vicinity of the
bases;
(d) the rights to acquire, as may be agreed between the two
Governments, such right of way, and to construct thereon, as may be
required for military purposes, wire and radio communications facilities,
including submarine and subterranean cables, pipe lines and spur tracks
from railroads to bases, and the right, as may be agreed upon between the
two Governments to construct the necessary facilities;
(e) to construct, install, maintain, and employ on any base any type
of facilities, weapons, substance, device, vessel or vehicle on or under the
ground, in the air or on or under the water that may be requisite or
appropriate, including meteorological systems, aerial and water navigation
lights, radio and radar apparatus and electronic devices, of any desired
power, type of emission and frequency.
3. In the exercise of the above-mentioned rights, power and authority, the
United States agrees that the powers granted to it will not be used unreasonably or,
unless required by military necessity determined by the two Governments, so as to
interfere with the necessity rights of navigation, aviation, communication, or land




1. It is mutually agreed that United States public vessels operated by or for
the War or Navy Departments, the Coast Guard or the Coast and Geodetic Survey,
and the military forces of the United States, military and naval aircraft and
Government-owned vehicles, including armor shall be accorded free access to and
movement between ports and United States bases throughout the Philippines,
including territorial waters, by land, air and sea. This right shall include freedom
from compulsory pilotage and all toll charges. If, however, a pilot is taken,
pilotage shall be paid for at appropriate rates. In connection with entrance into
Philippine ports by United States public vessels appropriate notification under
normal conditions shall be made to the Philippine authorities.
2. Lights and other aides to navigation of vessels and aircraft placed or
established in the bases and territorial waters adjacent thereto or in the vicinity of
such bases shall conform to the system in use in the Philippines. The position,
characteristics and any alterations in the lights or other aids shall be communicated
in advance to the appropriate authorities of the Philippines.
3. Philippine commercial vessels may use the bases on the same terms and
conditions as United States commercial vessels.
4. It is understood that a base is not a part of the territory of the United
States for the purpose of coastwise shipping laws so as to exclude Philippine
vessels from trade between the United States and the bases.
ARTICLE V
EXEMPTION FROM CUSTOMS AND OTHER DUTIES
No import, excise, consumption or other tax, duty or import shall be
charged on material, equipment, supplies or goods, including food stores and
clothing, for exclusive use in the construction, maintenance, operation or defense
of the bases, consigned to, or destined for, the United States authorities and
certified by them to be for such purposes.
ARTICLE VI
MANEUVER AND OTHER AREAS
The United States shall, subject to previous agreement with the Philippines,
have the right to use land and coastal sea areas of appropriate size and location for
periodic maneuvers, for additional staging areas,bombing and gunnery ranges, and
for such intermediate airfields as may be required for safe and efficient air
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operations. Operations in such areas shall be carried on with due regard and
safeguards for the public safety.
ARTICLE VII
USE OF PUBLIC SERVICES
It is mutually agreed that the United States may employ and use for United
States military forces any and all public utilities, other services and facilities,
airfields, ports, harbors, roads, highways, railroads, bridges, viaducts, canals,
lakes, rivers and streams in the Philippines under conditions no less favorable than
those that may be applicable from time to time to the military forces of the
Philippines.
ARTICLE VIII
HEALTH MEASURES OUTSIDE BASES
It is mutually agreed that the United States may construct, subject to
agreement by the appropriate Philippine authorities, wells, water catchment areas
or dams to insure an ample supply of water for all base operations and personnel.
The United States shall likewise have the right, in cooperation with the appropriate
authorities of the Philippines, to take such steps as may be mutually agreed upon to
be necessary to improve health and sanitation in areas contiguous to the bases,
including the right, under such conditions as may be mutually agreed upon, to
enter and inspect any privately owned property. The United States shall pay just
compensation for any injury to persons or damage to property that may result from
action taken in connection with this Article.
ARTICLE IX
SURVEYS
It is mutually agreed that the United States shall have the right, after
appropriate notification has been given to the Philippines, to make topographic,
hydrographic and coast and geodetic surveys and aerial photographs in any part of
the Philippines and waters adjacent thereto. Copies with title and triangulation data
of any surveys or photomaps made of the Philippines shall be furnished to the
Philippines.
ARTICLE X
CEMETERIES AND HISTORICAL SITES
1. The United States shall have the right to retain and maintain such united
States military cemeteries and such sites of historical significance to the United
States as may be agreed upon by the two Governments. All rights, power and
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authority in relation to bases granted under this Agreement shall be applicable, in
so far as appropriate, to the cemeteries and sites mentioned in this Article.
2. Furthermore, it is recognized that there are certain cemeteries and
historical sites in the Philippines revered in the memory of the People of the
Philippines and the United States, and it is therefore fitting that the maintenance
and improvement of such memories be the common concern of the two countries.
ARTICLE XI
IMMIGRATION
1. It is mutually agreed that the United States shall have the right to bring
into the Philippines members of the United States military forces and United States
nationals employed by or under a contract with the United States together with
their families, and technical personnel of other nationalities (not being persons
excluded by the laws of the Philippines) in connection with the construction,
maintenance, or operation of the bases. The United States shall make suitable
arrangements so that such persons may be readily identified and their status
established when necessary by the Philippine authorities. Such persons, other than
members of the United States armed forces in uniform, shall present their travel
documents to the appropriate Philippine authorities for visas, it being understood
that no objection will be made to their travel to the Philippines as non-immigrants.
2. If the status of any person within the Philippines and admitted thereto
under the foregoing paragraph shall be altered so that he would no longer be
entitled to such admission, the United States shall notify the Philippines and shall,
if such person be required to leave the Philippines by the latter Government, be
responsible for providing him with a passage from the Philippines within a
reasonable time, and shall in the meantime prevent his becoming a public
responsibility of the Philippines.
ARTICLE XII
INTERNAL REVENUE TAX EXEMPTION
1. No member of the United States armed forces, except Filipino citizens,
serving in the Philippines in connection with the bases and residing in the
Philippines by reason only of such service, or his dependents, shall be liable to pay
income tax in the Philippines except in respect of income derived from Philippine
sources.
2. No national of the United States serving in or employed in the
Philippines in connection with the construction, maintenance, operation or defense
of the bases and residing in the Philippines by reason only of such employment, or
his spouse or minor children and dependent parents of either spouse, shall be liable
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to pay income tax in the Philippines except in respect of income derived from
Philippine sources other than the United States sources.
3. No person referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall be liable
to pay to the Government of local authorities of the Philippines any poll or
residence tax, or any import or export duty, or any other tax on personal property
imported for his own use; provided that privately owned vehicles shall be subject
to payment of the following only: when certified as being used for military
purposes by appropriate United States authorities, the normal license plate fee;
otherwise the normal license plate and registration fees.
4. No national of the United States, or corporation organized under the laws
of the United States, resident in the United States, shall be liable to pay income tax
in the Philippines in respect of any profits derived under a contract in the United
States with the Government of the United states in connection with the
construction, maintenance, operation and defense of the bases, or any tax in the
nature of a license in respect of any service or work for the United States in
connection with the construction, maintenance, operation and defense of the bases.
ARTICLE XIII
JURISDICTION
1. The Philippines consents that the United States shall have the right to
exercise jurisdiction over the following offenses:
(a) Any offense committed by any person within any base except
were the offender and offended parties are both Philippine citizens (not
members of the armed forces of the United States on active duty) of the
offense is against the security of the Philippines;
(b) Any offense committed outside the bases by any member of the
armed forces of the United States in which the offended party is also a
member of the armed forces of the United States in which the offended
party is also a member of the armed forces of the United States; and
(c) Any offense committed outside the bases by any member of the
armed forces of the United States against the security of the United states.
2. The Philippines shall have the right to exercise jurisdiction over all other
offenses committed outside the bases by any member of the armed forces of the
United States.
3. Whenever for special reasons the United States may desire not to
exercise the jurisdiction reserved to it in the paragraphs 1 and 6 of this Article, the
officer holding the offender in custody shall so notify the fical (prosecuting
attorney) of the city or province in which the offense has been committed within
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ten days after his arrest, and in such a case the Philippines shall exercise
jurisdiction.
4. Whenever for special reasons the Philippines may desire not to exercise
the jurisdiction reserved to it in paragraph 2 of this Article, the fiscal (prosecuting
attorney) or the city or province where the offense has been committed shall so
notify the officer holding the offender in custody within ten days after his arrest,
and in such a case the United States shall be free to exercise jurisdiction. If any
offense falling under paragraph 2 of this Article is committed by any member of
the armed forces of the United States,
(a) while engaged in the performance of a specific military duty or
(b) during a period of national emergency declared by either
Government and the fiscal (prosecuting attorney) so finds from the
evidence, he shall immediately notify the officer holding the offender in
custody that the United States is free to exercise Jurisdiction. In the event
the fiscal (prosecuting attorney) finds that the offense was not committed in
the actual performance of a specific military duty, the offender’s
commanding officer shall have the right to appeal from such finding to the
Secretary of Justice within ten days from the receipt of the decision of the
fiscal and the decision of the Secretary of Justice shall be final.
5.In all cases over which the Philippines exercises jurisdiction the custody
of the accused, pending trial and final judgment, shall be entrusted without delay to
the commanding officer of the nearest base, who shall acknowledge in writing that
such accused has been delivered to him for custody pending trial in a competent
court of the Philippines and that he will be held ready to appear and will be
produced before said court when required by it. The commanding officer shall be
furnished by the fiscal (prosecuting attorney) with a copy of the information against
the accused upon the filing of the original in the competent court.
6. Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions, it is mutually agreed that in
time of war the United States shall have the right to exercise exclusive jurisdiction
over any offenses which may be committed by members of the armed forces of the
United States in the Philippines.
7. The United States agrees that it will not grant asylum in any of the bases
to any person fleeing from the lawful jurisdiction of the Philippines. Should any
such person be found in any base, he will be surrendered on demand to the
competent authorities of the Philippines.
8. In every case in which jurisdiction over an offense is exercised by the
United states, the offended party may institute a separate civil action against the
offender in the proper court of the Philippines to enforce the civil liability which
under the laws of the Philippines may arise from the offense.
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ARTICLE XIV
ARREST AND SERVICE OF PROCESS
1. No arrest shall be made and no process, civil or criminal, shall be served
within any base except with the permission of the commanding officer of such
base; but should the commanding officer refuse to grant such permission he shall
(except in cases of arrest where the United States has jurisdiction under Article
XIII) forthwith take the necessary steps to arrest the person charged and surrender
him to the appropriate authorities of the Philippines or to serve such process, as
the case may be; and to provide the attendance of the server of such process before
the appropriate court in the Philippines or procure such server to make the
necessary affidavit or declaration to prove such service as the case may require.
2. In cases where the service courts of the United States have jurisdiction
under Article XIII, the appropriate authorities of the Philippines will, on request,
give reciprocal facilities as regards the service of process and the arrest and
surrender of alleged offenders.
ARTICLE XV
SECURITY LEGISLATION
The Philippines agrees to take such steps as may from time to time be
agreed to be necessary with a view to the enactment of legislation to insure the
adequate security and protection of the United States bases, equipment and other
property and the operations of the United States under this Agreement, and the
punishment of persons who may contravene such legislation. It is mutually agreed
that appropriate authorities of the two Governments will also consult from time to
time in order to insure that laws and regulations of the Philippines and of the




It is mutually agreed that the United States shall have the right to establish
and maintain United States offices in the bases for the exclusive use of the United
States armed forces and civilian personnel who are nationals of the United States
and employed in connection with the construction, maintenance, and operation of
the bases, and the families of such persons, for domestic use between United States
post offices in the bases and between such post offices and other United States post
offices. The United States shall have the right to regulate and control within the




1. It is mutually agreed that the United States shall have the right to remove
or dispose of any or all removable improvements, equipment or facilities located at
or on any base and paid for with funds of the United States. No export tax shall be
charged on any material or equipment so removed from the Philippines.
2. All buildings and structures which are erected by the United States in the
bases shall be the property of the United States and may be removed by it before
the expiration of this Agreement or the earlier relinquishment of the bases on
which the structures are situated. There shall be no obligation on the part of the
Philippines or of the united States to rebuild or repair any destruction or damage
inflicted from any cause whatsoever on any of the said buildings or structures
owned or used by the United States in the bases. The United States is not obligated
to turn over the bases to the Philippines at the expiration of this Agreement or the
earlier relinquishment of any bases in the condition in which they were at the time
of their occupation, nor is the Philippines obliged to make in the bases or for the
buildings or structures left thereon, all of which shall become the property of the
Philippines upon the termination of the agreement or the earlier relinquishment by
the United States of the bases where the structives have been built.
ARTICLE XVIII
SALES AND SERVICES WITHIN THE BASES
1. It is mutually agreed that the United States shall have the right to
establish on bases, free of all licenses, fees, sales, excise or other taxes, or
imports; Government agencies, including concessions, such as sales commissaries
and post exchanges, messes and social clubs, for the exclusive use of the United
States military forces and authorized civilian personnel and their families. The
merchandise or services sold or dispensed by such agencies shall be free of all
taxes, duties and inspection by the Philippine authorities. Administrative measures
shall be taken by the appropriate authorities of the United States to prevent the
resale of goods which are sold under the provisions of this Article to persons not
entitled to buy goods of such agencies and, generally, to prevent abuse of the
privileges granted under this Article. There shall be cooperation between such
authorities and the Philippines to this end.
2. Except as may be provided in any other agreements, no person shall
habitually render any professional services in a base except to or for the united
States or to or for the persons mentioned in the preceding paragraph. No business
shall be established in a base, it being understood that the government agencies
mentioned in the preceding paragraph shall not be regarded as business for the




It is mutually agreed that the United States shall have the right, with the
consent of the Philippines, to grant to commercial concerns owned or controlled by
citizens of the Philippines or of the United States such rights to the use of any base
or facility retained or acquired by the United States as may be deemed appropriate
by both Governments to insure the development and maintenance for defense
purposes of such bases and facilities.
ARTICLE XX
MILITARY OR NAVAL POLICE
It is mutually agreed that there shall be close cooperation on a reciprocal
basis between the military and naval policy forces of the United States and the
police forces of the Philippines for the purpose of preserving order and discipline
among United States military and naval personnel.
ARTICLE XXI
TEMPORARY INSTALLATIONS
1. It is mutually agreed that the United States shall retain the right to
occupy temporary quarters and installations now existing outside the bases
mentioned in Annex A and Annex B, for such reasonable time, not exceeding two
years, as may be necessary to develop adequate facilities within the bases for the
United States armed forces. If circumstances require an extension of time, such a
period will be fixed by mutual agreement of the two Governments; but such
extension shall not apply to the existing temporary quarters and installations within
the limits of the City of Manila and shall in no case exceed a period of three years.
2. Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding paragraph, the Port of
Manila reservation with boundaries as of 1941 will be a available for use to the
United States armed forces until such time as other arrangements can be made for
supply of the bases by mutual agreement of the two Governments.
3. The terms of this Agreement pertaining to bases shall be applicable to
temporary quarters and installations referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article while
they are so occupied by the armed forces of the United States; provided, that
offenses committed within the temporary quarters and installations located within
the present limits of the City of Manila shall not be considered as offenses within
the bases but shall be governed by the Provisions of Article XIII, paragraphs 2 and
4, except that the election not to exercise the jurisdiction reserved to the
Philippines shall be made by the Secretary of Justice. It is agreed that the United
States shall have full use and full control of all these quarters and installations
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while they are occupied by the armed forces of the United States, including the
exercise of such measures as may be necessary to police said quarters for the
security of the personnel and property therein.
ARTICLE XXII
CONDEMNATION OR EXPROPRIATION
1. Whenever it is necessary to acquire by condemnation or expropriation
proceedings real property belonging to any private persons, associations or
corporations located in bases named in Annex A and Annex B in order to carry out
the purposes of this Agreement, the Philippines will institute and prosecute such
condemnation or expropriation proceedings in accordance with the laws of the
Philippines. The United States agrees to reimburse the Philippines for all the
reasonable expenses, damages and costs thereby incurred, including the value of
the property as determined by the Court. In addition, subject to the mutual
agreement of the two Governments, the United States will reimburse the
Philippines for the reasonable costs of transportation and removal of any occupants
displaced or ejected by reason of the condemnation or expropriation.
2. Prior to the completion of such condemnation or expropriation
proceedings, in cases of military necessity the United States shall have the right to
take possession of such property required for military purposes as soon as the legal
requisites for obtaining possession have been fulfilled.
3. The properties acquired under this Article shall be turned over to the
Philippines upon the expiration of this Agreement, or the earlier relinquishment of




For the purpose of promoting and maintaining friendly relations by the
prompt settlement of meritorious claims, the United States shall pay just and
reasonable compensation, when accepted by claimants in full satisfaction and in
final settlement, for claims, including claims of insured but excluding claims of
subrogees, on account of damage to or loss or destruction of private property, both
real and personal, or personal injury or death of inhabitants of the Philippines,
when such damage, loss, destruction or injury is caused by the armed forces of the
United States, or individual members thereof, or otherwise incident to non-combat
activities of such forces; provided that no claim shall be considered unless
presented within one year after the occurrence of the accident or incident out of




All mineral (including oil) and antiquities and all rights relating thereto and
to treasure trove, under, upon, or connected with the land and water comprised in
the bases or otherwise used or occupied by the United States by virtue of this
Agreement, are reserved to the Government and inhabitants of the Philippines; but
no rights so reserved shall be transferred to third parties, or exercised within the
bases, without the consent of the United States. The United States shall negotiate
with the proper Philippine authorities for the quarrying of rock and gravel
necessary for construction work on the bases.
ARTICLE XXV
GRANT OF BASES TO A THIRD POWER
1. The Philippines agrees that it shall not grant, without prior consent of the
United States, any bases or any rights, power, or authority whatsoever, in or
relating to bases, to any third power.
2. It is further agreed that the United States shall not, without the consent
of the Philippines, assign, or underlet, or part with the possession of the whole or
any part of any base, or of any right, power or authority granted by this
Agreement, to any third power.
ARTICLE XXVI
DEFINITION OF BASES
For the purposes of this Agreement, bases are those areas named in Annex
A and Annex B and such additional areas as may be acquired for military purpose
pursuant to the terms of this Agreement.
ARTICLE XXVII
VOLUNTARY ENLISTMENT OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENS
It is mutually agreed that the United States shall have the right to recruit
citizens of the Philippines for voluntary enlistment into the United States armed
forces for a fixed term of years and to train them and to exercise the same degree
of control and discipline over them as is exercised in the case of other members of
the United States armed forces. The number of such enlistments to be accepted by
the armed forces of the United States may from time to time be limited by
agreement between the two Governments.
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ARTICLE XXVIII
UNITED STATES RESERVE ORGANIZATIONS
It is mutually agreed that the United States shall have the right to enroll and
train all eligible United States citizens residing in the Philippines in Reserve
organizations of the armed forces of the United States, which include the Officers
Reserve Corps and the Enlisted Reserve Corps, except that prior consent of the
Philippines shall be obtained in the case of such persons who are employed by the
Philippines or any Municipal or Provincial Government thereof.
ARTICLE XXIX
TERM OF AGREEMENT
The present Agreement shall enter into force upon its acceptance by the two
Governments and shall remain in force for a period of ninety-nine years subject to
extension thereafter as agreed by the two Governments.
Signed in Manila, Philippines, in duplicate this fourteenth day of March,
nineteen hundred and forty-seven.
On behalf of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines:
(Sgd.) MANUEL ROXAS
President of the Philippines
On behalf of the Government of the United States of America:
(Sgd.) PAUL V. MCNUTT
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
of the United States of America to the
Republic of the Philippines
ANNEX A
Clark Field Air Base, Pampanga.
Fort Stotsenberg, Pampanga.
Mariveles Military Reservation, POL Terminal and Training Area,
Bataan.
Camp John Hay Leave and Recreation Center, Baguio.
Army Communications System with the deletion of all stations in the
Port of Manila Area.
United States Armed Forces Cemetery No. 2, San Francisco del Monte,
Rizal.
Angeles General Depot, Pampanga.
Leyte-Samar Naval Base including shore installations and air bases.
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Subic Bay, Northwest Shore Naval Base, Zambales Province, and the
existing Naval reservation at Olongapo and the existing Baguio
Naval Reservation.
Tawi Naval Anchorage and small adjacent land areas.
Canacao-Sangley Point Navy Base, Cavite Province.
Bagobantay Transmitter Area, Quezon City, and associated radio
receiving and control sites, Manila area.
Tarumpitao Point (Loran Master Transmitter Station), Palawan.
Talampulam Island, Coast Guard No. 354 (Loran), Palawan.
Naule Point (Loran Station), Zambales.
Castillejos, Coast Guard No. 356, Zambales.
ANNEX B
Mactan Island Army and Navy Air Base.
Florida Blanca Air Base, Pampanga.
Aircraft Service Warning Net.
Camp Wallace, San Fernando, La Union.
Puerto Princess Army and Navy Air Base, including Navy Section Base
and Air Warning Sites, Palawan.
Tawi Naval Base, Sulu Archipelago.
Aparri Naval Air Base.
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Appendix Two
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES ON MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THE PHILIPPINES (March
21, 1947)
Considering the desire of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines
to obtain assistance in the training and development of its armed forces and the
procurement of equipment and supplies therefor during the period immediately
following the independence of the Philippines, considering the Agreement between
the United States of American and the Philippines concerning military bases,
signed March 14, 1947, and in view of the mutual interest of the two Governments
in matters of common defense, the President of the United States of America has
authorized the rendering of military assistance to the Republic of the Philippines
towards establishing and maintaining national security and towards forming a basis
for participation by that Government in such defensive military operation as the
future may require, and to attain these ends the Governments of the United States
of America and the Republic of the Philippines have agreed as follows:
TITLE I
PURPOSE AND DURATION
ARTICLE 1. - Subject to mutual agreements, the Government of the United
States of America will furnish military assistance to the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines in the training and development of armed forces and in
the performance of other services essential to the fulfillment of those obligations
which may devolve upon the Republic of the Philippines under its international
agreements including commitments assumed under the United Nations and to the
maintenance of the peace and security of the Philippines, as provided in Title II,
Article 6, hereof.
ARTICLE 2. - This Agreement shall continue for a period of five years
from the date of the signing thereof by the accredited representatives of the
Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic
of the Philippines unless previously terminated or extended as hereinafter provided.
ARTICLE 3. - If the Government of the Republic of the Philippines should
desire that this Agreement be extended beyond the stipulated period, it shall make
a written proposal to that effect at least six months before the expiration of this
Agreement.
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ARTICLE 4. - This Agreement may be terminated before the expiration of
the period of five years prescribed in Article 2, or before the expiration of an
extension authorized in Article 3, by either Government, subject to three months’
written notice to the other Government.
ARTICLE 5. - It is agreed on the part of the Government of the Republic
of the Philippines that title to all arms, vessels, aircraft, equipment and supplies,
expendable items excepted, that are furnished under this Agreement on a non-
reimbursable basis shall remain in the United States of America.
TITLE II
GENERAL
ARTICLE 6. - For the purpose of this Agreement the Military assistance
authorized in Article 1 hereof is defined as the furnishing of arms, ammunition,
equipment and supplies; certain naval vessels and aircraft, and instruction and
training assistance by the Army and Navy of the United States and shall include the
following:
(a) Establishing in the Philippines of a United States Military
Advisory Group composed of an Army group and a Navy group to assist
and advise the Republic of the Philippines on military and naval matters;
(b) Furnishing from United States sources equipment and technical
supplies for training, operations and certain maintenance of Philippine
armed forces of such strength and composition as mutually agreed upon;
(c) Facilitating the procurement by the Government of the Republic
of the Philippines of a military reserve of United States equipment and
supplies, in such amounts as may be subsequently agreed upon;
(d) Making available selected facilities of United States Army and
Navy training establishments to provide training for key personnel of the
Philippine armed forces, under the conditions hereinafter described.
TITLE III
MILITARY ADVISORY GROUP
ARTICLE 7. - The Military Advisory Group shall consist of such number
of United States military personnel as may be agreed upon by the Governments of
the United States of America and the Republic of the Philippines.
ARTICLE 8. - The functions of the Military Advisory Group shall be to
provide such advice and assistance to the Republic of the Philippines as has been
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authorized by the congress of the United States of America and as is necessary to
accomplish the purposes set forth in Article 1 of this Agreement.
ARTICLE 9. - Each member of the Military Advisory Group shall continue
as a member of the branch of the armed forces of the United States to which he
belongs and serve with that group in the rank, grade or rating he holds in the
armed forces of the united States and shall wear the uniform thereof, as provided
in current regulations. Officers and enlisted men so detailed are authorized to
accept from the Government of the Republic of the Philippines offices and such
pay and emoluments thereunto appertaining as may be offered by that government
and approved by the appropriate authorities of the United States, such
compensation to be accepted by the United States Government for remittance to the
individual if in the opinion of the appropriate authorities of the United states such
course appears desirable.
ARTICLE 10. - Members of the Military Advisory Group shall serve under
the direction of the authorities of the United States of America.
ARTICLE 11. - All members of the Group shall be on active duty and shall
be paid regularly authorized pay and allowances by the Government of the United
States of America, plus a special allowance to compensate for increased costs of
living. This special allowance shall be based upon a scale agreed upon by the
Government of the United States of America and the Republic of the Philippines
and shall be revised periodically. The Government of the Republic of the
Philippines shall reimburse the Government of the United States of America for the
special allowance provided for in this Article. The special allowance shall be
applicable for the entire period each member of the group resides in the Philippines
on duty with the Group, except as specified elsewhere in this Agreement.
ARTICLE 12. - The Government of the Republic of the Philippines agrees
to extend to the Military Advisory Group the same exemptions and privileges
granted by Articles V, XII and XIII of the Agreement Between the United States of
America and the republic of the Philippines, concerning Military Bases, signed
March 14, 1947.
ARTICLE 13. - Except as may be otherwise subsequently agreed by the
two Governments, the expense of the cost of transportation of each member of the
Military Advisory Group, his dependents, household effects, and belongings to and
from the Philippines shall be borne by the Government of the United States of
America to the extent authorized by law. Members of the Group shall be entitled to
compensation for expenses incurred in travel in the Republic of the Philippines on
official business of the Group and such expenses shall be reimbursed to the
Government of the United States of America by the government of the Republic of
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the Philippines except for expenses of travel by the transportation facilities of the
Group.
ARTICLE 14. - The Government of the Republic of the Philippines shall
provide, and defray the cost of, suitable living quarters for personnel of the
Military Advisory Group and their families and suitable buildings and office space
for use in the conduct of the official business of the Military Advisory Group. All
living and office quarters shall conform to the standards prescribed by the United
states military services for similar quarters. Official supplies and equipment of
American manufacture required by the Group shall be furnished by the government
of the United States of America which shall be reimbursed for the cost thereof by
the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. Official supplies and equipment
of other than American manufacture shall be provided without cost by the
government of the republic of the Philippines. The cost of all services required by
the Group, including compensation of locally employed interpreters, clerks,
laborers, and other personnel, except personal servants, shall be borne by the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines.
ARTICLE 15. - All communication between the Military Advisory Group
and the Republic of the Philippines involving matters of policy shall be through the
Ambassador of the United States of America to the Philippines or the Charge’
d’Affaires.
ARTICLE 16. - (a) The provisions of Articles XIII and XXI of the
Agreement of March 14, 1947 between the United States of America and the
Republic of the Philippines concerning Military Bases are applicable to the Military
Advisory Group, it being agreed that the Headquarters of the Military Advisory
Group will be considered a temporary installation under the provisions of Article
XXI of the aforementioned.
(b) The Chief of the Military Advisory Group, and not to exceed six




Article 17. - The decision as to what supplies, services, facilities,
equipment and naval vessels are necessary for military assistance shall be made by
agreement between the appropriate authorities of the United states and the Republic
of the Philippines.
ARTICLE 18. - Certain initial equipment, supplies and maintenance items
shall be furnished gratuitously by the United States in accordance with detailed
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arrangements to be mutually agreed upon. Additional equipment and supplies other
than those surplus to the needs of the United States required in the furtherance of
military assistance shall be furnished by the United states subject to reimbursement
by the Republic of the Philippines on terms to be mutually agreed upon. All items
of arms, munitions, equipment and supplies originated from sources other than
those surplus to the needs of the United States shall be furnished only when the
requisite funds have been specifically appropriated by the congress of the United
States.
ARTICLE 19. - The Government of the Republic of the Philippines agrees
that it will not relinquish physical possession or pass the title to any and all arms,
munitions, equipment, supplies, naval vessels and aircraft furnished under this
Agreement without the specific consent of the Government of the United States.
ARTICLE 20. - Military equipment, supplies and naval vessels necessary in
connection with the carrying out of the full program of military assistance to the
Republic of the Philippines shall be provided from United States and Philippines
sources in so far as practicable and the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines shall procure arms, ammunition, military equipment and naval vessels
from governments or agencies other than the United States of America only on the
basis of mutual agreement between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. The government
of the republic of the Philippines shall procure United States military equipment,
supplies and naval vessels only as mutually agreed upon.
TITLE V
TRAINING ASSISTANCE
ARTICLE 21. - As part of the program of military assistance the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines shall be permitted to send selected
students to designated technical and service schools of the ground, naval and air
services of the United States. Such students shall be subject to the same regulations
as are United States students and may be returned to the Philippines, without
substitution, for violation of such regulations. Numbers of students and detailed
arrangements shall be mutually agreed upon and shall be kept at a minimum for
essential requirements. All Philippine requests for military training of filipino




ARTICLE 22. - Disclosures and exchanges of classified military equipment
and information of any security classification to or between the Government of the
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United States of America and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines
will be with the mutual understanding that the equipment and information will be
safeguarded in accordance with the requirements of the military security
classification established thereon by the originating Government and that no
redisciosure by the recipient Government of such equipment and information to
third governments or unauthorized personnel will be made without specific
approval of the originating Government.
ARTICLE 23. - So long as this Agreement, or any extension thereof, is in
effect the Government of the Republic of the Philippines shall not engage or accept
the services of any personnel of any Government other than the United States of
America for duties of any nature connected with the Philippine armed forces,
except by mutual agreement between the government of the United States of
America and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines.
TITLE VII
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Undersigned, duly authorized thereto, have
signed this Agreement in duplicate, in the city of Manila, this twenty-first day of
March, 1947.
For the Government of the United States of America:
(Sgd.) PAUL V. MCNUTT
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
of the United States of America to the
Republic of the Philippines
For the Government of the Republic of the Philippines:
(Sgd.) MANUEL ROXAS
President of the Philippines
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Appendix Three
MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (Signed at
Washington, August 30, 1951. The Agreement entered into force, August 27,
1952.)
The Parties of this Treaty
Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the
United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all
governments, and desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific Area.
Recalling with mutual pride the historic relationship which brought their
two peoples together in a common bond of sympathy and mutual ideals to fight
side-by-side against imperialist aggression during the last war.
Desiring to declare publicly and formally their sense of unity and their
common determination to defend themselves against external armed attack, so that
no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that either of them stands alone
in the Pacific area.
Desiring further to strengthen their present efforts for collective defense for
the preservation of peace and security pending the development of a more
comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific area.
Agreeing that nothing in this present instrument shall be considered or
interpreted as in any way or sense altering or diminishing any existing agreements
or understandings between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of
America.
Have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE I. The parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United
Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by
peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice
are not endangered and to refrain in their international relation from the threat or
use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.
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ARTICLE II. In order more effectively to achieve the objective of this
Treaty, the Parties separately and jointly by self-help and mutual aid will maintain
and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.
ARTICLE III. The Parties, through their Foreign Ministers or their
deputies, will consult together from time to time regarding the implementation of
this Treaty and whenever in the opinion of either of them the territorial integrity,
political independence or security of either of the Parties is threatened by external
armed attack in the Pacific.
ARTICLE IV. Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific
area on either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and
declares that it would act to meet the common dangers in accordance with its
constitutional processes.
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be
immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations. Such measures
shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to
restore and maintain international peace and security.
ARTICLE V. For the purpose of Article IV, an armed attack on either of
the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of
either of the Parties, or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific
Ocean, its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific.
ARTICLE VI. This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as
affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of
the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance
of international peace and security.
ARTICLE VII. This Treaty shall be ratified by the Republic of the
Philippines and the United States of America in accordance with their respective
constitutional processes and will come into force when instruments of ratification
have been exchanged by them at Manila.
ARTICLE VIII. This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Either Party
may terminate it one year after notice has been given to the other party.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed
this Treaty.
DONE in duplicate at Washington this thirtieth day of August, 1951.
For the Republic of the Philippines:
(Sgd.) CARLOS P. ROMULO
(Sgd.) JOAQUIN M. ELIZALDE
(Sgd.) VICENTE J. FRANCISCO
(Sgd.) DIOSDADO MACAPAGAL
For the United States of America:
(Sgd.) DEAN ACHESON






AGREEMENT (WITH PROTOCOL AND EXCHANGE OF NOTES) REVISING
THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA CONCERNING TRADE AND RELATED
MATTERS DURING A TRANSITIONAL PERIOD FOLLOWING THE
INSTITUTION OF PHILIPPINE INDEPENDENCE (LAUREL-LANGLEY
AGREEMENT). (Signed at Washington, September 6, 1955).
The President of the Republic of the Philippines and the President of the
United States of America, mindful of the close economic ties between the people of
the Philippines and the people of the United States during many years of intimate
political relations, and desiring to enter into an agreement in keeping with their
long friendship, which will be mutually beneficial to the two peoples and will
strengthen the economy of the Philippines so as to enable the Republic to
contribute more effectively to the peace and prosperity of the free world, have
agreed to the following articles:
ARTICLE I
1. The ordinary customs duty to be collected on United States articles as
defined in Subparagraph (e) of Paragraph 1 of the Protocol, which during the
following portions of the period from January 1, 1956, to July 3, 1974, both dates
inclusive, are entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, in the Philippines for
consumption, shall be determined by applying the following percentages of the
Philippines duty as defined in subparagraph (h) of Paragraph 1 of the Protocol:
(a) During the period from January 1, 1956, to December 31, 1958,
both dates inclusive, twenty-five per centum.
(b) During the period from January 1, 1959, to December 31, 1961,
both dates inclusive, fifty per centum.
(c) During the period from January 1, 1962, to December 31, 1964,
both dates inclusive, seventy-five per centum.
(d) During the period from January 1, 1965, to December 31, 1973,
both dates inclusive, ninety per centum.
(e) During the period from January 1, 1974, to July 3, 1974, both
dates inclusive, one hundred per centurn.
2. The ordinary customs duty to be collected on Philippine articles as
defined in Subparagraph (0 of Paragraph 1 of the Protocol, other than those
specified in the Schedule to Paragraph 2 of Article II, which during such portions
of such period are entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, in the United States for
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consumption, shall be determined by applying the following percentages of the
United States duty as defined in Subparagraph (g) of Paragraph 1 of the Protocol:
(a) During the period from January 1, 1956, to December 31, 1958,
both dates inclusive, five per centurn.
(b) During the period from January 1, 1958, to December 31, 1961,
both dates inclusive, ten per centum.
(c) During the period from January 1, 1962, to December 31, 1964,
both dates inclusive, twenty per centum.
(d) During the period from January 1, 1965, to December 31, 1967,
both dates inclusive, forty per centurn.
(e) During the period from January 1, 1968, to December 31, 1970,
both dates inclusive, sixty per centum.
(f) During the period from January 1, 1971, to December 31, 1973,
both dates inclusive, eighty per centum.
(g) During the period from January 1, 1974, to July 3, 1974, both
dates inclusive, one hundred per centum.
3. Customs duties on United States articles imported into the Philippines,
other than ordinary customs duties, shall be determined without regard to the
provisions of Paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article, but shall be subject to the
provisions of Paragraph 4 of this Article.
4. With respect to United States articles imported into the Philippines, and
with respect to Philippine articles imported into the United States, no duty on or in
connection with importation shall be collected or paid in an amount in excess of
the duty imposed with respect to like articles which are the product of any other
foreign country, or collected or paid in an amount in excess of the duty imposed
with respect to like articles which are the product of any other foreign country, or
collected or paid in any amount if the duty is not imposed with respect to such like
articles. As used in this Paragraph, the term “duty” includes taxes, fees, charges,
or exactions, imposed on or in connection with importation, but does not include
internal taxes or ordinary customs duties.
5. With respect to products of the United States which do not come within
the definition of United States articles, imported into the Philippines, no duty on or
in connection with importation shall be collected or paid in an amount in excess of
the duty imposed with respect to like articles which are the product of any other
foreign country, or collected or paid in any amount if the duty is not imposed with
respect to such like articles which are the product of any other foreign country
As used in this Paragraph the term “duty” includes taxes, fees, charges, or
exactions, imposed on or in connection with importation, but does not include
internal taxes.
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6. With respect to products of the Philippines, which do not come within
the definition of Philippine articles, imposed into the United States, no duty on or
in connection with importation shall be collected or paid in an amount in excess of
the duty imposed with respect to like articles which are the product of any other
foreign country (except Cuba), or collected or paid in any amount if the duty is not
imposed with respect to such like articles which are the product of any other
foreign country (except Cuba). As used in this Paragraph the term ~duty” includes
taxes, fees, charges, or exactions, imposed on or in connection with importation,
but does not include internal taxes.
7. Notwithstanding the provisions of Paragraph 1 of this Article, the
Philippines shall impose a temporary special import tax, in lieu of the present tax
on the sale of foreign exchange, on any article of product imported or brought into
the Philippines, irrespective of source; provided that such special levy is applied in
a non-discriminatory manner pursuant to Paragraphs 4 and 5 of this Article, that
the initial tax is at a rate no higher than the present rate of the foreign exchange
tax, and that the tax shall be progressively reduced at a rate no less rapid than that
specified in the following Schedule. If, as a result of applying this Schedule the
total revenue from Philippine customs duties and from the special import tax on
goods coming from the United States is less in any calendar year than the proceeds
from the exchange tax on such goods during the calendar year 1955, no reduction
need be made in the special import tax for the next succeeding calendar year, and,
if necessary to restore revenues collected on the importation of United States goods
to the level of the exchange tax on such goods in calendar year 1955, the
Philippines may increase the rate for such succeeding calendar year to any previous
level provided for in this Schedule which is considered to be necessary to restore
such revenues to the amount collected from the exchange tax on United States
goods in calendar year 1955. Rates for the special import levy in subsequent years
shall be fixed in accordance with the schedules specified in this Article except as
the Philippine Government may determine that higher rates are necessary to
maintain the above-mentioned level of revenues from the importation of United
States goods. In this event, such rate shall be determined by the Philippine
Government, after consultation with the united States Government, at a level of the
Schedule calculated to cover any anticipated deficiency arising from the operation
of this provision.
SCHEDULE FOR REDUCING SPECIAL IMPORT TAX
(a) After December 31, 1956, ninety per centum.
(b) After December 31, 1957, eighty per centum.
(c) After December 31, 1958, seventy per centum.
(d) After December 31, 1959, sixty per centurn.
(e) After December 31, 1960, fifty per centum.
(f) After December 31, 1961, forty per centum.
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(g) After December 31, 1962, thirty per centum.
(h) After December 31, 1963, twenty per centum.
(i) After December 31, 1964, ten per centum.
(j) On and after January 1, 1966, nil.
ARTICLE II
1. During the period from January 1, 1956, to December 31, 1973, both
dates inclusive, the total amount of the articles falling within one of the classes
specified in Items A and A-i of the Schedule to this Paragraph, which are
Philippine articles as defined in Subparagraph (t) of Paragraph 1 of the Protocol,
and which, in any calendar year, may be entered, or withdrawn from warehouse,
in the United States for consumption, shall not exceed the amounts specified in
such Schedule as to each class of articles. During the period from January 1, 1956,
to December 31, 1973, both dates inclusive, the total amount of the articles falling
within the class specified in Item B of the Schedule to this Paragraph which are the
product of the Philippines, and which, in any calendar year, may be entered, or
withdrawn from warehouse, in the United States for consumption, shall not exceed
the amount specified in such Schedule as to such class of articles. During the
period from January 1, 1974, to July 3, 1974, both dates inclusive, the total
amounts referred to in the preceding sentences of this Paragraph shall not exceed
one-half of the amount specified in such Schedule with respect to each class of
articles, respectively. The establishment herein of the limitations on the amounts of
Philippine raw and refined sugar that may be entered, or withdrawn from
warehouse, in the United States for consumption, shall be without prejudice to any
increases which the Congress of the United States might allocate to the Philippines
in the future. The following Schedule to Paragraph 1 shall constitute an integral
part thereof:
SCHEDULE OF ABSOLUTE QUOTAS
Items Classes of Articles Amounts
A Sugars 952,000 short tons
A-i of which not to exceed 56,000 short tons
may be refined sugars,
meaning “direct-consumption
sugar” as defined in Section
101 of the Sugar Act of 1948,
as amended, of the United
States which is set forth in
part as Annex 1 to this
Agreement.
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B Cordage, including yarns,
twines (including binding
twine described in Paragraph
1622 of the Tariff Act of 1930
of the United States, as
amended, which is set forth as
Annex II to this Agreement),
cords, cordage, rope, and
cable, tarred or untarred,
wholly or in chief value of
manila (Abaca) or hard
fiber 6,000,000 lbs.
2. Philippine articles as defined in Subparagraph (f) of Paragraph 1 of the
Protocol falling within one of the classes specified in the items included in the
Schedule to the Paragraph, which, during the following portions of the period from
January 1, 1956, to December 31, 1973, both dates inclusive, are entered, or
withdrawn from warehouse, in the United States for consumption, shall be free of
ordinary customs duty, in quantities determined by applying the following
percentages to the amounts specified in such Schedule as to each such class of
articles:
(a) During each of the calendar years 1956 to 1958, inclusive, ninety-five
per centum.
(b) During each of the calendar years 1959 to 1961, inclusive, ninety per
centum.
(c) During each of the calendar years 1962 to 1964, inclusive, eighty per
centum.
(d) During each of the calendar years 1965 to 1967, inclusive, sixty per
centum.
(e) During each of the calendar years 1968 to 1970, inclusive, forty per
centum.
(0 During each of the calendar years 1971 to 1973, inclusive, twenty per
centum.
(g) On and after January 1, 1974, nil.
The following Schedule to Paragraph 2, shall constitute an integral part thereof:
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Cigars (exclusive of cigarettes,
cheroots of all kinds, and paper
cigars and cigarettes, including
wrappers) 200,000,000 cigars
B Scrap tobacco and stemmed and
unstemmed filler tobacco
described in Paragraph 602 of
the Tariff Act of the United
States, as amended, which is set
forth as Annex III to this
Agreement 6,500,000
C Coconut oil 200,000 long tons
D Buttons of pearl or shell 850,000 gross
The quantities shown in the Schedule to this Paragraph represent base quantities for
the purposes of computing the tariff-free quota and are not absolute quotas. Any
such Philippine article so entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, in excess of the
tariff-free quota provided in this Paragraph shall be subject to one hundred per
centum of the United States duty as defined in Subparagraph (g) of paragraph 1 of
the Protocol.
ARTICLE III
1. Except as otherwise provided in Article II or in Paragraph 2 of this
Article, neither country shall impose restrictions or prohibitions on the importation
of any article of the other country, or on the exportation of any article to the
territories of the other country, unless the importation of the like article of, or the
exportation of the like article to, all third countries is similarly restricted or
prohibited. If their country imposes quantitative restrictions on the importation or
exportation of any article in which the other country has an important interest and
if it makes allotments to any third country, it shall afford such other country a
share proportions to the amount of the article, by quantity or value, supplied by or
to it during a previous representative period, due consideration being given to any
special factors affecting the trade in such article.
2. (a) Not withstanding the provisions of Paragraph 1 of this Article, with
respect to quotas on United States Articles as defined in Subparagraph (e) of
Paragraph 1 of the Protocol (other than the articles for which quotas are
provided in Paragraph 1 of Article II) a quota may be established only if-
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(1) The President of the country desiring to impose the quota, after
investigation, finds and proclaims that, as the result of a preferential
treatment accorded pursuant to this Agreement, any article of the
other country is being imported in such increased quantities and
under such conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury to
domestic procedure of like or directly competitive articles; or
(2) The President of the country desiring to impose the quota finds
that such action is necessary to forestall the imminent threat of, or to
stop, a serious decline in its monetary reserves, or, in the event its
monetary reserves are very low, to achieve a reasonable rate of
increase in its reserves.
(b) Any quota imposed for any twelve-month period under (a): (1) above
for the purpose of protecting domestic industry shall not be less than the
amount determined by the President of the importing country as the total
amount of the articles of such class which, during the twelve months
preceding entry into effect of the quota, was entered, or withdrawn from
warehouse, for consumption, after deduction of the amount by which he
finds domestic production can be increased during the twelve-month period
of the quota, or if the quota is established for any other period other than a
twelve-month period, it shall not be less than a proportionate amount.
(c) Each Party agrees not only to apply restrictions so as to prevent
unreasonably the importation of any description of goods in minimum
commercial quantities, the exclusion of which would seriously impair
regular channels of trade, or restrictions which would prevent the
importation of commercial samples, or prevent compliance with patent,
trademark, copyright or similar procedures.
(d) Any quota established pursuant to this Paragraph shall not continue in
effect longer than necessary to achieve the purposes for its imposition, at
which time the President of the country imposing the quota, following
investigation, shall find and proclaim that the conditions which gave rise to
the establishment of the quota no longer exist.
3. Either country taking action pursuant to the provisions of this Article
shall give notice to the other country as far in advance as may be practicable, and
shall afford it an opportunity to consult in respect of the proposed action. It is
understood that this right of consultation does not imply that the consent of the
other country to the establishment of the quota is needed in order for the quota to
be put into effect.
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ARTICLE IV
1. With respect to articles which are products of the United States coming
into the Philippines, or with respect to articles manufactured in the Philippines
wholly or in part from such articles, no internal tax shall be-
(a) Collected or paid in an amount in excess of the internal tax imposed
with respect to like articles which are the product of the Philippines, or
collected or paid in any amount if the internal tax is not imposed with
respect to such like articles;
(b) Collected or paid in an amount in excess of the internal tax imposed
with respect to like articles which are the product of any other foreign
country, or collected or paid in any amount if the internal tax is not
imposed with respect to such like articles.
Where an internal tax is imposed with respect to an article which is the product of
a foreign country to compensate for an internal tax imposed (1) with respect to a
like article which is the product of the Philippines, or (2) with respect to materials
used in the production of a like article which is the product of the Philippines, if
the amount of the internal tax which is collected and paid with respect to the article
which is the product of the United States is not in excess of that permitted by
Paragraph 1 (b) of Article IV such collection and payment shall not be regarded as
in violation of first sentence of this Paragraph.
2. With respect to articles which are products of the Philippines coming into
the United States, or with respect to articles manufactured in the United States
wholly or in part from such articles, no internal tax shall be-
(a) Collected or paid in an amount in excess of the internal tax imposed
with respect to like articles which are the product of any other foreign
country, or collected or paid amount if the internal tax is not imposed with
respect to such like articles;
(b) Collected or paid in an amount in excess of the international tax
imposed with respect to like articles which are the product of any other
foreign country, or collected or paid in any amount if the internal tax is not
imposed with respect to such like articles.
Where an internal tax is imposed with respect to an article which is the product of
a foreign country to compensate for an internal tax imposed (1) with respect to a
like article which is the product of the United States, or (2) with respect to
materials used in the production of a like article which is the product of the United
States, if the amount of the internal tax which is collected and paid with respect to
259
the article which is the product of the Philippines is not in excess of that permitted
by Paragraph (b) of Article IV such collection and payment shall not be regarded
as in violation of first sentence of this Paragraph. This Paragraph shall not apply to
the taxes imposed under Sections 4591, 4812, or 4831 of the Internal Revenue
code of the united States which are set forth in part as Annexes IV, V, and VI of
this Agreement.
3. No processing tax or other internal tax shall be imposed or collected in
the United States or in the Philippines with respect to articles coming into such
country for the official use of the Government of the Philippines or of the United
States, respectively, or any department or agency thereof.
4. No processing tax or other internal tax shall be imposed or collected in
the United States with respect to Manila (abaca) fiber not dressed or manufactured
in any manner.
5. The United States will not reduce the preference of two cents per pound
provided in Section 4513 of the Internal Revenue Code of the United States
(relating to processing taxes on coconut oil, etc.) which is set forth as Annex VII
to this Agreement, with respect to articles “wholly the production of the Philippine
Islands” or articles “produced wholly from materials the growth or production of
the Philippine Islands”; except that it may suspend the provisions of Section 4511
(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of the United States, after consultation with the
President of the Philippines, if it finds that adequate supplies of neither copra nor
coconut oil, the product of the Philippines, are readily available for processing in
the United States.
ARTICLE V
The Republic of the Philippines will take the necessary legislative and
executive actions, prior to or at the time of the entry into force of the revisions of
this Agreement authorized by the congress of the Philippines and the Congress of
the United States in 1955, to enact and implement legislation similar to that already
enacted by the Congress of the United States as Public Law 419, 83rd Congress,
Chapter 323, 2nd Session, to facilitate the entry of Philippine traders.
ARTICLE VI
1. The disposition, exploitation, development, and utilization of all
agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals,
coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces and sources of potential energy,
and other natural resources of either Party, and the operation of public utilities,
shall, if open to any person, be open to citizens of the other Party and to all forms
of business enterprise owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by citizens of
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such other Party in the same manner as to and under the same conditions imposed
upon citizens or corporations or associations owned or controlled by citizens of the
Party granting the right.
2. The rights provided for in Paragraph 1 may be exercised, in the case of
citizens of the Philippines with respect to natural resources in the United States
which are subject to Federal control or regulations, only through the medium of a
corporation organized under the laws of the United States or one of the States
thereof and likewise, in the case of citizens of the United States with respect to
natural resources in the public domain in the Philippines, only through the medium
of a corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines and at least 60 per
cent of the capital stock of which is owned or controlled by citizens of the United
States. This provisions, however, does not affect the right of citizens of the United
States to acquire or own private agricultural lands in the Philippines or citizens of
the Philippines to acquire or own land in the United States which is subject to the
jurisdiction of the United states and not within the jurisdiction of any State and
which is not within the public domain. The Philippines reserves the right to dispose
of its public lands in small quantities on especially favorable terms exclusively to
actual settlers or other users who are its own citizens. The United States reserves
the right to dispose of its public lands in small quantities on especially favorable
terms to actual settlers or other users who are its own citizens or aliens who have
declared their intention to become citizens. Each Party reserves the right to limit
the extent to which aliens may engage in fishing or engage in enterprises which
furnish communications services and air or water transport. The United States also
reserves the right to limit the extent to which aliens may own land in its outlying
territories and possessions, but the Philippines will extend to American nationals
who are residents of any of those outlying territories and possessions only the same
rights with respect to ownership of lands, which are granted therein to citizens of
the Philippines. The rights provided for in this Paragraph shall not, however, be
exercised by either Party so as to derogate from the rights previously acquired by
citizens or corporations or associations owned or controlled by citizens of the other
Party.
3. The United States of America reserves the rights of the several States of
the United States to limit the extent to which citizens or corporations or
associations owned or controlled by citizens of the Philippines may engage in the
activities specified in this Article. The Republic of the Philippines reserves the
power to deny any of the rights specified in this Article to citizens of the United
States who are citizens of States, or to corporations or associations at least 60 per
cent of whose capital stock or capital is owned or controlled by citizens of States,
which deny like rights to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or
associations which are owned and controlled by citizens of the Philippines. The
exercise of this reservation on the part of the Philippines shall not affect previously
acquired rights, provided that in the event that any State of the United States of
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America should in the future impose restrictions which would deny to citizens or
corporations or associations owned or controlled by citizens of the Philippines the
right to continue to engage in activities in which they were engaged therein at the
time of the imposition of such restrictions, the Republic of the Philippines shall be
free to apply like limitations to the citizens or corporations or associations owned
or controlled by citizens of such States.
ARTICLE VII
1. The Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America each
agrees not to discriminate in any manner, with respect to their engaging in business
activities, against the citizens or any form of business enterprise owned or
controlled by citizens of the other and that new limitations imposed by their Party
upon the extent to which aliens are accorded national treatment with respect to
carrying out business activities within its territories, shall not be applied as against
enterprises owned or controlled by citizens of the other Party which are engaged in
such activities therein at the time such new limitations are adopted, nor shall such
new limitations be applied to American citizens or corporations or associations
owned or controlled by American citizens whose State do not impose like
limitations on citizens or corporations or associations owned or controlled by
citizens of the Republic of the Philippines.
2. The United States of America reserves the rights of the several States of
the United States to limit the extent to which citizens or corporations or
associations owned or controlled by citizens of the Philippines may engage in any
business activities. The Republic of the Philippines reserves the power to deny any
rights to engage in business activities to citizens of the United States who are
citizens of States or to corporations or associations at least 60 per cent of the
capital stock or capital of which is owned or controlled by citizens of such States,
which deny like rights to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or
associations owned and controlled by citizens of the Philippines. The exercise of
this reservation on the part of the Philippines shall not affect previously acquired
rights, provided that in the event that any State of the United States of America
should in the future impose restrictions which would deny to citizens or
corporations or associations owned or controlled by citizens of the Philippines the
right to continue to engage in business activities in which they were engaged
therein at the time of the imposition of such restrictions, the Republic of the
Philippines shall be free to apply like limitations to the citizens or corporations or
associations owned or controlled by citizens of such States.
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ARTICLE VIII
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed:
(a) to require either Party to furnish any information the disclosure of which
it considers contrary to its essential security interests; or
(b) to prevent either Party from taking any action which it considers
necessary for the protection of its essential security interests --
(1) relating to fissionable materials or the materials from which they
are derived;
(2) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition, and implements of
war and to such traffic in other goods and materials as is carried on
directly or indirectly for the purpose of supplying a military
establishment;
(3) taken in time of war or other emergency in international
relations: or
(c) to prevent either Party from taking any action in pursuance of its
obligations under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of
international peace and security.
ARTICLE IX
1. Upon the taking effect of this Agreement, and upon the taking effect of
the revisions thereof authorized by the Congress of the Philippines and the
Congress of the United States in 1955, the provisions placing obligations on the
United States: (a) if in effect, shall continue in effect as laws of the United States
during the effectiveness of the Agreement; or (b) if nor so in effect, shall take
effect and continue in effect as laws of the United States during the effectiveness of
the Agreement. The Philippines will continue in effect as laws of the Philippines,
during the effectiveness of this Agreement, the provisions thereof placing
obligations on the Philippines.
2. The Philippines and the United States will promptly enact, and shall keep
in effect during the effectiveness of this Agreement, such legislation as may be
necessary to supplement the laws of the Philippines and the United States,
respectively, referred to in Paragraph 1 of this Article, and to implement the
provisions of such laws and provisions of this Agreement placing obligations on the
Philippines and the United States, respectively.
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ARTICLE X
The Philippines and the United States agree to consult with each other with respect
to any questions as to the interpretation or the application of this Agreement,
concerning which either Government may make representations to the other. Not
later than July, 1971, the Philippines and the United States agree to consult with
each other as to joint problems which may arise as a result or in anticipation of the
termination of this Agreement.
ARTICLE XI
1. This Agreement shall have no effect after July 3, 1974. It may be
terminated by either the Philippines or the United States at any time, upon not less
than five years’ written notice. If the President of the Philippines or the President
of the United States determines and proclaims that the other country has adopted or
applied measures or practices which would operate to nullify or impair any right or
obligation provided for in this Agreement, then the Agreement may be terminated
upon not less than six months written notice.
2. The revisions of this Agreement authorized by the congress of the
Philippines and the congress of the United States in 1955 shall enter into force on
January 1, 1956.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed this
Agreement and have affixed hereunto their seals.
DONE in duplicate in the English language at Washington this sixth day of
September, one thousand nine hundred and fifty-five.
For the President of the Republic of the Philippines
(Sgd.) CARLOS P. ROMULO
Special and Personal Envoy
Of the President of the Philippines
For the President of the United States of America
(Sgd.) JAMES M. LANGLEY
Special Representative of the
President of the United States of America
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PROTOCOL
The undersigned duly empowered Plenipotentiaries have agreed to the following
Protocol to the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the United
States of America concerning trade and related matters during a transitional period
following the institution of Philippine Independence, signed at Manila on July 4,
1946, as revised, which shall constitute an integral part of the Agreement:
1. For the purpose of the Agreement--
(a) The term “person” includes partnerships, corporations, and
associations.
(b) The term “United States” means the United States of America
and, when used in a geographical sense, means the States, the
District of Columbia, the Territories of Alaska and Hawaii and
Puerto Rico.
(c) The term “Philippines” means the republic of the Philippines
and, when used in a geographical sense, means the territories of the
Republic of the Philippines, whether a particular act in question took
place, or a particular situation in question existed, within such
territories before or after the institution of the Republic of the
Philippines. As used herein the territories of the Republic of the
Philippines comprise all of the territories specified in Section 1 of
Article I of the Constitution of the Philippines which is set forth as
Annex X to this Agreement.
(d) The term “ordinary customs duty” means a customs duty based
on the article as such (whether or not such duty is also based in any
manner on the use, value, or method of production of the article, or
on the amount of like articles imported, or on any other factor); but
does not include -
(1) A customs duty based on an act or omission of any
person with respect to the importation of article, or of the
country from which it comes; or
(2) A countervailing duty imposed to offset a subsidy,
bounty, or grant; or
(3) An anti-dumping duty imposed to offset the selling of
merchandise for exportation at a price less than the prevailing
price in the country of export; or
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(4) Any tax, fee, charge, or exaction, imposed on or in
connection with importation unless the law of country
imposing it designates or imposes it as a customs duty or
contains a provision to the effect that it shall be treated as a
duty imposed under the customs laws; or
(5) The tax imposed by Section 4581 of the Internal Revenue
code of the United States, which is set forth as Annex VIII to
this Agreement, with respect to an article, merchandise, or
combination, ten per centum or more of the quantity by
weight of which consists of, or is derived directly or
indirectly from, one or more of the oils, fatty acids, or salts
specified in Section 4511 of such Code which is set forth as
Annex VII of this Agreement; or the tax imposed by Section
4510 (b) of such Code, which is set forth as Annex IX to this
Agreement.
(e) The term “United States article” means an article which is the
product of the United States unless, in the case of an article
produced with the use of any foreign country (except the Philippines)
the aggregate value of such imported materials at the time of
importation into the United States was more than twenty per centum
of the value of the article imported into the Philippines, the value of
such article to be determined in accordance with, and as of the time
provided by, the customs laws of the Philippines in effect at the time
of importation of such article. As used in this Subparagraph the term
“value,” when used in reference to a material imported into the
United States includes the value of the material ascertained under the
customs laws of the United States in effect at the time of importation
into the United States, and, if not included in such value, the cost of
bringing the material to the United States, but does not include the
cost of landing it at the port of importation, or customs duties
collected in the United States. For the purposes of this
Subparagraph, any imported material, used in the production of an
article in the united States, shall be considered having been used in
the production of an article subsequently produced in the United
States, which is the product of a chain of production in the United
States in the course of which an article, which is the product of one
stage of the chain, is used by its producer or another person, in a
subsequent stage of the chain, as a material in the production of
another article. It is understood that “United States articles” do not
lose their status as such, for the purpose of Philippine tariff
preferences, by reason of being imported into the Philippines from a
country other than the United States or from an insular possession of
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the United States or by way of or via such a country or insular
possession.
(f) The term “Philippine article” means an article which is the
product of the Philippines, unless, in the case of an article produced
with the use of materials imported into the Philippines from any
foreign country (except the United States) the aggregate value of
such imported materials at the time of importation into the
Philippines was more than twenty per centum of the value of the
article imported into the United States, the value of such article to be
determined in accordance with, and as of the time provided by, the
customs laws of the United States in effect at the time of importation
of such article. As used in this Subparagraph the term “value,” when
used in reference to a material imported into the Philippines,
includes the value of the material ascertained under the customs laws
of the Philippines, in effect at the time of importation into the
Philippines, and, if not included in such value, the cost of bringing
the material into the Philippines, but does not include the cost of
landing it at the port of importation, or customs duties collected in
the Philippines. For the purposes of this Subparagraph, any imported
material, used in the production of an article in the Philippines, shall
be considered as having been used in the production of an article
subsequently produced in the Philippines, which is the product of a
chain of production in the Philippines in the course of which an
article, which is the product of one stage of chain, is used by its
producer or another person, in a subsequent stage of the chain, as a
material in the production of another article. It is understood that
“Philippine articles” do not lose their status as such, for the purpose
of United States tariff preferences, by reason of being imported into
the United States from a country other than the Philippines or from
an insular possession of the United States or by way of or via such a
country or insular possession.
(g) The term “United States” means the rate or rates of ordinary
customs duty which (at the time and place of entry, or withdrawal
from warehouse, in the United States for consumption, of the
Philippines article) would be applicable to a like article if imported
from that foreign country which is entitled to the lowest rate, or the
lowest aggregate of rates, of ordinary customs duty with respect to
such like article.
(h) The term “Philippine duty” means the rate or rates of ordinary
customs duty which (at the time and place of entry, or withdrawal
from warehouse, in the Philippines for consumption, of the United
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States article) would be applicable to a like article if imported from
that foreign country which is entitled to the lowest rate, or the
lowest aggregate of rates, of ordinary customs duty with respect to
such like article.
(i) The term “internal tax” includes an internal fee, charge, or
exaction, and includes -
(1) The tax imposed by Section 4581 of the Internal Revenue
code of the United States, which is set forth as Annex VIII to
this Agreement, with respect to an article, merchandise, or
combination, ten per centum or more of the quantity by
weight of which consists of, or is derived directly or
indirectly from one or more of the oils, fatty acids, or salts
specified in Section 4511 of such Code which is set forth as
Annex VII of this Agreement; and the tax imposed by Section
4501 (b) of such Code, which is set forth as Annex IX to this
Agreement; and
(2) Any other tax, fee, charge, or exaction, imposed on or in
connection with importation unless the law of country
imposing it designates or imposes it as a customs duty or
contains a provision to the effect that it shall be treated as a
duty imposed under the customs laws.
2. For the purposes of Subparagraphs (g) and (h) of paragraph 1 of this
Protocol -
(a) If an article is entitled to be imported from a foreign country free
of ordinary customs duty, that country shall be considered as the
country entitled to the lowest rate of ordinary customs duty with
respect to such articles; and
(b) A reduction in ordinary customs duty granted any country, by
law, treaty, trade agreement, or otherwise, with respect to any
article, shall be converted into the equivalent reduction in the rate of
ordinary customs duty otherwise applicable to such article.
3. For the purposes of Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article IV, any material, used
in the production of an article, shall be considered as having been used in the
production of an article subsequently produced, which is the product of a chain of
production in the course of which an article, which is the product of one stage in
the chain, is used by its producer or another person, in a subsequent stage of the
chain, as a material in the production of another article.
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4. The term “includes” and “including” when used in a definition contained
in this Agreement shall not be deemed to exclude other things otherwise within the
meaning of the term defined.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed this
Protocol and have affixed hereunto their seals.
Done in duplicate in the English language at Washington this sixth day of
September, one thousand nine hundred and fifty five.
For the President of the Republic of the Philippines
(Sgd.) CARLOS P. ROMULO
Special and Personal Envoy
Of the President of the Philippines
For the President of the United States of America
(Sgd.) JAMES M. LANGLEY
Special Representative of the
President of the United States of America
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